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This thesis investigates recorded music in everyday life and its relationship to memory. It 
does this by establishing the social and historical context in which sound recording was 
invented and developed, and by formulating a theory of how recorded music signifies. It 
argues that musical recordings do not simply facilitate remembering but are equally 
bound up with processes of forgetting.  
    Each chapter of the thesis examines a different aspect of the relationship between 
recorded music and memory. Chapter one analyses the origins of sound recording and 
charts its subsequent development in terms of a continuum between social and solitary 
listening. Chapter two interrogates common assumptions about what is meant by the   
‘everyday’, and argues that music in everyday life tends to be consumed and remembered 
in fragmentary form. Chapter three investigates the significance of, and reasons for, 
involuntary musical memories. Chapter four analyses the relationship between recorded 
music and nostalgia. Chapter five examines recorded music’s role in pleasurable forms of 
forgetting or self-oblivion. Chapter six is a summation of the whole thesis, arguing that 
recorded music in everyday life contains utopian traces which, when reflected upon, yield 
insights into the nature of social reality. 
    The thesis also contains two ‘interludes’ that deal with pertinent theoretical issues in 
the field of cultural studies. The first of these interludes argues that Peircean semiotics is 
better suited to the task of analysing music than Saussurean semiology and that, 
furthermore, it is able to contribute to the emerging field of affect theory. The second 
interlude continues this analysis by arguing that mimesis or creative imitation should 
become a key concept in cultural studies.















This project is about recorded music in everyday life and its relationship to memory, the 
general thesis being that recording gives rise to new kinds of musical memories but also 
new forms of forgetting. At the heart of the project is a concern with changing the way 
we listen to music – and the way we think about listening to music – in order to re-
invigorate social space. To this end, I introduce the notion of the ‘everyday reverie’: a 
moment of vivid reminiscence, heightened affect, or expanded potential triggered by the 
chance audition of recorded music in everyday life. 
    Recorded music has a claim to being the medium that has had the biggest impact on 
everyday life. More than cinema, newspapers, television or the Internet, recorded sounds 
have penetrated almost all everyday spaces and accompany all manner of everyday 
activity, whether we are at home or at work, in the bathroom or on the beach, in the 
supermarket or in our cars. In its early years as a fairground gimmick, the phonograph 
helped prepare people for the ‘magic’ of media to come – ‘talkies’ at the cinema, 
television at home, and the transistor radio anywhere it could be taken. In spite of this, 
there was, until recently, a sense that the record industry had been ‘routinely ignored’ in 
media studies in favour of visual culture (Frith 1996b: 457). The Internet’s role in 
facilitating digital downloads and file sharing has altered this situation somewhat, moving 
sound recording closer to the centre of discussions concerning the cultural and political 
significance of the ‘new media’ for example, yet it can still be argued that analysis of the 
record industry often stands in for analysis of recorded music. This, I would suggest, is 
connected to the fact that recorded music shares with everyday life a certain ‘invisibility’: 





both fall below the horizon of conscious awareness, rarely warranting further attention. In 
this respect, recorded music remains an element in what C.N. Seremetakis (1994) 
describes as ‘the material culture of the unconscious’ (12). This material unconscious 
belongs to the everyday, described by Seremetakis as ‘a zone of devaluation, 
forgetfulness, and inattention’ but also as a ‘site where new political identities can be 
fabricated by techniques of distraction’ (13). Recorded music and the everyday are united 
through ‘habitual’ or ‘procedural’ memory: a type of memory that is deeply sedimented 
in the body as a set of predispositions, and which we are often barely aware of as 
‘memory’. In spite of, or rather, because of this, recorded music and the everyday belong 
to sites where the senses and the memory of the senses get re-made, away from the glare 
of critical scrutiny and official agendas. In this regard, the role played by recorded music 
in everyday life is part of a project stemming from time immemorial through which the 
human senses are constituted. To quote Marx (1844/1974): ‘The forming of the five 
senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present’ (96). 
    As has often been noted, music and memory are intimate partners. Michael Chanan 
(2005), for instance, observes, ‘Music and memory interact at every possible level and in 
every possible way. […T]he experience of music […] is an unceasing shuttle back and 
forth between private moments and public settings, private and public associations and 
connotations’ (50, 54). The specific concern of my work is with recorded music and its 
effects on cultural memory – the way it makes possible new kinds of musical memories 
while, at the same time, giving rise to new forms of forgetting. Sound recording is one of 
a number of technologies – writing, printing, photography, computers, etc. – which have 
had more or less direct effects on the way we remember while, unsurprisingly, providing 
metaphors for how we remember, as when we talk about ‘photographic memory’ or  
something being ‘etched’ on our minds. John Young (2008) makes explicit the analogies 
between the ‘internal’ memory of our minds and the ‘external’ memory of phonography: 
‘The fact that the same snatches of recordings are reiterated in new contexts epitomises 
the creative, fluid and contextual nature of memory; the specific experiences are the 
same, but the context in which they are recalled, and therefore the perspectives offered on 
them, have altered’ (324). Memory traces, then, like familiar musical recordings, are ‘re-
made’ in the process of their being recalled (or ‘re-played’); they are rendered fluid and 





mobile, forming new connections with other memories. To understand more fully the 
connection between sound recording and memory, we must go beyond metaphorical 
parallels. It should be stated instead that phonographic devices are not mere adjuncts to 
memory, neither are they mere ‘artificial’ or ‘external’ forms of memory; rather they are 
examples of the kinds of tools, aids, or artefactual signs through which human conscious 
activity has always been formed, and are thus innate to a specifically human form of 
memory. To quote the Soviet psychologist, A.R. Luria (1973): ‘these […] historically 
formed devices are essential elements in the establishment of functional connections 
between individual parts of the brain [. …B]y their aid, areas of the brain which 
previously were independent become the components of a single functional system’ (31; 
original emphasis removed). Luria likens devices such as the phonograph to a knot which 
one ties in a handkerchief so as to remember something important. Such devices, in turn, 
‘tie new knots in the activity of [our] brain[s]’ (ibid.; original emphasis removed). It is 
not the case, then, that sound recording is an external or ‘prosthetic’ memory; rather 
memory itself is ‘a prosthesis of the inside’ (Derrida 1996: 19; original emphasis 
removed). 
    This project comes on the back of a wave of critical interest in memory as well as a 
resurgence of memorialisation. It is, in a sense, part of a ‘memory boom’ yet one which, 
paradoxically, stems from a deep-seated anxiety that memories are in short supply – at 
least those of a ‘real’, ‘genuine’ or politically-progressive description. The emergence of 
memory studies as a field of research in recent decades is thus predicated to some degree 
on the alleged existence of a ‘memory crisis’. Diagnoses of a crisis in memory are, of 
course, hardly new. At the dawning of the Western intellectual tradition, Socrates 
famously fretted that the introduction of writing would lead to a weakening of people’s 
memories as they would come to rely on ‘external’ props. Closer to our own time, the 
tumult of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in the nineteenth century produced a 
tangible sense that links to the past had been irretrievably broken. This was greatly 
exacerbated by the advent of modern warfare, which left shell-shocked survivors ‘poorer 
in communicable experience’ (Benjamin 1936/2002: 144). What is different about our 
own ‘crisis’, such as it is, is that it is founded less on the dislocation and disruption of 
tradition than it is on ‘the experiences of immediacy, instantaneity and simultaneity’ 





(Radstone 2000: 7). Rather than there being an unbridgeable gap between past and 
present, they have seemingly collapsed into one another as part of a fully-mediatised 
reality in which significant events can be (re-)presented to us almost as they happen, and 
can be spliced alongside archive materials reproduced with an almost equal sense of 
immediacy. The contemporary memory boom can be understood then as an attempt to 
recover a more reflective mode of existence as a response to this collapsing of the 
boundaries between past and present. In the words of Andreas Huyssen (1995): ‘Memory 
[…] represents the attempt to slow down information processing, to resist the dissolution 
of time in the synchronicity of the archive, to recover a mode of contemplation outside 
the universe of simulation and fast-speed information and cable networks’ (7). Huyssen 
suggests that contemporary interest in memory is also part of a widespread loss of faith in 
progress, dating from about the 1960s onwards. On this account, a momentous shift in 
temporal orientation has occurred from attention being focussed on the future to it now 
being focussed on the past (92). For Huyssen, this means that nostalgia is no longer the 
opposite of utopia – if it ever was – ‘but, as a form of memory, [is] always implicated, 
even productive in it’ (88). Indeed, he suggests that remembering itself has assumed a 
utopian demeanour: ‘In an age of an unlimited proliferation of images, discourses, 
simulacra, the search for the real itself has become utopian, and this search is 
fundamentally invested in a desire for temporality’ (101). 
    As suggested by my former comments regarding the necessity of historically-formed 
signs and devices in the development of a distinctively human memory, there is a danger 
of romanticising ‘memory’ as the personal, direct, unmediated counterpart to ‘history’. 
As Raphael Samuel (1994) points out, our current notions of memory owe more to the 
Romantic movement in poetry and painting than they do to the mnemotechnics or ars 
memorativa of antiquity and the Renaissance (vii). A decisive shift in our contemporary 
ways of thinking about the relationship between history and memory has seen history 
increasingly viewed as an emergent property of memory rather than as something 
radically counterposed to it. Paul Ricoeur (2004), for example, argues that memory is the 
‘matrix’ of history (386). In the early modern period, by contrast, memory was viewed as 
inviolably private and individual and thus at odds with the public sphere. Radstone and 
Hodgkin (2003) note an ambivalence in attitudes towards this relevantly recent 





privileging of memory: on the one hand, it might be greeted as evidence of the 
democratisation of history, of history from the bottom up; on the other hand, it might 
represent the dissolution of the public sphere into a swirling flux of incommensurable 
privatised narratives (2-3). For better or worse, something of this ambivalence is to be 
found in my notion of the ‘everyday reverie’.  
    This project is also concerned with what might be called a phenomenology of the sign, 
whereby processes of signification are taken to be always already embedded in affective 
experience. Music has always operated on the plane of affect precisely because of its 
problematic relationship to referentiality – the way it signifies via connotation rather than 
denotation (Kassabian 2008). The challenge in my work is to conceptualise musical 
affect and musical signification in ways that are not mutually exclusive but which stress, 
instead, that they are two aspects of essentially the same experience.  
    As can be seen, this project has been undertaken at the intersection of several distinct 
fields of research: memory studies, everyday life studies, affect theory, semiotics, cultural 
history, musicology, etc. More generally, I am working within a critical-philosophical 
tradition whereby insights are gleaned from a range of sources, and then synthesised and 
gauged against personal experience in order to formulate new insights. My methodology 
is, in part, then, autoethnographic in that I frequently reflect implicitly or explicitly on my 
own experiences of recorded music. In this way, I often conduct what has been called 
‘micrological’ analysis – the analysis of concrete details, personal reminiscences, fleeting 
reveries, etc. – with the aim of tracing their more general historical and sociological 
lineaments (Wolff 1995: 29). This approach is intended to avoid reifying or naturalising 
‘memory’, ‘everyday life’, ‘recorded music’, etc. and thereby forestalling a more 
penetrating analysis of what they are and what they entail.  
    Each chapter of this thesis examines a different aspect of the relationship between 
recorded music and memory. In chapter one, ‘Music and memory in the age of 
recording’, I go back to the origins of phonography and, from there, give an account of 
how recording has enabled music to be heard in an almost limitless variety of contexts, 
each of which changes the overall meaning of what is being communicated. I also trace 
how recording has helped to make non-notational features more important in music. We 
recognise and respond to these features when we hear them but struggle to recall them 





later, in our ‘mind’s ear’ so to speak – hence recorded music’s ability to surprise us with 
its vividness of detail, even after many listenings. I argue that an oscillation between 
forgetting and recognition has become crucial to the experience of recorded music. 
    In chapter two, I argue that, in everyday life, recorded music tends to resolve into stray 
fragments: free-floating riffs, hooks and refrains devoid of a stable context. This is true 
also of the fleeting and contingent ways in which we remember snatches of musical 
material. The advertising jingle is explored as the paradigmatic example of such a 
fragment: a musical phrase written in order to be memorable, with the result that it often 
lives on in popular memory long after the product it advertised has disappeared from the 
market.   
    There then follows an ‘interlude’ entitled ‘Music, semiotics, affect’. The ‘affective 
turn’ in cultural studies has been predicated, to a large extent, on a rejection of the 
Saussurean-derived model of the textuality of culture, i.e. culture in all its forms as being 
analogous to language. I argue that this is to dismiss the contribution of C.S. Peirce, 
whose semiotics – unlike the semiology of Saussure – was already concerned with non-
linguistic signs. In this ‘interlude’, I use Peirce’s work in order to investigate the precise 
nature of musical signification, focusing on how his model is able to accommodate recent 
interest in affect without jettisoning the insights to be gained from the ‘linguistic turn’. 
    In chapter three, ‘Involuntary musical memories’, I investigate the reasons why we 
spontaneously hear snatches of melody ‘in our heads’. The term ‘involuntary memory’, 
appearing first in the work of Ebbinghaus and soon after in Proust, arises at a juncture in 
the history of modernity in which the nature of experience increasingly comes to be 
recognised as fleeting and contingent. It is also a point at which the problematic notion of 
the bounded individual – the repository of memories – is more rigorously formulated. 
The regulation of, and defence against, the stimuli of industrial and urban life also 
become a matter of concern. In this chapter, I explore different theories as to why 
involuntary musical memories occur, drawing on Peircean semiotics as well as the work 
of Freud and Benjamin.  
    Chapter four is entitled ‘Recorded music and nostalgia’. The meaning of ‘nostalgia’ 
changes during the period in which Western societies industrialise and their populations 
become chiefly urban. ‘Nostalgia’ ceases to mean ‘homesickness’, a longing for a 





particular place, and becomes, instead, a longing for a particular time. It loses its spatial 
meaning and gains a predominantly temporal one. Music answers to this change. An 
ineluctably temporal art form, the sovereign role of which is to create a sense of virtual 
time via patterns of repetition and periodicity, it is the perfect matrix for this new 
temporal form of nostalgia. With regard to recorded music, I examine the tendency for 
people to have a greater number of ‘self-defining’ memories in their late teens and early 
twenties. A concomitant effect of this tendency – sometimes known as the ‘reminiscence 
bump’ – is that music from this time in people’s lives is often valued more highly and is 
more ‘memorable’ than more recent recordings. Two mutually-supporting explanations 
can be cited for this: firstly, that such music indexes an era in one’s life of greater 
emotional intensity; secondly, that this music has had more time to accrue a wealth of 
personal and public associations. This nostalgic tendency dovetails neatly with the 
economic imperatives of the record industry in its releasing of compilations, reissues, etc. 
in order to recoup profits from their relatively small proportion of commercially 
successful artists. 
    There then follows another ‘interlude’, this time about music’s primordial connection 
with mimesis. The ancient doctrine of music as mimesis or ‘creative imitation’ still has 
much to teach us about the meaning of music, particularly its relation to embodied 
emotion. In this section, I explore the idea of music as a gestural ‘language’, iconically 
and functionally connected to the features of paralinguistic communication: facial 
expression, intonation, and physical gesture. 
    Chapter five is entitled ‘Recorded music, mimicry, and self-oblivion’. In the twentieth 
century, the piano was usurped by the gramophone as the fulcrum of domestic musical 
life. This development might seem, on the face of it, to be evidence of an increasing 
passivity in musical culture but this would be to discount the many active forms of 
listening that recording has facilitated such as singing along, miming as if one were 
playing an instrument, and dancing. Such mimetic actions are characterised by an 
element of self-oblivion in which the listener forgets his or her identity and momentarily 
assumes another. I liken this to the age-old practice of possession rituals, in which a 
devotee becomes possessed by his or her preferred deity, usually to the accompaniment 
of music. 





    The final chapter, ‘Everyday reveries’, is a summation of the whole thesis. ‘Reverie’ 
means not only ‘a dream-like state’ but also an instrumental passage of music. The 
word’s etymology can be traced back to the Old French, reverie, meaning ‘rejoicing’ and 
‘revelry’, itself derived from rever, ‘to be delirious’. A word that once had a 
carnivalesque meaning to do with the expression of outward, collective joy has come to 
be associated with an individual and interior psychological state. Nineteenth-century 
paintings on musical themes often portray this more inward, atomised meaning of reverie. 
Moving into the age of recording, music gives rise to a slightly different kind of reverie. 
Still inward and individual, it is, however, distinguished by much greater contingency, 
synchronicity, and serendipity. Recorded music frequently irrupts unexpectedly in the 
midst of everyday life, transforming for a moment or two its character. By reversing the 
polarity of the recorded music we come across in everyday life – by putting ‘background’ 
music in the ‘foreground’ – we invite moments of reverie that have a potentially 
transformative effect. Attentiveness to recorded music as we encounter it in our day-to-
day environment parallels attentiveness to those with whom we share social space. It is 
also a way of inviting a contemplative mode of existence into the midst of everyday life – 
a way of allowing both personal reminiscences and a sense of solidarity to be evoked by 
the literal and metaphorical voices from the past that we hear preserved on musical 
recordings. 






Music & Memory in the Age of Recording 
* 
These singers male and female whom he heard, 
he could not see; their corporeal part abode in 
America, in Milan, Vienna, St. Petersburg. But 
let them dwell where they might, he had their 
better part, their voices, and might rejoice in the 
refining and abstracting process which did away 
with the disadvantages of closer personal 




In one version of the Greek myth, Echo is a talkative mountain nymph condemned to 
silence other than in repetition of the shouted words of others. She falls in love with 
Narcissus and stalks him through some woods where he is hunting stags. Longing to 
address him from where she is hidden, she must wait for him to speak first. Eventually, 
he hears her footfalls and cries out ‘Who’s there?’ to which she can only reply ‘Who’s 
there?’ This continues for some time until Echo shows herself and rushes to embrace 
him. However, Narcissus pulls away from her and tells her to leave him alone. Spurned 
by the handsome but vain youth, she pines away until only her voice is left. 
    In a myth belonging to our own age, an inventor, whose technical ingenuity is matched 
only by his talent for self-promotion, instructs one of his engineers to build a hand-
powered device consisting of a metal cylinder covered in tinfoil, two diaphragm-and-
needle units positioned either side of it, and a mouthpiece. When the machine is ready – 
we are told within less than thirty hours – its inventor speaks into its mouthpiece and the 
first of the needles makes tiny indentations on the tinfoil as the cylinder is rotated. The 
second needle is then placed in the groove pattern made by the first and the cylinder is 





rotated once more. To the astonishment of the assembled group of workshop technicians,  
the words of the nursery rhyme, ‘Mary had a little lamb’, as spoken by the machine’s 
creator just a minute before are faintly but unquestionably audible. 
    The inventor was, of course, Thomas Edison. The machine was the phonograph and 
the year was 1877. To tell the story of the phonograph like this is myth in the sense that it 
ignores the social, economic and cultural forces that made the invention of such a device, 
or one very similar, such a pressing concern.1 It was not mere coincidence that, on the 
other side of the Atlantic, another inventor, Charles Cros, was working on his version of a 
machine capable of reproducing sound. Cros outlined his work in a paper written some 
months before Edison’s application for a patent but the Frenchman’s ideas remained a 
theory. It should also be remembered that the term phonograph (‘voice writer’) was not 
coined by Edison himself. In the 1850s, it was already in use to refer to a system of 
phonetic writing. Then, in 1863, another North American, F.B. Fenby, applied for a 
patent for his idea of an ‘Electromagnetic phonograph’: a means of recording keyboard 
strokes onto paper, and a precursor to the punchcard tabulator and the piano roll, both of 
which followed shortly after in the 1880s. Perhaps most crucially in the genesis of 
Edison’s particular ‘phonograph’ was an invention that used the same idea of tracing 
sound waves from a diaphragm and had only a slightly different name: Leon Scott’s 
‘phonautograph’ of 1855 (Chanan 1995: 23; Millard 1995: 26). To state the matter 
simply, the invention of the phonograph came about as a result of what Raymond 
Williams (1974), writing in a slightly different context, refers to as ‘a continuing complex 
of need and invention and application’ (15). Or, to quote Andre Millard (1995) from his 
history of recorded sound, the phonograph ‘was more of a step forward along a well-
travelled path than a great breakthrough’ (26). Like the other inventions with which it is 
roughly contemporaneous and genealogically intertwined – the telegraph, the telephone – 
the phonograph was a product of the relationship between metropolitan centre and 
provincial periphery that marked systems of distribution for both manufactured goods 
and information in industrialised capitalist societies. 
    Prior to it becoming both technically accomplishable and socially important, the 
reproduction of sound, and in particular, the reproduction of the human voice, had figured 
as both a powerful literary trope and a matter for quasi-scientific investigation. A 





combination of these is to be found in Francis Bacon’s ‘New Atlantis’ published in 1627, 
in which he depicts the mythical island of Bensalem (somewhere west of Peru) and its 
state-sponsored college, ‘Solomon’s House’: 
 
We have also sound-houses, where we practise and demonstrate all sounds and their 
generation. We have harmonies which you have not, of quarter-sounds, and lesser slides of 
sounds. Divers instruments of music likewise to you unknown, some sweeter than any you 
have; together with bells and rings that are dainty and sweet […]. We have also divers and 
strange echos, reflecting the voice many times, and as it were tossing it: and some that give 
back the voice louder than it came; some shriller, and some deeper; yea, some rendering the 
voice differing in the letters [i.e. ‘notes’] or articulate sound from that they receive. We 
have also means to convey sounds in trunks and pipes, in strange lines and distances 
(Bacon 1627/1862: 407). 
 
For understandable reasons, this passage has somewhat anachronistically been interpreted 
as a seventeenth-century anticipation of the modern recording studio.2 Bacon’s 
prescience is, however, better placed in its proper historical context as part of the 
emerging science of acoustics, which Joseph Sauveur was to give a name to in the 
century that followed. In common with accounts from around the same time of attempts 
to preserve sound, Bacon’s vivid description focuses, not on writing or transcribing the 
voice (as is implied by the nineteenth-century term ‘phonography’), but on manipulating 
and conveying its echo. In 1589, the Italian scientist, Giovanni Batista della Porta, one of 
the inventors of the telescope, made the following rather improbable claim: ‘I have 
devised a way to preserve words, that have been pronounced, inside lead pipes, in such a 
manner that they burst forth from them when one removes the cover’ (quoted in Grivel 
1992: 43). Similarly, a Nuremburg optician, one F. Grundel, is recorded in the letters of 
J.J. Becher (1683) as having suggested enclosing the echoes of voices in bottles, where, 
with the assistance of a spiral that one rotates, they might be held for up to an hour 
(Grivel 1992: 43). 
    These somewhat fanciful accounts of attempts to literally capture the human voice 
occur within a hundred years of each other, from the end of the sixteenth century to the 
latter part of the seventeenth. As such, they are early responses to a new temporal 
conception: time as both unrepeatable and irreversible, a conception we now recognise 
with hindsight as being distinctively modern (Boym 2001: 13). Edison’s ‘talking tin foil’ 
can therefore be viewed – or even ‘heard’ – as the realisation of an historically-formed 





dream founded in the uncanny experience of hearing the echo of one’s own voice (Gelatt 
1977: 17). It was a dream that could only assume significance once time was no longer 
viewed as cyclical and recurrent but as linear and ever new, and it could only be realised 
after a long concatenation of social, technical, and economic developments, even though 
all the basic elements of Edison’s invention were in place well before his technologically-
produced ‘echo’ was first heard.  
    Reverberation is musical reproduction in its primordial form, the echo the most instant 
form of playback.3 Its history is bound up with the history of special acoustic spaces, 
from caves to cathedrals, music rooms to concert halls. The experiments and reveries of 
the early acousticians in this regard contributed towards what Jonathan Sterne (2003) has 
described as ‘the objectification and abstraction of hearing and sound, their construction 
as bounded and coherent objects’, which, he claims, ‘was a prior condition for the 
construction of sound-reproduction technologies’ (23).4 Prior to recording – and just as 
importantly, prior to musical notation – certain interiors, certain acoustic shells, were 
valued for the way they seemed to preserve, or at least prolong, sound’s inevitable 
‘decay’. In this sense, the echo was a sonic memento mori, morphing the cry of the 
human voice and delaying its return just long enough for its sender to be given a sense of 
their own ghostly and disembodied otherness. Like the obscure mountain nymph of 
Greek mythology, the echo evokes a sense that the human voice might persist in spite of 
the dissolution of the body. 
    Today, the echo provides a metaphor of, and, as such, a way of conceptualising, the 
initial stages of auditory perception (Snyder 2000: 19). ‘Echoic memory’, in cognitive 
psychology, is what allows us to repeat back a telephone number immediately after 
hearing it but not after a break of some seconds. The term suggests a ‘reverberation’ of 
the nervous system: a rudimentary sensory memory that forms the initial step prior to the 
formation of ‘short-term’ and ‘long-term’ memories.5 According to this model, it is what 
audiences at pop concerts rely upon during call-and-response sessions, in which the 
singer gets the crowd to repeat back a series of melodic phrases immediately after he or 
she has sung each of them.6 Such ‘echoed’ phrases are particularly prominent in musical 
traditions in which improvisation is highly valued, for example, in classical Indian and 
Persian music, as well as jazz. Skill is demonstrated by being able to instantly play back 





what a fellow musician has just played. In Western classical music, in which notation 
eclipsed improvisation, such echoing of phrases by the players of different instruments 
was retained as a fundamental principle of composition, from ‘imitative counterpoint’ or 
the ‘round’ as it is more commonly known – ‘London’s burning’ is the example that 
every English school child knows – to the infinitely more sophisticated contrapuntal 
complexities of the fugue, as exemplified in the music of J.S. Bach. 
    One last example of an echo effect is especially revealing in terms of how it anticipates 
recording’s alleged disembodiment of musical sound. As with so many of his concerti, 
Vivaldi’s Echo Concerto for Three Violins in A (RV 522) was commissioned by the 
governors of the Conservatorio della Pietà, the orphanage in Venice where Vivaldi 
(1678-1741) worked as director of music prior to his itinerant career as an opera 
composer. The Conservatorio placed special emphasis on the musical education of the 
foundling girls who comprised its outstanding choir and orchestra. The concerto in 
question requires the second and third violinists to be positioned offstage so that they can 
‘echo’ phrases played by the first violinist. In Vivaldi’s day, they would have been 
hidden behind a screen with the result that the unexpected return of the lead violinist’s 
phrases, exactly as she had played them, would have seemed all the more novel and 
remarkable.7 In contemporary performances, the practice of keeping the mimicking 
violinists apart from the lead is maintained but with one significant alteration: instead of 
being hidden behind a screen they are clearly visible to the audience, often by being 
positioned in their midst. As audiences for whom recording is a given, we have wearied 
of musicians playing behind the metaphorical screens of our hi-fi systems: part of what 
we crave from concert-going is the spectacle of performance and the sociability this 
engenders. The disconnection of sound from a visible source has become the norm, its 
reconnection a novelty.8 
    The term acousmatic aptly describes this condition. The word already existed in 
French long before the founder of musique concrète, Pierre Schaeffer, employed it to 
describe a kind of listening facilitated by modern media that focuses attention away from 
production and transmission and onto the sonorous object itself in all its uncircumscribed 
and unanticipated richness of detail. As such, the acousmatic field extends beyond that of 
acoustics with its concerns with what is visible and measurable, placing attention instead 





on direct phenomenological experience. In the dictionary entry to which Schaeffer refers, 
acousmatic simply describes ‘a noise that one hears without seeing what causes it’ 
(Schaeffer 1966/2006: 76; original emphasis removed). The term derives from the 
Acousmatics of ancient Greece: ‘disciples of Pythagoras who, for five years, listened to 
his teachings while he was hidden behind a curtain, without seeing him, while observing 
a strict silence’ (76-7; original emphasis removed). Vivaldi’s Echo Concerto is not 
unusual for containing acousmatic elements: there are many such elements in the history 
of Western art music. Court musicians were frequently separated from their audience by 
screens. When Copenhagen’s Rosenborg Palace was being built in the 1620s, the Danish 
king, Christian IV, went one better and had the Royal Orchestra banished to a dank cellar 
from where their music would be conveyed to the State Rooms above via an elaborate 
system of pipes and ducts – surely one of the first and most literal examples of piped 
music (Tremain 2005: 7). No doubt, the isolation of sound from a visible source lent it a 
greater mystery, rather like catching a few strains of the music of the spheres, but for the 
musicians themselves one suspects that it was a rather less celestial experience. At around 
the same time in London, musicians found themselves in a similarly uncomfortable and 
unfamiliar situation as the first public commercial concerts got underway. Later, such 
concerts would be a welcome source of revenue as well as a chance to experiment with 
new styles in an atmosphere of greater conviviality and informality than that to be found 
in aristocratic houses, but for this first series of concerts, held – so posterity has it – in 
1672 in a room above a tavern owned by a man called John Banister, the musicians were 
so uncertain and ashamed of what they were doing that they hid behind a curtain while 
they were playing (Bott 2008; Chanan 1994: 133). Closer to our own time – and closer 
too to the introduction of acousmatic music in Schaeffer’s sense – Wagner (1813-1883) 
took care to position the musicians out of sight from the audience when constructing his 
opera house at Bayreuth so that the music would contribute to the impression of a 
Gesamtkunstwerk or ‘total work of art’.9 What these examples of acousmatic music have 
in common with Vivaldi’s Echo Concerto and echoes more generally is a process of 
displacement. Echoes displace their sound source and, moreover, displace the subjectivity 
or logos that has long been thought to inhere in the human voice.      





    In discussing echoes, as well as the first ever recording of a human voice – which must 
itself have seemed like a strange breed of hallucinatory echo – we have already touched 
upon the relationship between an original and its copy or representation. The phonograph 
has a much more extensive yet problematic role to play in this regard, expressing the 
tensions and tendencies of the culture that gave birth to it. 
 
The phonograph and the mimetic faculty 
In his Poetics, Aristotle claims that humans are mimetic beings, impelled to create artistic 
forms that, in one way or another, reflect or represent the reality of their experience 
(1984: 2318). This innately human urge to create copies or models of what we perceive in 
the world is reflective self-consciousness in action: an embodied engagement with 
sensuous reality that both imitates and transforms that reality. Aristotle’s theories of 
mimēsis (‘imitation’) differed quite markedly from those of his forebear, Plato, but both 
philosophers agreed that the term stood in contrast to diegesis (‘narrative’) (Plato 1987: 
92-3; Aristotle 1984: 2317). Whereas diegesis reports, narrates and indicates, mimesis 
represents, embodies and transforms. Furthermore, diegesis looks back on the past while 
mimesis occupies a continuous present.  
    In contemporary usage, the distinction to be made is that between ‘mimesis’ and 
‘representation’, for the latter has passive, ideal and reflective connotations that are quite 
alien to mimesis, or at least, to a more productive understanding of it.10 As the 
hermeneuticist, Paul Ricoeur (1991) explains: 
 
far from producing a weakened image of pre-existing things, mimesis brings about an 
augmentation of meaning in the field of action, which is its privileged field. It does not 
equate itself with something already given. Rather it produces what it imitates, if we 
continue to translate mimesis by ‘imitation’ (138).  
 
Thus, mimesis is ‘creative imitation’ (ibid.). What this implies is that mimesis frames a 
perception of the world that was not possible beforehand. The ‘copy’ becomes the 
original as when a photograph allows us to see an aspect of reality that was previously 
invisible to us. 
    It is in precisely this sense that Edison’s phonograph was a mimetic technology rather 
than a representational one.11 Like other forms of mechanical reproduction from the 





nineteenth century, most notably photography and moving pictures, phonography drew 
attention to the constructed nature of the representations it produced. This was partly 
because of technical imperfections but also because of the creative decisions that had to 
be taken regarding how and what to record. The phonograph actively transformed what it 
recorded.12 This was particularly true of, firstly, the human voice, which could be 
memorialised, scrutinised and contemplated in a manner that simply hadn’t been possible 
before; and, secondly, it was true of music, the trajectory which it took in the twentieth 
century being unimaginable without recording. Just as photography and film opened up 
new ‘image-worlds’, the phonograph and its technological successors enabled the 
exploration of new ‘sound-worlds’ (Benjamin 1928/1999: 156). And in acting upon sonic 
materials – our constant yet scarcely acknowledged companions throughout life – the 
phonograph also acted upon the human sensorium, investing it with new capabilities and 
altering which acoustic phenomena were deemed perceptible and meaningful. In this 
regard, Walter Benjamin’s claim that ‘film has brought about a […] deepening of 
apperception’ also applies to sound recording (Benjamin 1936/1968: 237). 
    In his book, Mimesis and Alterity, Michael Taussig (1993) claims that the invention of 
the phonograph and other forms of mechanical reproduction led to a resurgence of the 
mimetic faculty. By this he means, at the most basic level, that ‘copies’ could be made 
more easily: ‘copies’ of spoken words and music on phonograph cylinders or 
gramophone records, of people and landscapes on photographic plates, and of dramatic 
gestures on film reels, etc. More significantly, however, the invention of these 
‘mimetically capacious machines’ was an event of considerable historico-anthropological 
significance: a ‘curious and striking recharging’ of the primordial impulse to make 
fetishes, totems, tokens, models and images, imbued with talismanic powers (Taussig 
1993: xiv). Taussig’s rendering of the term ‘mimesis’ is phenomenological in that it 
stresses the interpenetration of subject and object within transacted relations of similitude 
and difference. His conception of the term is also animistic in making the inert material 
world of Western dualistic thought once more alive and sentient. He describes mimesis as 
‘a copying or imitation, and a palpable, sensuous, connection between the very body of 
the perceiver and the perceived’ (21). Accordingly, the mimetic faculty is ‘the nature that 





culture uses to create second nature, the faculty to copy, imitate, make models, explore 
difference, yield into and become Other’ (xiii). 
    Central to Taussig’s claims about the impact of mimetic technologies is the 
Benjaminian idea that mimesis constitutes a ‘primitive’ faculty lodged right in the midst 
of late modernity – not merely as a counterweight to that modernity, but as a distinctive 
part of its ideological and material formation: 
 
modernity provides the cause, context, means, and needs, for the resurgence – not the 
continuity – of the mimetic faculty. […M]ass culture in our times both stimulates and is 
predicated upon mimetic modes of perception in which spontaneity, animation of objects, 
and a language of the body combining thought with action, sensuousness with intellection, 
is paramount (Taussig 1993: 20).  
       
This reinvigoration of the mimetic impulse in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries is therefore complex and ambiguous in terms of its relationship to modernity.  
On the one hand, the use of recording technologies to make aural and visual copies 
parallels the prehistoric production of cave paintings and carved figurines, or the 
imitation of birdsongs and other animal noises. As such, it is part of a distinctly 
primitivist impulse, sharing something of the ‘sympathetic magic’ of earlier forms of 
mimesis (Taussig 1993: xiii). On the other hand, such a technologically-derived ability 
lies at the heart of what it means to be ‘modern’: it is part of what Benjamin (1936/1968) 
describes as ‘the urge […] to get hold of an object at very close range by way of its 
likeness, its reproduction’ (225). Thus, to marvel at what a machine like a phonograph 
could do, to contemplate a sonic likeness, was, at once, to be returned to a primeval sense 
of wonder and to be brought up to date, to be both ‘primitive’ and ‘modern’. 
    In this manner, the phonograph – and the gramophone, which superseded it – was a 
significant source of enchantment. The magical, quasi-ritualistic delight that the use of 
these record players elicited – especially in the earlier years of the twentieth century prior 
to their appropriation by the culture industry – helped to counter an alleged sense of 
disenchantment. According to Max Weber, the world bore ‘the imprint of 
meaninglessness’ due to the evacuation of wonder and mystery from modernity, and the 
attendant mastery of all things by bureaucracy and rational calculation (quoted in Bennett 
2001: 8). In contrast to this sense of meaninglessness identified by Weber and other 





purveyors of disenchantment narratives, the mimesis wrought by the phonograph was 
profoundly meaningful, but in an embodied, sensuous way as opposed to an arid, 
abstracted one. Edison’s mimetic contraption, quite literally, ‘made sense’. The 
impression of enchantment it produced is well expressed in an editorial from Scientific 
American dated 17 November, 1877 in which the author greets news of Edison’s latest 
invention:  
 
It has been said that Science is never sensational; that it is intellectual, not emotional; but 
certainly nothing that can be conceived would be more likely to create the profoundest of 
sensations, to arouse the liveliest of human emotions, than once more to hear the familiar 
voices of the dead. […W]hoever has spoken into the mouthpiece of the phonograph, and 
whose words are recorded by it, has the assurance that his speech may be reproduced 
audibly in his own tones long after he himself has turned to dust. The possibility is simply 
startling. […S]peech has become, as it were, immortal (quoted in Read and Welch 1959: 
12).13 
 
In addition to the phonograph’s ability to memorialise the dead, the editor of Scientific 
American was keenly aware of its musical possibilities: ‘Music may be crystallized as 
well. Imagine an opera or an oratorio, sung by the greatest living vocalists, thus recorded, 
and capable of being repeated as we desire’ (ibid.). 
    For the thousands of North Americans who made their own home recordings on wax 
cylinders, hearing the world’s leading tenors and sopranos probably held less fascination 
than hearing themselves, but the sense of enchantment must have been every bit as 
thrilling as the Scientific American had anticipated. This brief flourish of homespun, 
mimetic activity began in 1888, the year in which Edison replaced tinfoil cylinders with 
wax ones, and lasted until 1912, at which point the two-minute wax cylinders were 
themselves superseded by a more durable alternative (Katz 2004: 69; Koenigsberg 1969: 
xxiii).14 As Mark Katz (2004) notes in Capturing Sound, these cylinders ‘provide a 
fascinating window into domestic musical life’ (70). Typically, they were a rough-hewn 
combination of spoken word and amateur musical performance, such as the ‘Christmas 
card’ recorded by one A.H. Mendenhall for a friend, in which Mendenhall intersperses 
festive greetings with a harmonica solo and a comic song about two Irish bricklayers 
(ibid.). 
    Initially, there was considerable encouragement of home recording from within the 
industry, such as an 1899 pamphlet issued by the National Phonograph Company in 





which two sisters describe ‘How We Gave a Phonograph Party’: an evening of recording 
by friends and neighbours, complete with phonograph-shaped gingersnaps. Later, 
however, phonography was blocked from developing into the aural counterpart of 
photography, which, by contrast, became a genuinely popular mimetic pastime, opened 
up to a huge domestic market by the first Kodak Brownie of 1900 (Katz 2004: 69-70). In 
1912, production ceased of phonographs equipped to allow users themselves to make 
recordings. In any case, Edison’s cylinders were quickly becoming obsolete, ousted by 
Emile Berliner’s disc-playing ‘gramophone’, which the German immigrant to the United 
States had first demonstrated in 1888 (Millard 1995: 32).15 Berliner, unlike Edison, was 
finally able to solve the problem that had held back the phonographic industry in its early 
years: how to produce multiple copies from an original ‘master’ recording. In doing so, 
he established a model of consumption that still holds sway today, even in the age of 
digital downloads. Firstly, music was to take precedence over speech; this in spite of the 
launch in 1901 by Berliner and associates of the misleadingly-named Victor Talking 
Machine Company. Secondly, the gramophone record was to be treated more like a book 
than a photograph. (The use of the term ‘album’ to describe the collection of discs needed 
to cover all but the very shortest pieces suggested a parallel with photos that was equally 
deceptive.16) Thirdly, the gramophone became an instrument strictly for playback, a 
different machine being necessary for recording – one that was not marketed to domestic 
buyers. As Michael Chanan (1995) points out in his history of sound recording: ‘The 
technical possibilities of amateur and domestic recording had to wait for the techniques 
of magnetic recording to reach fruition fifty years later – while photography became a 
popular art form’ (29). 
 
The ‘wonder-box’ 
In spite of the gramophone’s development leading sound recording in the direction of a 
more passive model of consumption, users tended to engage with recorded music in a 
way that was often very active. We will have occasion to pause and consider many such 
instances of the active, affectively-engaged consumption of records, but for now I would 
like to single out one particular example for the way it evokes the enchantment attendant 
upon the gramophone’s mimetic powers. In his 1924 novel, The Magic Mountain, 





Thomas Mann offers a striking depiction of a first encounter with a gramophone, at a 
point in the machine’s development when recordings of musical performances were 
beginning to aspire to what was to become known in the 1950s as ‘high fidelity’.17 The 
novel is set in the geographically and intellectually rarefied environment of a sanatorium 
in the Swiss Alps shortly before the outbreak of the First World War. When the director 
and chief doctor, Hofrat Behrens, purchases what he mischievously announces as ‘The 
truly musical, in modern, mechanical form, the German soul up to date’, it is the novel’s 
young and impressionable protagonist, Hans Castorp, who takes the keenest interest 
(Mann 1924/1952: 637). Upon hearing his first few discs, he is ‘filled with the surest 
foreknowledge of a new passion, a new enchantment, a new burden of love […]. Here 
was a world to conquer, large enough that even to survey it was a difficult task at first, 
and bewildering; yet a world full of beautiful possibilities’ (639). Castorp quickly takes 
custodianship of the enigmatic ‘casket’, assuming the mantle of prototypical disc jockey 
for the other residents of the sanatorium: 
 
he had a changing audience for his performance – unless one must reckon him in with the 
audience, instead of as the dispenser of the entertainment. Personally, he inclined to the 
latter view. And the Berghof [i.e. the sanatorium’s] population agreed with him, to the 
extent that from the very first night they silently acquiesced in his self-appointed 
guardianship of the instrument (641). 
 
In sharp contrast to Castorp, the other residents appear almost entirely passive in their 
consumption of the gramophone and its accompanying albums of discs: ‘they cared little 
to take their pleasures actively, instead […] sitting to be served […] as much and such 
enjoyment as they could comfortably and unbored receive’ (639). In a manner that 
adumbrates the uptight muso or hi-fi bore, Castorp’s attitude towards them becomes 
somewhat scornful, in spite of – or perhaps because of – their obvious enjoyment: 
 
They did not care, these people. Aside from their ephemeral idolatry of the tenor, 
luxuriating in the melting brilliance of his own voice, letting this boon to the human race 
stream from him in cantilenas and high feats of virtuosity, notwithstanding their loudly 
proclaimed enthusiasm, they were without real love for the instrument, and content that 
anyone should operate it who was willing to take the trouble’ (641-2). 
 
Eventually, Castorp arrogates to himself sole rights to operate the gramophone, keeping 
hold of the key to the cabinet where the needles and records are kept, partly in order to 





prevent damage being done to the fragile equipment but also so that he can indulge in a 
more solitary and personal engagement with the machine and the reveries it gives rise to 
after the other residents have gone to bed. 
    In describing the responses of Castorp and the other listeners to the sanatorium’s newly 
acquired machine, the narrator gives a vivid impression of the animatedness of the 
gramophone, its sensate richness. When orchestral music is played upon it during its 
premier outing, the narrator remarks that ‘The wonder-box seemed to seethe: it poured 
out the chimes of bells, harp glissandos, the crashing of trumpets, the long rolling of 
drums’ (638). Later that same night, Castorp goes to bed as if drunk from carousing of 
the gramophone’s many discs, and proceeds to dream of the ‘peculiar, sidling undulation’ 
of the needle upon the record, ‘an elastic oscillation, almost like breathing’ (641). The 
inscrutable mystery of the machine’s living presence, the secret of its enchanted 
mechanism, envelops him: ‘it remained unclear, sleeping as waking, how the mere 
following out of a hair-line above an acoustic cavity, with the sole assistance of the 
vibrating membrane of the sound-box, could possibly reproduce such a wealth and 
volume of sound as filled Hans Castorp’s dreaming ear’ (ibid.). During another late-night 
session of gramophone-playing, Castorp worries lest the sound of the music should 
disturb the other residents. He discovers, however, that ‘there was less danger than he had 
feared of disturbing the nightly rest of the house; for the carrying power of this ghostly 
music proved relatively small. The vibrations, so surprisingly powerful in the near 
neighbourhood of the box, soon exhausted themselves, grew weak and eerie with 
distance, like all magic’ (642). The ritualistic aspects of his solitary nocturnes are 
emphasised: ‘Hans Castorp was alone among four walls with his wonder-box; with the 
florid performance of this truncated little coffin of violin-wood, this small dull-black 
temple’ (ibid.). The gramophone becomes a kind of altar allowing him to interface, not 
only with the music of past ages and distant cultures, but with ‘a whole world of feeling 
and sentiment’ (651). This is especially true in the case of a recording of Schubert’s Der 
lindenbaum (‘The linden tree’), the aesthetic power of which evokes in Castorp a sense of 
universal yet precisely modulated love: ‘the love felt for such a creation is in itself 
“significant”: betraying something of the person who cherishes it, characterising his 
relation to that broader world the conception bodies forth – which, consciously or 





unconsciously, he loves along with and in the thing itself’ (ibid.). Intriguingly, the 
narrator suggests that the lied, from Schubert’s song cycle Der Winterreise (‘Winter 
Journey’) may have been sung in simplified form by Castorp when he was a child at 
school: ‘We all know that the noble lied sounds rather differently when given as a 
concert-number from its rendition in the childish or popular mouth’ (650).18 This would 
account, in part, for Castorp’s overwhelming response to it. As we shall discover in more 
detail when we come to discuss the semiotics of recorded music, the affective potential of 
songs that we have had occasion to listen to – or sing – at various times throughout our 
lives is greatly increased due to the fact that a cascade of powerful yet scarcely 
articulated sign-complexes is set off, based on our memories of previous auditions 
(Turino 1999).       
    Mann’s description of the gramophone pays careful attention to its mimetic qualities. 
After the over-inflated grandiloquence of Behrens’ introduction to the newfangled 
contraption, the ‘first contagious bars of an Offenbach overture’ resonate from it and the 
lips of the assembled patients part in rapturous smiles: 
 
They could scarcely believe their ears at the purity and faithful reproduction of the colour 
of the wood-wind. A solo violin preluded whimsically; the bowing, the pizzicato, the sweet 
gliding from one position to another, were all clearly audible (Mann 1924/1952: 637). 
 
Yet, in spite of its ‘A-1, copper-bottomed, superfinissimo’ credentials as attested to by the 
sanatorium’s director, the gramophone does not imitate the sound of an orchestra in any 
straightforward relation of identity between original and copy. Rather, there is an effect 
of miniaturisation or, more precisely, distantiation: 
 
Of course, it was scarcely like a real orchestra playing in the room. The volume of sound, 
though not to any extent distorted, had suffered a diminution of perspective. If we may 
draw a simile from the visual field, it was as though one were to look at a painting through 
the wrong end of an opera-glass, seeing it remote and diminutive, though with all its 
luminous precision of drawing and colour (ibid.). 
 
There is a clear difference in this regard with our contemporary experience of recorded 
music. Whereas the antique gramophone described in the pages of The Magic Mountain 
produces music that suffers from effects of diminution and a kind of aural elongation of 
the listener’s sense of perspective, our current recording and playback equipment is 





carefully designed in order to hold true to George Berkeley’s dictum that ‘sounds are as 
near to us as our thoughts’ (quoted in Rée 1999: 36). In this context, the whole history of 
recorded music has been aimed at bringing the music progressively ‘closer’. (‘Closer’ 
must be qualified by inverted commas as what we are really talking about is a virtual 
sense of closeness to an equally virtual sound source, predicated upon the listener’s 
understanding and imagination of what happens in an actual performance.)  In particular, 
the electric microphone and stereo amplification have produced effects of nearness and 
intimacy that not only satisfy the Benjaminian urge ‘to get hold of an object at very close 
range by way of its likeness’ but regularly surpass the sense of closeness we would 
expect from a ‘live’ performance. Recorded music, at root, tends towards the non-
perspectival, allowing us to fully inhabit the music and vice versa. If it produces a sense 
of space for the listener, it is more often a virtual and inner space – a sense of the music’s 
voluminousness. Mann’s ingenious metaphor of the reversed opera glasses indirectly 
expresses a wish, borne out of an intuition of recording’s potential, to collapse any 
remaining distance between us and the sound source, and transform mere representation 
into mimesis. 
 
Reveries of the solitary listener 
Hans Castorp’s rapid and eager shift from group to solitary listening in the ‘Fullness of 
harmony’ chapter of The Magic Mountain enacts in miniature the large-scale transition 
that occurred between the initial period of the gramophone’s use, when it still retained 
something of the bourgeois ritual of domestic sociability around the parlour piano, to a 
slightly later period by which time social scruples regarding listening alone had been cast 
aside.19 In his history of recorded sound, Mark Katz cites other contemporary reactions to 
the new phenomenon of solitary listening. A 1923 contributor to one of the gramophone 
industry’s journals, Orlo Williams, imagines how one might react upon walking in on a 
friend who was listening to recorded music alone:  
 
You would think it odd, would you not? You would endeavour to dissemble your surprise: 
you would look twice to see whether some other person were not hidden in some corner of 
the room, and if you found no such [person,] one would painfully blush, as if you had 
discovered your friend sniffing cocaine, emptying a bottle of whisky, or plaiting straws in 





his hair. People, we think, should not do things “to themselves,” however much they may 
enjoy doing them in company (quoted in Katz 2004: 17). 
 
Yet, as Katz admits, such a reaction was probably overdone: a rhetorical device inserted 
into a piece that, in other respects, actually serves as a manifesto for solitary 
gramophone-use, including listening to it at hitherto unthinkable times of the day such as 
first thing in the morning. The slightly later comments of one Richard Magruder, this 
time from 1931, are probably more typical of early responses to solitary listening, 
especially once sound quality had been improved by the electrification of the recording 
process. His paean to the gramophone is an early example of the by-now well-rehearsed 
claims to greater immediacy that greet the introduction of each new audio or audio-visual 
medium: 
 
Alone with the phonograph, all the unpleasant externals are removed: the interpreter has 
been disposed of; the audience has been disposed of; the uncomfortable concert hall has 
been disposed of. You are alone with the composer and his music. Surely no more ideal 
circumstances could be imagined (quoted in Katz 2004: 17). 
 
Such thoughts of ‘unpleasant externals’ would not have occurred to those of the 
preceding generation or two: listening to music on one’s own had simply not been 
possible.20 Katz emphasises that solitary listening went against the grain of centuries of 
musical tradition in which ‘music accompanied central communal events, including birth 
or death rites, weddings, and religious festivals’ (ibid.). And yet, at the same time, it 
seems that many of the quibbles and scruples were voiced, as in Williams’ article, largely 
for melodramatic effect. The fact is that the already-established model of solitary reading 
had helped to make solitary listening a lesser source of concern than it might otherwise 
have been. Moreover, the more rigorous codification of the bounded, unitary individual 
that occurred in the nineteenth century brought with it different norms governing what 
was considered socially-acceptable behaviour. So if the phonograph, gramophone and 
radio were not, on the whole, suspected of eroding the accepted ethical standards 
associated with when, where and with whom one should listen to music, if they were not 
viewed as potential sources of ‘anomie’ – a word coined in the 1930s to express the 
apparent ‘lawlessness’ engendered by certain aspects of modernity – this is because those 
ethical standards had already been in flux for some time.  





    As we shall find in the case of the many other changes that were attendant upon the 
introduction of recording, the musical tide had been turning in the direction of solitary 
listening for some time, well before it was actually technologically achievable. In the 
purpose-built concert halls of the nineteenth century, there was already an ingrained 
tendency in listening habits towards greater introspection and solitariness if not actual 
solitude. One finds this in Mark Twain’s account of his visit to the ‘shrine of St. Wagner’ 
at Bayreuth:  
 
You detect no movement in the solid mass of heads and shoulders. You seem to sit with the 
dead in the gloom of a tomb. You know that they are being stirred to their profoundest 
depths; that there are times when they want to rise and wave handkerchiefs and shout their 
approbation, and times when tears are running down their faces, and it would be a relief to 
free their pent emotions in sobs or screams; yet you hear not one utterance till the curtain 
swings together and the closing strains have slowly faded out and died (Twain 1891/2008: 
191).21 
 
As Chanan (1994) points out, ‘the subjective individualism associated with the 
appreciation of art music is a historical product of the imposition of decorum in the 
concert hall in the century following Mozart’ (157). This concern with comportment 
during musical performances was itself the bourgeoisie’s means of asserting their moral 
and intellectual superiority over the aristocracy: a will-to-power achieved via rigorous 
self-policing. ‘Contemplation’ became, in Benjamin’s words, ‘a school for asocial 
behaviour’ so that, in hearing the canonical works of the classical and romantic 
repertoire, one found oneself in the distinctly odd but now characteristic position of 
listening alone together (Benjamin 1936/1968: 240). Even though bourgeois music was 
held up as an image of spontaneous social harmony – as opposed to the social order 
imposed by hierarchy and aristocratic privilege – one, in effect, listened alone as this was 
an atomised society based on the values of possessive individualism (Fitzgerald 1994: 
122). As musical styles changed, and late romantic and early modernist compositions 
foretold – via the breakdown of the established harmonic code – of impending social 
crisis, the subjectivity of responses to art music tended to intensify, as evinced by the 
behaviour of the Wagner devotees at Bayreuth. 
    In the century prior to the invention of sound recording, not only was musical 
consumption among the middle classes becoming more subjective and individualist, it 





was also becoming more domestic. The key development here was the introduction of the 
piano into people’s homes. By most estimates, piano sales peaked at the close of the 
nineteenth century, the market for domestic instruments – especially uprights, which 
were now within reach of the better-off working classes – remaining buoyant until the 
First World War threw the entire industry into disarray (Chanan 1994: 208). Being too 
primitive for its first fifty years, the phonograph was unable to challenge the supremacy 
of the piano, both as a means of accompanying ‘silent’ films, and as a source of 
entertainment in the home. The original phonographs were acoustic rather than electric 
and therefore didn’t have sufficient amplification for their sound to fill a large room. 
Initially then, the phonograph had to find a place alongside the piano rather than as a 
substitute for it; in these decades immediately prior to the piano’s usurpation at the 
fulcrum of domestic musical life, the instrument was to have important implications for 
the future of recorded music as it set the precedent for the gramophone’s principal use: 
home entertainment. 
    In other ways too, the culture of domestic piano-playing served as a bridge to the 
culture of domestic gramophone-listening. Due to the elements it shares with traditional, 
everyday modes of music-making – what Roland Barthes (1977), reviving a medieval 
term, called musica practica – playing piano in one’s own home might, on the face of it, 
seem very different from merely putting on a gramophone disc. (A cheery image of a 
family singing round the parlour piano comes to mind.) Yet, domestic piano-playing was 
at times quite solitary and passive – ‘mechanical’ even – with the result that there is a 
blurring of the boundary that separates it from literal mechanical reproduction. Alan 
Durant (1984) has alerted, in this regard, to the importance of sheet music, which had 
itself, since the introduction of Breitkopf’s music printing press in the 1750s, been 
mechanically reproduced. According to Durant, musical notation in the nineteenth 
century increasingly becomes  
 
a set of definitions of aesthetic intention in accordance with which precise execution can be 
attained [… . N]otation led to an increasing emphasis on reproduction, as against creative, 
collaborative performance. Indeed, the term ‘reproduction’, when used of music, seems to 
have itself encroached, during this period, upon senses previously attached to the word 
‘performance’ (100-1).  
 





    Also important in blurring the distinction in usage between ‘reproduction’ and 
‘performance’ was the player-piano or pianola. This was a piano that was ‘played’ by 
being fed rolls of perforated paper, the master copies of which were often recorded by the 
top names from early twentieth-century music: Mahler, Busoni, Paderewski, Fats Waller, 
and Jelly Roll Morton all made their own piano rolls, providing us today with a 
fascinating archive of their playing styles (Cook 2009). The pianola’s mechanism is not 
quite as automatic as that of the musical boxes and barrel organs that preceded it: the 
‘pianolist’ pumps pneumatic pedals in order to vary the dynamics and sustain of the 
music, such that each single reproduction of the music on a roll can be considered an 
‘interpretation’ (Kobbé 1907). One might assume that the player-piano was simply an 
intermediate step between piano and phonograph; the truth of the matter is rather more 
complicated. The genealogies of the player-piano and the phonograph were roughly 
contemporaneous, each machine constituting a different solution to essentially the same 
problem. (Indeed, Edison himself had considered, but later rejected, the possibility of 
‘sheets’ of paper as a means of storing musical recordings (Laing 1991: 5).) In the event, 
it was the disc-playing gramophone that, in the 1890s, found a mass market first; the 
pianola’s brief domestic tenure didn’t occur until the following decade. The similarity of 
each machine’s intended function meant that there was an obvious tension between them. 
In the years leading up to the First World War, when gramophone recordings were still 
made acoustically by scrums of musicians leaning into a megaphone at each of their 
requisite moments, ‘pianola companies tried to cosy up to gramophone manufacturers 
with the idea that the player-piano could accompany voices recorded on the gramophone’ 
(Cook 2009). It was, however, an unhappy marriage, and when recording entered the 
electrical era with the introduction of microphones and the marked improvement in sound 
quality they brought with them, pianola makers faced up to what, perhaps only with 
retrospect, seems like the inevitability of their demise.22  
    It should be mentioned in passing that by the end of the nineteenth century, the 
pianola, phonograph, and gramophone were not the only ways of listening to music in 
solitude. In London, Paris, and Budapest, telephone lines were used to relay concerts, 
plays, news bulletins, and church sermons into subscribers’ homes and hotel rooms, 
where they would wear special headsets. We know that Proust, for example, listened to 





the whole of Debussy’s Pelléas et Mélisande this way, using what in France was known 
as the théâtrophone, while, in London, Queen Victoria was among the electrophone’s 
regular users (Seckerson 2011). In Budapest, the Telefon Hírmondó was conceived of as 
a telephonic newspaper. All three of these experiments anticipated radio broadcasting 
and, indeed, it was radio that superseded them. 
    In stating that recording makes actual solitary listening possible for the first time, it 
should be added that each new playback or broadcasting medium implies a different kind 
of listening, with subtle modulations of sociability and solitariness. If one takes the 
example of radio, it could, in the family living room, be at the centre of hearth and home, 
imbuing domestic life with a sense of intimacy and warmth. Revealingly, Roosevelt’s 
radio addresses to the nation were known as his ‘fireside chats’. Similarly, on the other 
side of the Atlantic, the British Broadcasting Corporation, under the directorship of John 
Reith, instilled its wireless programming with an overt sense of domesticity, aiming it at 
an audience conceived of as an idealised lower-middle class family with acceptably 
middle-brow tastes. Yet in the teenager’s bedroom of the 1950s and 60s, radio could at 
times function as a vehicle for more solitary, somewhat transgressive, reveries, giving the 
rural or suburban adolescent access to sound-worlds otherwise unavailable in their 
immediate social milieu: the music of black America, for example; or the pop music 
broadcast in Britain by the offshore pirate station, Radio Caroline, prior to the 
appropriation of its format – as well as some of its disc jockeys – by the Corporation’s 
youth channel, BBC Radio 1, established in 1967. Such radio-induced reveries were often 
characterised by high levels of contingency and serendipity, being predicated on the turn 
of a dial and the radio user’s ability to tune into something to their taste – or something 
which provoked it.    
    Radio also allowed people to listen to music in their cars. Michael Bull (2004) spells 
out the ramifications of this for the history of twentieth-century audio-consumption in 
terms of the ‘increasing mobility’ and increasing privatisation of ‘sound use in Western 
culture’: ‘As early as the 1930s American auto manufacturers associated the radio with 
individualized listening in automobiles. In the space of five years, between 1936 and 
1941, over 30 percent of US cars were fitted with radios’ (245). In later decades, car 
audio helped drive – quite literally – the market for Philips’ audio-cassette, introduced in 





1963. As improvements to the compact cassette allowed its ‘fidelity’ to gain pace with 
that of the high-quality stereo LP, the car interior became a model acoustic environment, 
a wrap-around of glass, steel, plastic and chrome, enfolding immersive layers of sound 
whilst denoting individual mobility and sensory cool. Car stereos and car radios were also 
important for dating, creating an atmosphere of intimacy and tactility without the need for 
conversation to be maintained, and contributing to the sense of sexual licence that the car 
already granted. According to the infamous description proffered by a judge in a US 
juvenile court in the 1950s, the automobile had become a ‘brothel on wheels’ (quoted in 
Caccamo 2000: 53).        
    With the advent of vinyl records, as opposed to the brittle shellac ones of the 
gramophone, came a distinctly different kind of listening, indissociable from the activity 
of collecting. According to musicologist, Timothy Day (2000), in the first ten years alone 
of the long-player, ‘a greater range of musical repertoire was brought into the home than 
in the entire history of recording in its first century’ (101). This included pieces that had 
previously languished in obscurity such as Vivaldi’s Four Seasons, recorded in its 
entirety for the first time in 1948, the year of the new format’s launch. In the words of 
Travis Elborough (2008), Vivaldi’s concerto had, until then, been merely a ‘file-under-
Bach footnote of the baroque era’.23 Crucially for the classical market, the new 33 ⅓  rpm 
microgroove LPs obviated the need to change discs every three or four minutes, as had 
been the case with shellac 78s, allowing whole movements or acts, and sometimes whole 
pieces, to be heard for the first time without interruption.24 Other benefits derived from 
the new vinyl discs: their slower revolving speed and very much smaller grooves reduced 
surface noise and enhanced the recorded signal (Chanan 1995: 93). 
    The introduction of vinyl – including the seven-inch 45 rpm, which was initially 
launched as a rival to the 33⅓ LP but quickly found a niche as the format of choice for 
popular music – coincided with the reconstruction of post-war economies and allowed 
record-collecting to become possible and practicable on a much wider scale. According 
to Antoine Hennion (2001), it was this culture of vinyl collecting that brought about the 
historical formation of a new kind of listener: a ‘specialist endowed with an ability which 
no-one possessed before the 20th century, represented by the technical availability of a 
historicized musical repertoire dating from the Middle Ages to the present day, with 





different interpretations, explanatory booklets and clear-cut relations’ (4). This ‘invention 
of the listener’, or ‘the production of the amateur’ as Hennion also refers to it, marks a 
decisive shift towards the predication of musical culture on a phonographic archive; to be 
knowledgeable about music comes to mean having at one’s disposal an artefactual 
memory made up of shiny black discs. By means of such prostheses, the horizons of what 
can be remembered musically are greatly expanded. As the musicologist, Joseph Kerman 
(1985), points out, it wasn’t until relatively recently, with one or two exceptions, that the 
repertory of Western art music extended back more than a generation or two. For 
example, the composer and theorist, Johannes Tinctoris, was able to claim back in 1477 
that there was no music worth listening to that had not been composed in the previous 
forty years or so. Similarly, we are told that Lasso’s choir in Munich, a mere fifty years 
after Josquin’s death in 1521, sang music no older than that of Josquin and his 
contemporaries. The contrast with Renaissance painting and literature is clear: music, 
because of its inevitable decay into silence, leaves no tangible objects behind and is thus 
easily forgotten. Even the introduction in the Middle Ages of staff notation with its fixing 
of pitch and rhythm had not been enough to ensure the longevity of a piece of music. 
Kerman argues that it was not until the nineteenth century that a new historical attitude 
was fully established and the likes of Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Weber and Rossini 
were afforded a place in a more or less permanent canon rather than being supplanted by 
the next set of good composers to come along (Kerman 1985: 337; Chanan 1995: 13). 
This historically-informed attitude feeds into the twentieth-century culture of record 
collecting, producing a new relationship to music: ‘The ability to listen is not so much a 
personal quality as the end result of having reflexively made the necessary time and 
space, after a long historical and collective apprenticeship which itself produced a world 
of co-ordinated objects […]. We have learnt to enjoy listening to music’ (Hennion 2001: 
4). Though these ‘co-ordinated objects’ might include textual material such as scores, 
sleeve notes, reviews, etc., they are primarily the discs contained in a record collection, 
arranged alphabetically, chronologically, or else in some more ad hoc fashion according 
to the record user’s own taxonomical whims. Extrapolating from Benjamin’s arguments 
in his 1936 article, ‘The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction’, a type of 
expertise accrues to the record collector, formed not so much out of awed 





‘contemplation’ of an original ‘auratic’ work of art as out of ‘habit’ and the ‘tactile 
appropriation’ of mechanically-reproduced artworks, in this case, those contained on the 
vinyl discs that make up a record collection (Benjamin 1936/1968: 242). As we shall 
discover, recorded sound in general – and more specifically the culture of record-
collecting – modifies the human sensorium, allowing us to hear in subtly different ways 
and making possible a different kind of aural perception founded, firstly, on what we as 
collectors can do with the music – how we can ‘manipulate’ it in the tactile sense of 
handling it – and, secondly, on what the music can do to us – how it can bring about 
changes in our mood or environment, or trigger personal reminiscences or other 
associations.  
    These kinds of arguments regarding the historical construction of the senses have been 
especially prevalent in the literature on personal stereos: the Sony Walkman, first 
introduced in 1979, and Apple’s iPod, launched in 2001.25 More than any other kind of 
individualised listening, using a personal stereo problematises the distinction between 
public and private space. Walkman- or iPod-use creates boundaries around the self, rather 
like a sonic suit of armour or psychic buffer, allowing the highly atomised listener to 
negotiate public space by imbuing it with their own privatised reveries. The ‘walk-
person’ in this sense permeates their physical environment with musically-enhanced 
affect, receiving the illusory rebounding from that same environment of what, in reality, 
is their own affective stimulation and comfort. An alienated social world is thus made 
habitable, in the sense of being mastered via habit, but at the cost, it would seem, of an 
actual retreat from interpersonal space and a corresponding increase in alienation. (When 
did you last try asking an iPod-wearer for the time or for directions? And have you also 
stopped saying ‘excuse me’ if you need to pass, assuming that they won’t be able to hear 
you?)  I would briefly like to frame these remarks by tracing a debate within the literature 
on personal stereos concerning the role of chance. In an essay written a couple of years 
prior to the analogue personal stereo’s replacement by its digital counterpart, Steven 
Connor (1999) makes a claim for the emergence of a new kind of musical reception, 
founded on the welcoming of contingency and serendipity with regard to the auditory 
channel’s interaction with other sensory streams: ‘We’ve become much better as listeners 
at tolerating openness and chance and at living in a world of multiple stimuli’. He uses 





the example of the personal stereo to illustrate his point: ‘The Walkman-user is often 
creating a kind of chance collage between the sounds that are filtering through and are 
partly contingent and the organised sound they’re hearing. There is a sense, therefore, of 
the recorded sound, which is fixed and complete and perfect, being deliberately exposed 
to the chance of what might happen’ (308). In a more recent article, however, Kathleen 
Ferguson (2008) takes up some of Judith Williamson’s early ruminations on the 
Walkman in order to question Connor’s view: ‘For Williamson, the Walkman “negates 
chance: you never know what you are going to hear on a bus or in the streets, but the 
walk-person is buffered against the unexpected – an apparent triumph of individual 
control over social spontaneity” ’ (70; emphasis in original). Williamson, writing in 1986, 
views the Walkman as homologically related to Thatcherism: a retreat from civic 
engagement and communal participation in favour of personal choice and self-
betterment. Ferguson extends this analysis to include the MP3 player, ‘which’, she writes, 
‘if we’re to be honest, carries a fairly limited scope for chance’: ‘Songs chosen from a 
repertoire of a relatively narrow, personally tailored music library recycle around in a 
state of contented monomania’ (72). It should be noted in this regard that the iPod’s 
celebrated ‘shuffle’ function has led some listeners to interpret the suitability to their 
situation or mood of a randomly-selected track as evidence of a telepathic link between 
human and machine: ‘It’s almost as if my iPod understands me’ (73). Rather 
disappointingly, however, these imputations of sympathetic responses on the part of an 
electronic device coated in sleek white plastic would appear to stem from a poor 
understanding of the maths of probability rather than something more supernatural; 
simply put, the likelihood of ‘the right song’ being played at ‘the right time’ is greater 
than we often appreciate.26 
    In outlining all the different ways in which recording allows music to be listened to in 
solitude, it should be pointed out that a peculiarly sociable feeling often attaches to 
solitary listening. This can be explained, in part, as being a residual effect of music’s 
centuries-old function as an index of social rituals, but it can also be understood as an 
effect that is specific to the phonographic medium. Because we tend to hear the playback 
as the performance itself – not as its trace – we feel the immediacy of a presence, 
especially when engulfed by the rapture of a living, rasping, sensuously-replete voice. 





Yet, at the same time, we are reminded, especially in the case of deceased artists, that 
they are ‘no longer with us’, and that their presence is an illusion. Recordings are thus 
glossed by their own poignancy as artefacts of the fleeting and evanescent; the ‘decay’ of 
the human voice is arrested, if only in so far as we are able to hear its passage towards 
silence a theoretically limitless number of times. In a radio programme about the 
Bacharach-David composition, ‘The look of love’, Dusty Springfield’s former backing 
singer and close confidante, Simon Bell, speaks of his befuddlement whenever he’s in a 
shop, café or restaurant and is caught unawares by the smooth, suspired intimacy of the 
song’s opening bars: ‘The look…of love…is in…your eyes…’. As Bell remarks, 
‘Suddenly, without warning, Dusty’s here again’ (David 2009). 
 
The ‘choral production in the drawing room’: text and context in recorded music 
In ‘The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction’, Benjamin (1936/1968) makes 
the fundamental point that ‘technical reproduction can put the copy of the original into 
situations which would be out of reach for the original itself. […T]he choral production, 
performed in an auditorium or in the open air, resounds in the drawing room’ (223). 
Recording allows for music to be heard in new locations and new situations. This, 
perhaps, is remarkable enough in itself but the point I’d like to stress is that the context in 
which listening occurs plays a determining role in shaping the act of musical 
communication as a whole. Recorded music’s penetration into new physical locations has 
important repercussions, not merely for musical reception, the way in which we listen to 
music, but also for the way it is made and what kinds of musical texts, what kinds of 
aesthetic objects, are produced.27 In seeking to understand exactly how recorded music 
signifies, we have, therefore, to take account of both text and context. One model of 
communication that is particularly fitting to this task is that put forward by Roman 
Jakobson (1986). His six-fold schema, which he proposes as a way of investigating 
language ‘in all the variety of its functions’, has been fruitfully applied to music by, 
among others, Claude Lévi-Strauss (1969), Gino Stefani (1973), Franco Fabbri (1981), 
Richard Middleton (1990), and Michael Chanan (1999). In conducting my own semiotic 
analysis, I would like to apply Jakobson’s model specifically to recorded music, seeing 
that the proliferation in listening situations enabled by phonography makes it a more 





urgent task to consider, in addition to the musical ‘utterance’ itself, the context in which 
the conveyance of such a message takes place.  
    Jakobson’s communicative schema can be represented by the following diagram in 
which the words in capital letters stand for the various FACTORS which influence 

















As Chanan (1999) succinctly puts it, communication in Jakobson’s terminology ‘consists 
in a MESSAGE referring to a CONTEXT, formulated in terms of a CODE, directed by 
an ADDRESSER to an ADDRESSEE, through a channel of CONTACT between them’ 
(140; adapted). In the case of recorded music, the ADDRESSER and ADDRESSEE will 
not usually be physically present to each other; the act of musical communication is, to 
use Schaeffer’s word, ‘acousmatic’. The MESSAGE conveyed from one to the other is 
the music itself – the particular pattern of sounds. CONTACT between addresser and 
addressee is maintained, in the final instance, by the particular playback device being 
used, often in competition with other ambient sounds in the addressee’s immediate 
environment – people talking, noise from cars or other machinery, etc. – or in 
competition with other stimuli. Having sketched out some of the rudiments of musical 
communication in the age of recording, I would like to illustrate each of the factors and 
functions identified by Jakobson, which, he claims, ought to be considered within an 
integrative and well-rounded semiotic analysis. I will pay particular attention to the ways 
in which the advent of recording heralds an alteration in the semiotic code governing 





‘musicking’ in its entirety (Small 1998). In order to do this, I will cite three examples of 
musical communication in each of which the musical text, the piece of music, is 
substantially the same, only the context in which it is heard differing from those of the 
others. 
    The first situation is that of Bach’s St. Matthew Passion, performed in its original 
setting of a Lutheran church in Leipzig as part of the Good Friday mass in 1727. The 
CONTEXT, i.e. what the work refers to, is immediately obvious; Bach’s setting of the 
German translation of the gospel of St. Matthew – with one or two judicious insertions 
courtesy of the librettist – means that the piece is heard fairly straightforwardly as a 
choral and orchestral representation of Christ’s last days. The referential function of the 
music is thus governed by the words it sets, so that, unlike purely instrumental pieces, it 
is denotative as well as connotative: one not only hears musical allusions to the drama of 
Jesus’ suffering; the details of such allusions are spelt out, firstly, by the soloists, who 
take the roles of each of the main characters and, secondly, by the choir, who comment 
upon the events.28 The context of Good Friday mass further constrains the range of 
possible meanings: it is clear to all present that this is a religious piece intended to aid 
contemplation of Christ’s betrayal and subsequent agonies on the cross. Having said this, 
there were those for whom Bach’s cantatas and Passion settings aroused mixed feelings; 
the juxtaposition of Italianate arias and German chorales led some to disapprove of what 
they perceived as an opera performance in a sacred setting (Staines and Clark et al 2005: 
22; Chanan 1999: 150). In this sense, works like St. Matthew Passion can, to some 
degree, be construed as a commentary on the musical CODE itself. Such a critique of, or 
pause to consider, the conventions by which a message is organised is what Jakobson 
terms communication’s metalingual function.29 In terms of its ADDRESSER, the Passion 
is twice-authored, first by the composer and, second, by the musicians, yet the figure of 
Bach is, in a sense, absent from these first performances. Instead of the work being heard 
as the outpouring of a singular genius, it is performed and listened to very much as a 
communal endeavour. Certainly, there are individual flourishes, as in the arias and certain 
passages by the lead violinist, marking this out from church music of the Middle Ages 
but, on the whole, the ADDRESSER is a collective one as is the ADDRESSEE. The 
billowing acoustic of the church adds to this impression, with the separate voices and 





instruments tending to merge all the more, even without the contrapuntal complexity of 
the work’s many interwoven melodic lines. The vehicle of the Passion chorale, which 
punctuates the drama at five points, reinforces the sense of community.30 
    The second situation concerns another performance of the St. Matthew Passion, this 
time in a nineteenth-century concert hall. Mendelssohn’s Berlin revival of Bach’s 
grandest work was certainly greeted by some, including Mendelssohn’s sister, Fanny, as 
a quasi-religious experience (Applegate 2005: 41). Others among those present in the 
Singakademie building, however, were unmoved. Hegel, for one, merely found the music 
peculiar; Heine, for another, thought it boring. The illustrious roll-call of those who 
attended – other names include Schleiermacher, Rahel Varnhagen, and Alexander von 
Humboldt as well as the Prussian king and crown prince – adds to the impression of a 
momentous occasion (42). At the same time, this was a decidedly more secular 
experience for most than the work’s premiere in Leipzig’s Thomaskirche (‘Church of St. 
Thomas’) had been just over a hundred years earlier.31 In simple terms, what had been 
sacred music was now art music. To some degree, then, the referential function of the 
work had changed; alongside the explicit, denotative meaning provided by the setting of 
the gospel of St. Matthew, there crept in less explicit connotations, most notably a feeling 
that the recovery of the work contributed to a sense of nationhood – that reviving Bach 
was somehow ‘national work’ (Applegate 2005). In tandem with this slippage in the 
Passion’s terms of reference, more focus was placed on the MESSAGE itself, what 
Jakobson calls the poetic function. Bach’s mastery of counterpoint meant that the 
‘poetry’ of the music, or ‘the play of notes’ as Stravinsky called it, was already 
abundantly evident: no composer before him and few since have experimented as 
thoroughly with music’s formal possibilities. What was different perhaps in the 1829 
performances was a new receptivity to this aspect of his work. In the context of a concert 
hall as opposed to that of a church, the St. Matthew Passion was able to be received in a 
less literal or ‘programmatic’ sense as being concerned with an external set of reference 
points – the glorification of the messiah, etc. – and more as an introverted piece of ‘pure’ 
or ‘absolute’ music.32 This implies too a different relationship to the ADDRESSER of the 
work: Bach is no longer just a mere kapellmeister (literally ‘chapel-master’) but instead a 
founding father for the German nation as ‘the people of music’ (Applegate 2005). In a 





way that has become characteristic of the concert-hall setting, the audience feel that in 
some indefinable way they are in direct contact with the figure of the dead composer, and 
that the musicians are not so much the addressers of the musical message as its 
intermediaries or the channel via which CONTACT is maintained (Small 1998). Unlike  
the case of the ADDRESSER, it is ambiguous whether or not the ADDRESSEE is 
individualised or not. On the one hand, the ADDRESSEE is still a collective one, though 
obviously no longer a church congregation, rather a more heterogeneous group bound by 
ties of nationality and social class. On the other hand, musical reception is more 
atomised, the audience comprising a public defined by its ability to make value 
judgements on matters of taste; hence, for example, Hegel’s reaction to the Passion, 
recalling in turn Fontenelle’s famously bemused question: ‘Sonate, que me veux-tu?’ 
(‘Sonata, what do you want from me?’). 
    The third situation is that alluded to by Benjamin: ‘the choral production […] in the 
drawing room’. In listening to, or inattentively hearing, a recording of the Matthew 
Passion as distinct from a ‘live’ performance of it, its meaning, its referential function is 
put in flux. The multiplication of possible listening situations as well as the pile-up of 
memories of previous auditions in different contexts means that the piece has for the 
listener a greatly expanded set of possible associations, both personal and public. The 
words of the written text have almost entirely released their semantic grip, and the 
reference points for the act of musical communication possess a new polysemy, fluidity 
and contingency. Over time, however, a new set of conventional meanings ossifies, based 
on connotations embedded in the listener’s perception of the Passion’s style or genre. 
This is particularly true if snatches of the piece, or even a pastiche of it, have been heard 
as the background music in films or television programmes, functioning as a kind of 
indexical and iconic shorthand. The piece might, for instance, signify ‘the baroque’, 
‘religious devotion’, ‘piety’, ‘angst’ or ‘despair’, or even a cluster of such associations 
since – in contrast to ‘symbols’, i.e. signs with a propositional content and thus a more or 
less univocal meaning – the two classes of signs, ‘icons’ and ‘indices’, via which music 
signifies typically carry several, often heterogeneous, meanings at once. In addition to the 
CONTEXT to which the musical MESSAGE refers becoming more unstable, certain 
other aspects of communication tend to become heightened. The first of these is the 





expressive or emotive function of the ADDRESSER, who is now to be understood not so 
much as the composer as the performer on the recording. As we shall see in more detail, 
the emphasis laid on the performer’s expressivity is partly to do with the way in which 
the history of recording has moulded performance practice, but it’s also connected to the 
way we now listen, attending to what Adorno disparagingly calls ‘grandiose moments’, 
and often regarding the emotive as the primary, if not the sole, function of music (Adorno 
1976: 7; Chanan 1999: 147).33 Thus, as domestic listeners, we might linger, for example, 
upon the expressive qualities to be found on particular recordings of the Passion’s arias: 
the incomparable diction of tenor Mark Padmore on ‘Geduld! Geduld!’ perhaps, or the 
soaring falsetto of countertenor Andreas Scholl singing ‘Erbarme dich’. The correlate of 
this increased emphasis on the ADDRESSER and their emotive function is an 
augmentation in the conative or imperative function associated with the ADDRESSEE. 
We hear the intensity of the performer’s expressivity not merely as an objective aesthetic 
criterion but as something addressed uniquely to us in our role as listeners capable of 
receiving the exquisite sorrow of his or her message. As the Cuban music critic, Alejo 
Carpentier (1972), points out, the model for this kind of listener is already apparent in 
Proust. Listening to a sonata, Swann ‘lies in wait for that moment when a brief phrase on 
the violin “addresses itself to him”, and […] “tells him everything it had to tell him”, to 
him and him alone’ (1097).34 
    The main changes to musical communication in the age of recording can thus be 
summarised as follows: (i) the destabilisation of music’s referential function; and (ii) the 
predominance, relative to other functions, of the emotive, the conative and the phatic.35 
As we have seen, the emotive is concerned with the expressivity of the performer; the 
conative function, on the other hand, is imperative or exhortatory, prompting physical, 
emotional or psychological responses on the part of the listener. The phatic refers to the 
maintenance of CONTACT between ADDRESSER and ADDRESSEE, the verification 
that the channel of communication between them is open.36 These three communicative 
functions become more pronounced in the age of recording, partly in order to compensate 
for the fact that the performer is no longer physically present. This points to the 
importance of body language and facial expressions in the overall schema of musical 
communication.37 In the acousmatic realm, the performer’s physical gestures cannot be 





relied upon to execute these functions, so that greater emphasis devolves upon executing 
them by purely sonic means. I’d like to illustrate this by citing one or two examples for 
each function. 
    The first example is that of violinists using vibrato as a means for conveying their 
expressivity. In the early decades of the twentieth century, violin virtuosos substituted the 
physical histrionics of the concert hall with the aural histrionics of expanded and virtually 
continuous vibrato in order to ensure that, in the absence of visual cues, the emotional 
intensity of their performances was conveyed to an audience that was now largely 
comprised of listeners at home.38 Katz (2004) refers to this as a ‘phonograph effect’, 
citing the shift apparent in early recordings from sparing or light vibrato round about the 
turn of the century to its heavy and virtually continuous application a mere decade or so 
later (85). He also notes the difference between nineteenth-century treatises and scores on 
the one hand, from which it can be inferred that vibrato had been used very frugally, and 
later accounts on the other, which either celebrate or denounce the by-now firmly 
entrenched trend for producing wavering pitches via ‘the rapid quiver of the left hand’ 
(85). In addition to the notion that vibrato made up for the lack of visual expressivity, 
Katz suggests two further reasons why the technique caught on in quite the way it did. 
The first is that it helped violinists minimise unwanted bowing noise while, at the same 
time, allowing them to produce enough volume to be picked up by the acoustic horn or 
the electric microphone. The second reason is that vibrato concealed imperfect intonation 
on performances which, musicians knew, would be heard again and again by the 
unforgiving ears of posterity.39  
    The embellishment of pitch accomplished by vibrato is analogous to rhythmic 
embellishment in the form of syncopation. While there is no simple explanation for the 
rise of vibrato among classical violinists nor for the rise of syncopation in the jazz world 
– the causes of each are ‘overdetermined’ – it is interesting to note that both appear to 
have been taken up on a much wider scale during the first few decades of recording. We 
can chart, for example, via the piano rolls and early gramophone recordings he made, 
Fats Waller’s transition from ‘ragtime’ to ‘swing’,  i.e. from the occasional shifting of the 
accent onto the offbeat in certain measures (literally ‘ragged time’) to consistently 
shifting it throughout entire pieces. The characteristically mischievous lag in rhythm 





entered Waller’s playing over the course of about a decade, from the ragtime of ‘T ain’t 
nobody’s biz-ness if I do’ (1922) via the transitional ‘Ain’t misbehavin’ (1929) to the full 
swing of ‘Honeysuckle rose’ (1934) (Goodall 2006). By playing with our expectations of 
where the accent is going to fall, syncopation adds to the emotional impact of a song. As 
in the case of vibrato, it is tempting to speculate that syncopation gave recorded music a 
new kind of expressivity, partly as a way of making up for the fact that musicians’ facial 
expressions and physical gestures were absent from the act of communication. 
    The next example of a communicative function that becomes more important in the 
age of recording is the conative, i.e. an imperative mode of address aimed at eliciting a 
response from the listener. In popular music, this often takes the form of song lyrics 
addressed directly to the listener, such as in Eddie Cochran’s 1958 rallying cry to teenage 
fun, ‘C’mon everybody’. As Richard Middleton (1990) notes, lyrics such as these, 
especially when addressed to a ‘you’ – ‘I will always love you’, etc. – function via 
‘interpellation’, absorbing the listener and their identity into the song’s text, albeit usually 
at a subconscious, affective level (241-2). The conative function also operates in popular 
music, not to mention military music, via exhortatory or imperative rhythms. Even 
listening absent-mindedly, you often find yourself tapping your feet. The intros to 
popular songs can be especially important in goading listeners into action. In music critic 
David Hepworth’s words, the first ten seconds of a good dance record act as ‘a 
combination of permission and order’, getting people up and out of their seats and onto 
the dancefloor (quoted in Chambers 2007). Take, for example, the opening bars of 
Abba’s ‘Dancing queen’: the warm yet ethereal sheen of vocals, punctuated by piano 
chords and underpinned by bass and drums, gives you just enough time to get to your feet 
before you’re straight into the chorus: ‘You can dance, you can jive…’.  Another 
example of a song that brings together the lyrical and rhythmic dimensions of pop 
music’s imperative function is John Lennon’s ‘Instant karma’. Each of the song’s verses 
constitute a catalogue of admonitions and entreaties, with John’s voice straining in order 
to get his message across: ‘You better get yourself together’, ‘What in the world are you 
thinking of?’, ‘What on earth are you trying to do?’, ‘It’s up to you, yeah you!’, etc. In 
the passage from verse to chorus, however, there is a shift from one voice to many, and 
from ‘you’ to ‘we’, suggesting the formation of a collective: ‘And we all shine on…’ and 





‘Everyone, come on!’ The conative ‘we’ of the chorus thus replaces the more usual 
singular addressee of pop songs, implying that the entreaty to ‘join the human race’ has 
been responded to. In terms of rhythm, the piano chords plod along on every beat but 
they are offset by the use of a very predominant backbeat – itself a form of syncopation – 
in which the drummer accents the second and fourth beat of each bar, often punctuating 
Lennon’s singing as, for example, here on the chorus: 
 
And we all *whack* shine *whack* | on *whack* [rest] *whack* | 
             1         2          3           4         1        2         3           4 
   
Like the moon *whack* and the stars *whack* | And the sun *whack* [rest] *whack* || 
               1           2                      3          4                        1          2          3           4 
(Levitin 2006: 67; adapted).40  
 
Furthermore, the use of cross-rhythmic drum-fills temporarily disrupts the song’s other 
rhythms. Such percussion is very conative, almost physically shaking the listener in order 
to make them sit up and pay attention. 
    The third communicative function that becomes heightened in the era of recording is 
the phatic: the ‘endeavor to start and sustain communication’ (Jakobson 1986: 153). This 
concern with CONTACT takes on a peculiar urgency in the phonographic age, not 
because it is difficult for us to access recorded music but because it is too easy. Recorded 
music’s colonisation of almost every single daily environment results in it being heard all 
too often as background noise rather than as a message with informational content. 
Musically, our ears have become attuned to inattention. Writing in a slightly different 
context, Benjamin (1936/1968) describes this kind of musical ‘reception’ as occurring ‘in 
a state of distraction’ that is ‘symptomatic of profound changes in apperception’ (242). 
I’d like to focus on a few examples of attempts to sustain the act of musical 
communication in a culture in which inattentive or distracted listening has become the 
norm. The first concerns a set of musicological features – vamps, riffs, and hooks, etc. – 
all of which are aimed at catching the listener’s interest (Middleton 1990: 242). (This set 
of features includes, but goes well beyond, the kinds of gimmicks and other fetishistic 
details to be found in ‘the novelty song’ (Adorno 1938/1982).41) The second example – 





or rather, group of examples – concerns amplification. With the advent of electric 
amplification, especially of bass frequencies, the notion that hearing is a form of touch 
becomes realisable.42 Sound enters more concretely the fields of haptics and proxemics 
(Waters 2008). In their study of the politics of electronic dance music, Jeremy Gilbert and 
Ewan Pearson (1999) note that ‘As sound, the vibrations of all musics are capable of 
being communicated to the whole body [… . I]t is precisely the bass end of the frequency 
spectrum – comprising of the slowest vibrating sound waves – that provides listeners and 
dancers with the most material, most directly corporeal, types of experience [… . T]he 
bass and sub-bass […] are felt at least as much as they are heard’ (45-6). Amplified 
music is, then, capable of establishing almost direct physical contact with listeners, yet 
there is an unfortunate side to developments in amplification – quite apart from hearing 
loss – which is again predicated on the need to make contact with already-overstimulated 
listeners. The so-called ‘loudness wars’ of the last couple of decades have seen record 
companies and artists engage in a kind of arms race of amplitude, in which each tries to 
make their CDs stand out from those of their rivals by increasing the volume of each 
successive release. This wouldn’t be a problem in itself if it weren’t for the fact that the 
maximum amplitude of CDs is at a fixed level so that, once that level is achieved, the 
only way to attain extra loudness is to bring all the softer dynamics up to a similar 
amplitude. The result is a much smaller or ‘compressed’ dynamic range, as well as some 
distortion or ‘clipping’ of the recording’s waveform.43 As many producers and sound 
engineers themselves admit, these are CDs mixed in order to have an impact in crowded 
bars; music, in other words, to be talked over but which, at the same time, makes 
conversation more difficult (Lynskey 2008: 44).44 
    It can be seen, then, that the new context for musical reception, in which performers 
and listeners inhabit separate physical spaces, alters the act of musical communication as 
a whole. Although some general tendencies can be delineated, there is, in tandem, a 
particularisation of types of listening in the age of recording, depending on which aspects 
of communication are emphasised at any one time. We have, to some degree, become 
proficient at very different kinds of listening. I would like to pursue this further in the 
remainder of this chapter in relation to the different kinds of memory processes that are 
engaged when we listen to recorded music. 






Ravel’s Boléro and the shortened durée 
If one were choosing a piece that exemplifies Western music in the early twentieth 
century, Ravel’s Boléro (1928) might, on the face of it, seem like a strange choice. At a 
time when the Second Viennese School were rigorously avoiding melodic repetition in 
their compositions, Ravel’s piece was built from an unwaveringly repetitive phrase in C 
major, underscored by a snare drum and taken up by the various orchestral instruments 
during the quarter of an hour or so leading up to the piece’s famous climax. Composed as 
a commission for a ballet and scored for a conventional orchestra in a distinctly European 
idiom, Boléro hardly seems to epitomise the decade that F. Scott Fitzgerald termed ‘the 
jazz age’. My interest here with Ravel’s most famous composition is to do with its 
allegorical significance, not as a programmatic piece ‘about’ a particular subject but as a 
piece whose structure and circumstances of composition seem to exemplify certain 
changes undergone by the human sensorium in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. These changes have profoundly altered the way we listen to music, especially 
in terms of the kinds of musical features we listen for and find significant. 
    In spite of being an idiosyncratic piece, both in relation to Ravel’s oeuvre as a whole 
and in relation to the rest of Western art music, Boléro foreshadows the features that 
would come to characterise almost all twentieth-century music, not just that confined to 
the classical concert hall: an emphasis on memorable phrases reinforced by their 
repetition, and the privileging of rhythm, timbre and dynamics as pertinent musical 
features. ‘Orchestration without music’ was Ravel’s rueful judgement of his own 
composition, emphasising the extent to which his primary concern in Boléro was with the 
different tone colours of the instruments that take up the melody, as well as the piece’s 
steadily increasing dynamics (quoted in Staines and Clark et al 2005: 435). The piece 
shows off Ravel’s skill as an orchestrator while concealing his failing perceptions of 
melody and harmony: he is thought to have been experiencing the onset of 
frontotemporal dementia when he composed it. One of the symptoms associated with this 
specific kind of dementia is an impairment of the ability to perform tasks that involve 
complex planning or sequencing – such as writing pieces of music that are through-
composed or that have intricate harmonic structures. Other symptoms include 





compulsivity, repetition, and perseveration, i.e. repeating or prolonging an action or 
utterance after the stimulus that prompted it has ceased (Blakeslee 2008: 1). What Ravel 
was experiencing, in other words, was a shortened sense of ‘duration’. Duration is the 
term Henri Bergson (1889/2001) uses to describe our lived experience of the present as 
being mobile and in flux, extending either side of a mathematical point in time as the 
present moves into the immediate past while anticipating what is about to come. One 
senses that, for Ravel, this impression of the present moment had contracted somewhat, 
making him more reliant in his work on what could easily be grasped and repeated within 
the here and now. 
    It is my contention that something analogous has occurred to our musical faculties as 
listeners in the recorded era. This is to say we have become increasingly drawn to those 
musical features over which Ravel retained complete mastery – timbre, rhythm, dynamics 
– while neglecting those same ones which he lost his grasp on – harmony, counterpoint, 
thematic development, etc. As I will go on to argue, an important determining factor in 
this shift is the phonographic medium itself which has meant, for example, that, in 
popular music especially, musicians now ‘compose with timbre’ and that this is a large 
part of what we as listeners find meaningful in recorded music (Levitin quoted in 
Thompson 2006). In tandem with this, we have become better at discerning nuances of 
pitch and rhythm; for example, when we hear an alternative version of a recording we are 
already familiar with.       
 
Recognising and forgetting recorded music  
The ability to hear the exact same performance again marks a sea change in terms of how 
we listen to and remember music. In an essay entitled ‘The collective memory of 
musicians’, Maurice Halbwachs (1939/1980) remarks on the situation prior to recording: 
‘On leaving a concert, we retain in memory almost nothing of a piece just heard for the 
first time. The melodic themes break up and notes scatter like pearls from a necklace 
whose thread has broken’ (160).45 The reason for this evanescence is to be found in the 
nature of the musical sign itself. According to Halbwachs, ‘a sequence of sounds has no 
other meaning than itself’ and ‘thus is recaptured only by constant re-creation’ (186). 
Unlike a verbal proposition, which can easily be couched in other words, music ‘must be 





retained […] in full’ as ‘no appeal’ can be made as to its ‘meaning’ (ibid.).46 This makes 
non-recorded music exemplary among the arts in terms of the extent of its reliance on 
overtly co-operative forms of memory, including traditions of performance practice that 
supplement what is notated in the score: ‘the possibility of retaining a mass of 
remembrances with every nuance and in precise detail requires bringing into play every 
resource of the collective memory’ (ibid.). 
    Recorded music, by contrast, exacts no such demands – or, at least, different ones. 
Instead of pieces of music being reconstructed from their scores and the surrounding 
culture of musical literacy, they can be heard directly via their recording. As a result, the 
culture of music-making is thrown back upon the ear. This has had profound effects on 
the way music is both heard and composed, and accounts for the dominance of Afro-
American derived styles in twentieth-century music: ‘Suddenly, the performance by an 
improvising musician could be heard directly, without the previously-necessary 
mediation of notation. Details such as quality of voice, rhythmic nuance, expressive 
gesture could be captured and circulated far beyond the musician’s actual location’ 
(McClary 1999/2004: 294). In The Recording Angel, Evan Eisenberg (1988) gives an 
illuminating example of how this circulation of non-notational features occurred at the 
level of musical practice: ‘Whereas Bessie Smith had needed to go on the road with Ma 
Rainey in order to learn from her, Victoria Spivey and Billie Holiday and Mahalia 
Jackson could learn from Bessie Smith by staying put in Texas or Maryland or Louisiana 
and playing her records’ (116). The exquisitely-honed inflections of pitch and rhythm to 
be found in these singers’ work, together with their crafting of unique vocal timbres, is 
thus a feature of musical performance that has come about largely due to the introduction 
of sound recording. 
    Among the non-notational features of music that have become more salient in the age 
of recording, record producer turned musical neuroscientist Daniel Levitin reserves a 
special place for timbre or ‘tone colour’. Timbre is the unique set of acoustical vibrations 
produced by a person’s voice box or a particular musical instrument.47 Due to the fact 
that recording allows us to listen repeatedly to the same performance, more of our 
attention becomes placed on this musical parameter. During an interview, Levitin invites 
a journalist from the New York Times to identify a recording by listening to only a 





snippet: a single chord struck on a piano. The journalist recognises it instantly as the 
opening to Elton John’s ‘Bennie and the Jets’. ‘Nobody else’s piano sounds quite like 
that’, Levitin explains. Like so many other pop musicians, Elton John ‘compose[s] with 
timbre’, creating sounds with a distinct aural fingerprint and combining them to produce 
new sound-worlds that immediately distinguish his records from those of other artists 
(quoted in Thompson 2006). Levitin (2006) cites a study in which non-musicians were 
consistently able to match snippets of Top 40 pop songs with which they were already 
familiar to their titles. In each case the excerpt was a mere tenth of a second – about the 
same duration as a finger click – so that the subjects could not rely on melody or rhythm 
to identify the songs, just timbre (155-6). 
    The rise of timbre to its current position of pre-eminence in the world of popular music 
can be charted in other ways and over a much longer timescale than by referring solely to 
the history of recording. Levitin argues that whereas music from at least the time of the 
ancient Greeks onwards had been dominated by pitch, ‘[f]or the past two hundred years 
or so, timbre has become increasingly important’, with new musical instruments being 
invented ‘so that composers might have a larger palette of timbral colors from which to 
draw’ (52). As a result, there are distinct differences between baroque, classical and 
romantic timbres. New combinations of existing instruments have also been significant, 
for instance, in the meticulously crafted ‘sound paintings’ of Ravel and Scriabin, or in 
Wagner’s amassing of huge string sections, which allowed for greater dynamic range as 
well as new tonal shades. We can therefore discern differences in the way composers 
from the same era use timbre in their work. The rise of timbre is due, then, to other 
factors besides the invention of sound recording. One such factor is the way in which 
‘noise’ became progressively musicalised via the experiments of the classically-trained 
avant-garde. One thinks, for example, of Stravinsky’s idea for a composition consisting 
of one single chord in which only the timbres of the constituent pitches change; or of 
Russolo’s Futurist manifesto, The Art of Noises (1913), and the series of concerts held in 
London the following year in which he presented his intonarumori (‘noise instruments’); 
one thinks of the electronic music of Varèse; or of John Cage’s ‘prepared’ piano – the 
placing of leather, felt, pieces of metal and other objects between the instrument’s strings, 





thereby transforming its sound into something more like a percussion orchestra than a 
piano. Levitin cites other, more conventional examples of timbre’s importance:  
 
A standard component of music across all genres is to restate a melody using different 
instruments – from Beethoven’s Fifth and Ravel’s Boléro to the Beatles’ ‘Michelle’ […]. 
When a […] singer stops singing and another instrument takes up the melody – even 
without changing it in any way – we find pleasurable the repetition of the same melody 
with a different timbre (ibid.).  
 
Tone colour is such an important attribute of certain musical phrases that their impact 
would be greatly diminished if they were played on a different instrument or if different 
effects were applied to them. Imagine the gloriously begrimed fuzz of the guitar riff from 
The Rolling Stones’ ‘Satisfaction’ played on an acoustic guitar, or a flute or piano for that 
matter. Something of the slouching unease inherent in the phrase’s semitone interval 
would still be there but its musical merit would be quite limited. This was indeed the 
doubt that beset its creator, Keith Richards, prior to the riff becoming an integral part of 
the Stones’ most famous recording. Richards initially envisaged the fuzzbox-driven 
guitar being replaced in the final take of the song by a horn section but was overruled by 
the other members of the group as well as their manager and sound engineer. 
    Other factors notwithstanding, it is the capacity for hearing the same recording many 
times that explains, in large part, why timbre is of such importance in the phonographic 
age. The ability to hear exactly the same performance again allows for much finer 
gradations of discrimination between tone colours, as well as a greater sensitivity to 
nuances of pitch and rhythm. To quote Levitin, ‘When you hear that same song by a 
favourite artist replicated thousands of times, it lays down memory traces that are very 
vivid and detailed’ (quoted in Appleyard 2007: 9).48 In a study of the aesthetics of rock 
music, Theodore Gracyk (1996) expands upon this point, claiming that the expectation 
involved in listening to familiar recordings is of a completely different order to that of 
live gigs, the former being more concerned with shades of nuance and timbre than with 
the apprehension of melody: ‘No longer attuned to the question of how long the guitar 
will hold a note, we are free to savor and anticipate qualities and details that are simply 
too ephemeral to be relevant in live performance. When records are the medium, every 
aspect is available for our discrimination and thus for its interpretative potential’ (55). 
This, in turn, means that much of the pleasure of recorded popular music is based on 





recognition or else on having our expectations challenged by unfamiliar nuances and 
timbres: a novel instrumental effect, for example, or a striking vocal persona enacting a 
new kind of musical vernacular. 
    In the way we remember nuances of pitch, rhythm and timbre, there is a divergence 
between recognition and recall; this is to say, we can recognise such nuances when we 
hear them but cannot ordinarily recall them in our ‘mind’s ear’ once we have finished 
listening. Snyder (2000) writes about this from the perspective of cognitive psychology, 
evoking comparisons with the Kantian sublime – an aesthetic impression that seemingly 
defies the normal categories of experience: 
  
An important aspect of nuances is that, under normal circumstances, they cannot easily be 
remembered by listeners. Because category structure is a basic feature of explicit long-term 
memory, nuanced information, which bypasses this type of memory, is difficult to 
remember: it is ‘ineffable.’ This is probably the major reason why recordings, which freeze 
the details of particular musical performances, can be listened to many times and continue 
to seem vital and interesting (87-8). 
 
Gracyk (1996) concurs with this view: 
 
We can hear minute differences between similar timbres while listening, but these nuances 
begin to be forgotten about a second after the sounds cease […]. When timbre is the basis 
for expressive qualities of a work – and it seems very important for recorded rock – it will 
have an expressive impact in direct experience that will be absent in our memories of it. 
Hence listening to it will be important in a way that remembering it is not (59-60; emphasis 
in original). 
 
    To reiterate, recording has helped to make non-notational features more important in 
music, both in terms of production – the kind of music that gets made – and in terms of 
reception – the way we listen. Although we recognise and respond to nuances of timbre, 
pitch and rhythm when we hear them, we struggle to recall them later, in our ‘mind’s 
ear’, hence recorded music’s ability to surprise us with its vividness of detail, even after 
many listenings. In this way, an oscillation between forgetting and recognition has 
become crucial to the experience of recorded music. The listener forgets many nuances of 
timbre as well as many inflections of pitch and rhythm as they are not usually coded 
semantically, i.e. as long-term, musicological memories with a propositional content, but 
he or she is suddenly able to recognise them upon hearing them again.49 





    Having analysed how non-notational musical features have gained predominance in the 
age of recording, it becomes easier to make sense of – but not to share – Adorno’s 
blanket rejection of twentieth-century popular music. Wedded as he was to ‘structural’ 
listening mediated by the score, Adorno was often insensitive to the inner detail of music 
such as jazz, which had flourished as an integral part of the culture of phonography. To 
use the terms of Nicholas Cook’s critique, Adorno’s way of listening was more 
‘musicological’ than ‘musical’ (Cook 1990: 152). Chanan (1994) explores this idea 
further: 
 
Notation erected a block in the Western ear against the inner complexities of non-Western 
musics. A strange kind of deafness appeared in the most sophisticated ears – Adorno 
himself […] suffered from it. Under the hegemony of notation, the Western psyche came to 
fear the embrace of what it repressed, and responded to any music which manifested this 
repressed material as if it were a threat to civilization (77-8). 
 
    Yet, in other respects, we must concede that Adorno was uncannily perceptive about 
the way popular music often functions in the age of recording. Over time, we come to 
like what we can recognise because it serves as an index, a more or less unmediated sign, 
of our own lives and our own identities. As Adorno (1938/1982) writes, ‘The familiarity 
of the piece is a surrogate for the quality ascribed to it. To like it is almost the same thing 
as to recognize it’ (271). This situation is particularly the case when inattentive musical 
reception predominates, when listeners ‘fluctuate between comprehensive forgetting and 
sudden dives into recognition’ (286). This description corresponds in key respects to that 
of the secretary with whom Adorno’s friend and mentor, Siegfried Kracauer, became 
acquainted as part of an ethnographic study of white-collar workers. Kracauer 
(1930/1998) remarks: 
 
It is typical of her that, in a dancehall or suburban café, she cannot hear a piece of music 
without at once chirruping the appropriate popular hit. But it is not she who knows every 
hit, rather the hits know her, steal up behind her and gently lay her low. She is left in a state 
of stupor (70).  
  
The attribution of agency here to the records rather than to the secretary smacks of 
condescension on Kracauer’s part; we can only assume that, for the subject in question, 
her enjoyment of popular music was linked to her use of it as a performative resource, a 





way of constructing an identity out of the cultural materials in her immediate 
environment, and in this sense the ‘hits’ she sang along to were really no different from 
the ‘high’ cultural materials with which someone like Kracauer would have been 
familiar. Yet there is also a degree to which, in a world characterised by rapid and on-
going change, forging a sense of self becomes an act of improvisation, and the secretary’s 
relatively new sociological status would have made this task all the more pressing. In the 
midst of the culture of modernity, which makes it seemingly ever harder to remember 
who we are – in the sense of where we come from, what we do, where and among whom 
we feel we belong – we often respond to music we are familiar with out of an affective 
obligation to those shards of autobiographical memories that can be pieced together to 
form a life. This is to say that music – all music – in the age of recording becomes more 
intimately entwined with identity and the problems of identity. While modernity 
functions to dislodge traditional notions of self grounded in relatively stable experiences 
of time and place, we respond by actively engaging in the formation of more mobile and 
contingent identities from whatever fragments are at our disposal, including recorded 
music.










Recorded Music in Everyday Life 
* 
 
[W]e are each nodes in an enormous array of listening. 




I’m in an indoor market in Bristol. In the main hall of the large civic building, with its 
various stalls of clothes, jewellery, and vintage knick-knacks, a song is playing, imbuing 
the atmosphere with a stillness and poignancy that is almost too much for the 
everydayness of the location to sustain. When the tune – Snow Patrol’s ‘Chasing cars’? – 
comes to an end, it’s as if the workaday rhythms of midmorning and midweek can 
resume. The elderly man who runs the toy stall starts singing the song to himself, barely 
aware that he’s doing so, substituting ‘la’s and ‘da’s for the actual words and slightly 
changing the melody. When I pass by him again five minutes later, he’s still singing but 
the melody has changed even more. 
    Sitting inside my flat, I can hear the jingle from an ice-cream van being played over 
and over again. Appropriately enough for a sunny day, the tune is ‘The sun has got his 
hat on’.50 The jingles are a fairly common occurrence where my partner and I live, not 
because the streets are teeming with eager ice-cream vendors, but because there’s a 
garage tucked round the corner, where an ageing fleet of vans are serviced. Situated on a 
desolate backstreet, the garage is attached to an ice-cream wholesaler’s at the front, 
which faces on to the main road. Together with the pealing of bells from the nearby 
church and the steam train that sounds its whistle as it passes by in the summer months, 
the ice-cream jingles contribute to the sonic richness of the neighbourhood, steeping it in 
nostalgic ‘pet sounds’.51  





    I’m in the park one morning when I become aware of the sound of a trumpet 
emanating from one of the nearby houses. After listening for some moments to what the 
musician is practising, I smilingly recognise it as the theme tune from The Flumps: a TV 
programme I used to watch as a child. I can picture the fluffy creatures of the show’s 
title, can remember – or think I can remember – sitting down to watch it with my mum, 
as a toddler in the 1970s. The tune’s characteristic interspersing of pairs of quavers with 
quarter-rests, and the simplicity of its harmonic progression, which, in the manner of 
countless other melodies, modulates between tonic and subdominant before being 
followed by an authentic cadence, must have constituted part of my unwitting induction 
as an infant into the Western system of tonality, so that melodies like this are now so 
familiar, they’re part of my musical hard-wiring.52 
    These examples of auditory glimpses might not initially seem to be very representative 
of music in everyday life for being so specific and idiosyncratic, yet perhaps this is the 
point: if we reduce the everyday to its most general lineaments, we have failed to 
recognise its true character. In each of their separate ways, the examples just recounted 
suggest something of both the strangeness and familiarity of the everyday, the 
interpenetration of, on the one hand, that which we take for granted and, on the other, that 
which comes as an abrupt surprise. These examples combine the mundanity and the 
extraordinariness of the everyday. As such, they are instances of what I term ‘everyday 
reveries’, a notion that is explored in more detail in chapter six. An everyday reverie 
occurs when music that would ordinarily be heard as background noise is suddenly 
foregrounded and listened to attentively. As part of this experience, there is for the 
listener an enfolding of memory, a heightening of affect, an altered impression of time, 
and a new sensitivity towards his or her immediate physical environment and those he or 
she shares it with.     
    In this chapter, I will be examining the way in which musical recordings are able to 
migrate between different social and cultural contexts, often taking on new meanings in 
the process. I will present the contention that, in everyday life, music tends to resolve into 
stray fragments, both in the way it is consumed and in the way it is later remembered. 
Among these free-floating riffs, hooks, and refrains devoid of a stable context, the jingle 
will be considered as the paradigmatic example. Jingles are motifs written with the 





express intention of being memorable and are thus able to lodge their way into every 
available and contingent crevice, making them among the most mobile and ‘portable’ of 
musical forms. Before examining these nomadic musical forms in more detail, I wish to 
clarify what exactly is meant by a phrase, the very ordinariness of which obfuscates its 
many levels of meaning and disguises its historical and cultural lineaments. The phrase in 
question is ‘everyday life’. 
 
Music and everyday life 
In the era prior to recording, an historically-formed distinction can be observed between 
everyday music and music for special occasions. When one looks, for example, at 
paintings that depict music-making, both pre- and post-Renaissance, a noticeable class 
difference is to be found in this regard (Leppert 1993). Amongst the labouring classes, 
music is woven into the fabric of everyday life; it is simply in the air. For the aristocracy 
or nascent bourgeosie, however, music marks the site of social ritual: an event set aside 
from the everyday. This contrast should not be exaggerated, especially as music was a 
feature of weddings and other social occasions among farm workers. But in securing its 
own prestige, the upper strata of society sought to make their own music distinct from 
that of the lower classes. To achieve this, they reserved their music for activities at one 
remove from everyday life. Music became a decidedly unquotidian activity, increasingly 
an end in itself, requiring no bodily affirmation via singing or dancing. 
    The effect of recording is to immediately problematise this distinction. The ubiquity of 
recorded music makes it more difficult to use it as a way of demarcating a special time 
and space set apart from the everyday (Frith 2001). It becomes more difficult, for 
instance, for a classical concert to be regarded as a peak experience when background 
music is broadcast in the foyer immediately beforehand. The correlate of this is that the 
presence of musical recordings – through the earphones of an iPod, for example, or over 
a public-address system – can imbue ostensibly mundane situations such as the weekly 
shop with moments of reverie or specialness: the awakening of fond personal 
reminiscences, a fleeting sense of uncanniness or heightened affect perhaps, or a vivid 
impression of sensuous repletion. Due to this interpenetration of ordinariness and 
extrordinariness in our reception of music in everyday life, the category of the ‘everyday’ 





itself is subject to change. More generally, one might state that ‘everyday life’ emerges 
from the dialectical interplay of mundanity, routine, and repetition on the one hand, and 
uncanniness, phantasmagoria, and surreality on the other.53 
    It should be underscored at this point that the ‘everyday’ is an historically-constructed 
category rather than a transhistorical one, though this can seem contrary to our sense of 
what is typically meant by the term. To state the matter somewhat baldly, ‘everyday life’ 
is a set of experiences with a common rhythm and locus, emerging at first in the newly 
industrialised cities of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. To quote Henri 
Lefebvre (1971/1984), whose work stands at the forefront of properly critical and 
historicised accounts of the everyday, ‘Undoubtedly people have always had to be fed, 
clothed, housed and have had to produce and then re-produce that which has been 
consumed; but until the nineteenth century, until the advent of competitive capitalism and 
the expansion of the world of trade the quotidian as such did not exist’ (38). Essential 
factors in the formation of a sense of the everyday are the amassing of populations in 
urban centres and the routinisation of work and leisure in terms of strict spatial divisions 
between home and workplace, as well as equally strict temporal divisions between days 
of the week and within the working day. Life is no longer determined to the same extent 
by the traditional cycle of the seasons and the various labours and festivals associated 
with it. Instead, rapid and continual change becomes the norm, with the everyday as its 
ballast or counterpoint. In this regard, Rita Felski (2002) identifies everyday life as a 
regulatory force governed by three key principles: repetition, home, and habit. ‘The 
temporality of the everyday […] is that of repetition, the spatial ordering of the everyday 
is anchored in a sense of home and the characteristic mode of experiencing the everyday 
is that of habit’ (18). 
    ‘Everyday life’, then, is constituted through particular kinds of spatial and temporal 
organisation. Indeed, it could be argued that we do away with the ‘everyday’ as a critical 
category and replace it with an analysis of space and time seeing that the term ‘everyday 
life’ always implies a consideration of spatio-temporal modalities. This, I wish to argue, 
would be a mistake, as what a critical formulation of the everyday draws attention to, in 
addition to the particular rhythmic and spatial orchestrations of social behaviour in 
modern life, is the increasing division, specialisation and hierarchical ordering of skills 





and discourses that has occurred in modernity: the way that certain modes of becoming 
(physical labour, habit, affect, tactility, ‘absent-mindedness’) and certain modes of 
description (vernacular, slang, the ‘vulgar’,  the ‘feminine’, the ‘child-like’ and ‘naïve’) 
have been marginalised or ‘remaindered’ as obvious and transparent or merely quotidian, 
in contrast to types of behaviour and discourses that are considered ‘rational’, ‘scientific’, 
‘technical’, ‘analytical’, or ‘intellectual’ (and by extension, ‘white’, ‘masculine’ and 
‘authoritative’). ‘Premodern societies’, on the other hand, ‘formed a relatively coherent, 
organic totality, and different activities and knowledges were more fully integrated into 
everyday life’ (Gardiner 2000: 10). There has occurred, then, over the last three- or four-
hundred years what T.S. Eliot (1921/2006) refers to as a ‘dissociation of sensibility’: an 
(attempted) separation of mind from matter, reason from the passions, and intellectual 
work from physical labour (198).54 And it is as a consequence of these far-reaching 
dualisms and their dialectical interpenetration that ‘everyday life’ as such is constituted. 
As Mike Featherstone (1992) puts it, ‘science, art, philosophy and other forms of 
theoretical knowledge originally embedded within everyday life become progressively 
separated and subjected to specialist development, followed by a further phase whereby 
this knowledge is fed back in order to rationalize, colonize and homogenize everyday 
life’ (162). 
    With a few exceptions – Marx, Freud, Benjamin – social theory prior to Lefebvre 
(1947/1991) tended to offer an untheorised, uncritical, and ahistorical conception of 
everyday life. This was particularly true of empirical sociology, and remains so. As 
David Hesmondhalgh (2002) points out, ‘The “everyday” is a taken-for-granted category 
in such sociology, hardly ever discussed or defined, even in books which carry the term 
in its title. “Everyday” […] comes to mean something like “ordinary human experience” ’ 
(120).55 Such work unwittingly reproduces the same separation of discourses and the 
same reification of the everyday as an object of rational technocractic control. After 
Lefebvre, however – in the work of Mikhail Bakhtin (1965/1984), Guy Debord 
(1967/1995), Maurice Blanchot (1969/1993), Agnes Heller (1970/1984), and Michel de 
Certeau (1974/1984) – everyday life is figured not simply as a site of mundanity, routine, 
and repetition but as a site of possible resistance: a mode of becoming that, to some 
degree, evades rational analysis and control, and hence presents the possibility of 





challenging it. Summarising this critically-engaged strand of writing on the everyday, 
Alice Kaplan and Kristin Ross (1987) argue that ‘Even at its most degraded, the everyday 
harbors the possibility of its own transformation; it gives rise, in other words, to desires 
which cannot be satisfied within the weekly cycle of production/consumption. It is in the 
midst of the utterly ordinary, in the space where the dominant relations of production are 
tirelessly and relentlessly reproduced, that we must look for utopian and political 
aspirations to crystallize’ (3). Such writers are not naively optimistic about the everyday, 
nor do they dispense entirely with abstract, conceptual knowledge as a way of 
understanding it; they suggest, however, that there is something left over from everyday 
experience which can never be captured by discursive language, and which is, in some 
cases, resistant to it. Certeau (1974/1984), whose work is exemplary in this regard, 
stresses that ‘everyday practices’ such as ‘talking, reading, moving about, shopping, 
cooking, etc.’ are not just structurally determined or passive but can, instead, become 
ways of actively re-combining the ‘given elements’ of everyday life so that their meaning 
and function change (xix). Such ‘tactics’, as Certeau calls them, belong to ‘the art of 
manipulating “commonplaces” and the inevitability of events in such a way as to make 
them “habitable” ’ (xxii). They are a type of ‘bricolage’ or ‘making do’, representing the 
‘victor[y] of the “weak” over the “strong” ’ (xv, xix). Certeau repeatedly turns to the 
example of the indigenous peoples of Central and South America: 
 
Submissive, and even consenting to their subjection [at the hands of the Spanish 
colonisers], the Indians nevertheless often made of the rituals, representations, and laws 
imposed on them something quite different from what their conquerors had in mind: they 
subverted them not by rejecting or altering them, but by using them with respect to ends 
and references foreign to the system they had no choice but to accept (xiii; emphasis in 
original). 
 
In a similar way, Certeau notes that those who occupy subaltern positions in 
contemporary society – children, housewives, homosexuals, immigrants, tenants, 
employees –  develop ways of subverting cultural and material practices in their day-to-
day lives, ‘turn[ing] to their own ends forces alien to them’ (xix). 
    Everyday life understood in Certeauvian terms is, then, an ongoing act of bricolage – a 
‘making do’ with what is to hand but in ways that actively recombine and transform 
given material elements and what they signify. Bricolage has, of course, been one of the 





foundational concepts in cultural studies, particularly in relation to postwar popular 
music. This is evident when one looks at landmark texts from the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham, such as the collection of essays edited by 
Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, Resistance Through Rituals (1975/1993), as well as Dick 
Hebdige’s Subculture: The Meaning of Style (1979). It is also evident in the work of 
Lawrence Grossberg (1997), the earliest exponent of Birmingham-style cultural studies in 
the United States. This body of work has argued for subcultural musical genres and their 
associated fashions as a type of do-it-yourself collage, in which borrowed materials are 
arranged in such a way as to constitute a unified but contestatory semiotic system. 
Whether such writers are focusing on teddy boys, mods, skinheads or punks, the idea is 
that resistance is signified through the active re-combining of pre-existing cultural forms 
and artefacts in a way that disrupts the dominant symbolic order. Hebdige’s eulogy to 
punk serves as a signal example: 
 
Objects borrowed from the most sordid of contexts found a place in punks’ ensembles: 
lavatory chains were draped in graceful arcs across chests encased in plastic bin-liners. 
Safety pins were taken out of their domestic ‘utility’ context and worn as gruesome 
ornaments through the cheek, ear or lip. ‘Cheap’ trashy fabrics (PVC, plastic, lurex, etc.) in 
vulgar designs (e.g. mock leopard skin) and ‘nasty’ colours, long discarded by the quality 
end of the fashion industry as obsolete kitsch, were salvaged by the punks and turned into 
garments (fly boy drainpipes, ‘common’ miniskirts) which offered self-conscious 
commentaries on the notions of modernity and taste (Hebdige 1979: 107).  
 
In a similar vein but focusing on music and its relationship to affect, Lawrence Grossberg 
(1997) also describes youth-orientated musical genres as a type of ‘bricolage’, endlessly 
borrowing and recombining elements from already-existing styles of music. ‘Rock and 
roll’, he writes, ‘removes signs, objects, sounds, styles, and so forth from their apparently 
meaningful existence within the dominant culture and relocates them within an affective 
alliance of differentiation and resistance. The resultant shock – of both recognition and an 
undermining of meaning – produces a temporarily impassable boundary within the 
dominant culture, an encapsulation of the affective possibilities of the rock and roll 
culture’ (36). 
    At a more primordial level, it can be argued that music begins as bricolage, in the sense 
that found objects are put to new uses: an animal bone is fashioned into a flute, a dried 
seed pod becomes a shaker, a tree branch hollowed out by termites is used as a 





didgeridoo. This practice of music-making as bricolage continued into the twentieth 
century, for example, in the use of thimbles and a washboard to produce a new kind of 
percussion instrument, or the fashioning of a double bass from a tea chest. Bricolage has 
also been important in the history of recorded music, with key developments often 
resulting from already-existing materials and technologies being re-combined or used in 
ways not intended by their manufacturers. In many cases, these developments have been 
anticipated by the experiments of the classically-trained avant-garde. In using two or 
more record players at one time in order to combine music from separate discs, Paul 
Hindemith and Ernst Toch’s Grammophonmusik (1930) presaged turntablism and DJ 
culture. Similarly, audiotape experiments involving splicing, looping, and phase shifting 
were the forerunners of digital sampling. These experiments include James Tenney’s 
Collage No. 1 (‘Blue Suede’) (1961) – a tape collage of Elvis Presley’s ‘Blue Suede 
Shoes’ – and Steve Reich’s It’s Gonna Rain (1965) for which Reich recorded a 
Pentecostal preacher in San Francisco’s Union Square telling the story of Noah. When 
the preacher, Brother Walter, intoned the apocalyptic phrase ‘it’s gonna rain’, he was 
accompanied, quite by accident, by the sound of a pigeon taking flight. Through 
successive loops and phase shifting – i.e. the same recording being played on two 
machines but at slightly different speeds – the sound of flapping wings became the 
piece’s percussive foundation. Another example of existing technology being put to new 
uses concerns the defining instrument of acid house and techno. The Roland TB-303 bass 
line sequencer (1981-4) was originally marketed to guitarists as a way of providing them 
with bass accompaniment when practising alone, but when pushed into overdrive by 
house-music pioneers such as the Chicago-based group Phuture, it was made to produce 
high-frequency oscillations: a dirty, rippling buzz as if a field of metallic grasshoppers 
had imbibed psychedelics. This sound can be heard on Phuture’s 1987 composition, 
‘Acid tracks’. 
    My main concern in this chapter is with musical bricolage at the level of listening: a 
kind of interpretative bricolage, a search for the chance combinations and collage-like 
effects of hearing music in ever-shifting circumstances. This is one dimension of the 
‘everyday reverie’, an idea I develop more thoroughly in chapter six. As we have already 
seen, the textual meaning of a piece of music is changed by its insertion into a different 





context. Later on in the current chapter, I will explore this process with reference to 
concrete examples, focusing on the migration of recurrent melodies and other musical 
fragments between diverse social and cultural situations. The notion of the everyday 
reverie implies in this regard an attempt to actively interpret or at least to attend closely to 
what one hears, particularly in terms of the interplay of text and context. This, however, 
does not equate to self-conscious listening but, rather, profoundly conscious listening: an 
absorption in the music of one’s environment, both literal and metaphorical. The 
everyday reverie is thus a fleeting union of subject and object, an ‘assemblage’ of listener 
and music in which the physical, affective and intellectual meanings of such encounters 
are actively invited and explored. 
    For the moment, I would like to pursue the broader affiliations between music and the 
everyday in terms of their shared characteristics and modes of signification. It is my 
contention that there is a loose analogical affinity between music and everyday life. In a 
book on musical semiotics, Wilson Coker (1972) writes: ‘through its temporal 
characteristics music displays its profound likeness to life, because through temporal 
characteristics both music and life achieve organization’ (208). Arguably, repetition and 
recurrence are the temporal characteristics that unite music and everyday life most 
strongly. This is Lefebvre’s claim. Just as ‘[e]veryday life is made of recurrence’ in the 
sense of being composed of gestures and movements that are repeated on a greater or 
lesser timescale, so too is music (Lefebvre 1971/1984: 18). ‘[A]ll music’, he observes, ‘is 
repeatable; all melodies tend towards an end […] that may start a repeat’ (19). This 
musical repetition relies on the workings of memory in order to be perceived. It is 
mnemonic in another sense too: ‘Emotions from the past are re-evoked and moments 
recalled by and through music’ (ibid.). If we tend to think of repetition in everyday life as 
merely entailing monotony and drudgery, we should therefore pause to think: 
 
Such visions of the horror of repetition […] are distinctively modern. For most of human 
history, activities have gained value precisely because they repeat what has gone before. 
Repetition, understood as ritual, provides a connection to ancestry and tradition; it situates 
the individual in an imagined community that spans historical time. It is thus not opposed 
to transcendence, but is the means of transcending one’s historically limited existence 
(Felski 2002: 20). 
 





It should be noted that music of one kind or another, and its repetition, continues to be an 
integral part of many different kinds of rituals. Music, which – as Lefebvre (1971/1984) 
reminds us – is founded in repetition and recurrence of one kind or another, ‘is at the 
same time nothing else but lyricism, profusion and dream’ (20). Its similar temporal 
organisation allows it to evoke a poetics of the everyday – to ‘express the secret nature of 
everyday life’ as Lefebvre puts it, or, more pessimistically to ‘compensate […] for its 
triviality and superficiality’ (ibid.). Music evokes the recurrences and repetitions of 
everyday life but in doing so is able to transcend them.  
    Another affinity with everyday life is to be found in music’s non-referential mode of 
signification – the fact that it is generally connotative rather then denotative. In 
Saussurean terms, music is a signifier without any obvious signified: a sign vehicle 
without any readily identifiable concept attached to it. Similarly, in the semiotics of 
Saussure’s neglected contemporary, C.S. Peirce, music is a sign of something rather than 
a sign about something: it signifies at the more direct and concrete levels of ‘firstness’ 
and ‘secondness’ rather than the more mediated and abstract ‘third’ level of language and 
other ‘symbolic’ systems. This inexplicitness of music accords with the inexplicitness of 
everyday life – its relative ‘invisibility’. An essay by Maurice Blanchot (1969/1993) on 
‘Everyday speech’ helps clarify this connection. Blanchot describes the everyday as 
being ‘without a truth proper to it’: ‘It belongs to insignificance; the insignificant being 
what is without truth, without reality, and without secret, but also perhaps the site of all 
possible signification’ (238-240). To make the analogy with musical signification, music 
– like the everyday – says nothing and yet constitutes a ground for all possible 
statements. As Susanne Langer (1957) writes: 
 
The assignment of meanings [in music] is a shifting, kaleidoscopic play, probably below 
the threshold of consciousness, certainly outside the pale of discursive thinking […]. The 
lasting effect [of music] is […] to make things conceivable rather than to store up 
propositions (Langer 1957: 244). 
 
Music is a highly suggestive yet inchoate mode of expression, thus sharing in the ‘non-
significance’ of the everyday as described by Blanchot. ‘The everyday escapes’: ‘If we 
seek it through knowledge we cannot help but miss it, for it belongs to a region where 
there is still nothing to know’ (Blanchot 1969/1993: 241). 





    In his survey of everyday life studies, Ben Highmore (2002) claims that ‘everyday life 
is characterized by ambiguities, instabilities and equivocation’ with the result that ‘no 
form of discourse is ever going to be “proper” (appropriate) to [it]’ (17, 21). But perhaps 
music is this ‘form’ precisely because it is not quite ‘discourse’? To put this another way, 
music might be adequate to the task of describing the everyday because of the very 
inexplicitness of its mode of description. One could claim on its behalf, for example, that 
it connotes quotidian details in all their fluidity and contingency. As we have seen, 
Lefebvre (1971/1984) is tempted to privilege music in this regard, though he also 
wonders whether ‘architecture, painting, dancing, poetry or games’ might not be equally 
capable of evoking everyday life (20). If not the poetics of the everyday, then, music 
might at least be a poetics of everyday life. The current ubiquity of recorded sound means 
that, via music’s repetitive and recurrent temporal organisation and its connotative mode 
of signification, it evokes everyday life while being firmly lodged in its midst.   
 
Musical repetition 
Whether it be at the micro-level of a pitch, interval, melody or harmony, or the macro-
level of an entire section or even a whole work, repetition of musical material is crucial to 
the psychological experience of music. As remarked on earlier, musical repetition of all 
kinds engages the listener’s memory or, rather, a complex set of memory processes. If, as 
humans, we were cognitively different in terms of the way we remembered, our music 
would be very different as a result. Take short-term memory, for example. Its span of 
somewhere between five to nine seconds corresponds to the amount of musical material 
we can hear as belonging to the ‘present’ moment; as a result, a typical musical phrase 
across all cultures and all styles of music will not usually be longer than nine seconds. (If 
it is, it becomes very difficult even for accomplished musicians to repeat it after hearing it 
just once.) Intelligent life forms on other planets, however, might listen to music that falls 
into phrases of much longer duration. Such music, if it existed, would be largely 
unintelligible to our ears; we would literally ‘not get it’. One could make the more 
general point that music has a meaning for us because we recognise it: we recognise 
either the style, genre or era it belongs to, the location it originates from, or we recognise 





the specific piece. In the recorded era, we often recognise a performer’s voice even 
though we might not be familiar with the particular song we are listening to. 
    To a greater extent than we often appreciate, then, it is the repetition of musical 
material, both introversively and extroversively, that makes music meaningful and 
comprehensible – though too much repetition can, of course, drain music of meaning. A 
comparison of music and language is instructive in rendering more clearly the importance 
of repetition for musical communication. Whereas language, ideally, tends towards 
maximum information and minimum repetition, music tends towards minimum 
information and maximum repetition. It is not too much to say that music is, in essence, 
repetition, for without some explicitly iterative aspect, even if it is just the return of a 
particular pitch, rhythm or timbre, there would be little about incoming auditory 
information that could be described as ‘musical’. In his popular musicology, Richard 
Middleton employs Jakobson’s terminology, identifying (popular) music’s reliance on 
repetition as being crucial to its phatic aspect: the need to establish contact as one of the 
primary motives and expressions within musical communication. As Middleton (1990) 
comments, ‘The import [of repetitive musical phrases such as vamps and riffs] is: “Do 
you recognize this? Am I getting through? Are we on the same wave-length?” ’ (242). 
Music’s phatic function can be characterised, in part, as communication for 
communication’s sake: repetition in order to establish that communication is indeed 
occurring.  
    In what follows, I would briefly like to examine two main types of musical repetition 
before going on to consider the significance of re-hearing a fragment from a familiar 
piece of music but in a context that is markedly different from the one in which it was 
first heard. The first kind of repetition I would like to consider is introversive repetition: 
repetition within a single piece of music. Following Leonard Meyer (1956), introversive 
repetition can be subdivided into ‘reiteration’ and ‘recurrence’ (151-2). ‘Recurrence’ is 
the reappearance of melody or harmony after an intervening passage that is noticeably 
different, ‘reiteration’ the simple and prolonged repetition of the same musical material. 
‘Recurrence’ and ‘reiteration’ set up different patterns of expectation. The former causes 
the listener to anticipate the return of a phrase, melody or harmony, etc. whereas the latter 
will tend to make him or her expect some sort of deviation. In either case, ‘recurrence’ or 





‘reiteration’, the effect of hearing musical material a second, third, or fourth time is quite 
different to that of hearing it for the first time. The repetition of a melody is an example 
of what Meyer calls a ‘resolved audition’. As this phrase suggests, there is less tension in 
hearing a phrase or motif again, less uncertainty about where the music is going or what 
is to come. 
    And this is true also of extroversive repetition: the repetition of a piece of music, either 
in its entirety or as a fragment. A piece of music has a different significance for us if we 
are already familiar with it. This second main type of repetition is a feature most 
obviously of the age of recording, in which the exact same performance can be listened to 
again and again, but it is also dependent in a broader historical sense on, firstly, the 
development of musical notation in the Middle Ages and, secondly, on the stabilisation of 
a canon of European art music during the nineteenth century. Prior to this, the author of a 
work did not hear it performed more than perhaps once in his lifetime – as was the case 
with Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony and the majority of Mozart’s works (Attali 1977/1985: 
100).           
    The significance in one’s life of much recorded music, especially pop music, can be 
compared to the significance of strangers whom we pass each day on our way to work. 
With time, there is a certain sense of intimate discomfort as you pass each other at almost 
exactly the same spot and at exactly the same minute of the day for the nth time. Just as 
these strangers, quite arbitrarily it seems, give shape to one’s daily life, so too does music 
that one is exposed to on a recurrent, diurnal basis, such as a song playlisted for radio 
airplay, or a TV or radio theme tune – Coronation Street and The Archers to mention two 
of the most enduring and memorable British examples. In the same way that the role 
occupied by these intimate strangers could be filled by anyone, so too does it not really 
matter what the content of the music consists of in order to make it meaningful. The fact 
that it recurs and persists in our lives for a certain duration and then is heard again is 
enough to imbue it with significance. The nostalgic value we grant it over time follows 









Stray refrains, mobile motifs, and quotation listening   
In the Symphonie Fantastique, Berlioz uses a single melody that reappears in different 
guises throughout the work, representing the idea of the beloved. This idée fixe, as it is 
known, had not been used so thoroughly in a symphony before. It was the forerunner of 
Wagner’s Leitmotiv, a short phrase associated with a character, object or dramatic idea, 
which would go on to become an integral part of the classical Hollywood film score of 
the 1930s and 40s. Both the idée fixe and the leitmotif anticipate the way we now hear 
music in everyday life – as recurrent melodies. The difference, however, is that idées 
fixes and leitmotifs were carefully embedded within a narrative context; the leitmotifs of 
everyday life are usually not. Instead, they are, to a large extent ‘free-floating’. In spite of 
composers’ intentions to the contrary, melodies or phrases tend to be lifted free from the 
works in which they were once embedded, via the use of excerpts in film, television, 
radio, as well as in ‘micro-media’ such as the looped music played when you’re put on 
hold during a phone call, or ringtones for mobile phones. With a claim to being the 
world’s most heard tune, the Nokia ringtone – belonging to those brief few years before 
ringtones became more personalised – is a cadential snippet from a beautiful waltz for 
solo guitar by Francisco Tárrega entitled Gran Vals (1902). The ringtone is arranged for 
piano instead of guitar and, interestingly, its final note resolves whereas Tárrega’s 
original does not. Although the phrase quoted by the ringtone was just a cadence rather 
than the main melody of Gran Vals, it is impossible now to listen to a performance of the 
three minutes plus of the original without the phrase in question leaping out from the rest 
of the composition. 
    The case of Gran Vals / the Nokia tune is a good example of what Adorno (1941/2002) 
calls ‘quotation listening’: the way in which the original version of a piece of music is 
heard as a quotation or simulacrum due to it having previously been heard in truncated 
form in another context (263). Whether it be a fragment of classical music used as the 
theme tune for a television programme, a cover version of a pop song, or a sample of 
another record, the copy often supplants the original as the ‘authentic’ version, at least in 
the listener’s mind: ‘by sounding like a quotation – the quintessence of the whole – the 
trivialized theme assumes a peculiar air of authority’ (264). Writing in 1941 as an émigré 
in the United States, Adorno bemoans the fact that Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony has been 





transformed into ‘a set of quotations from theme songs’ (263). ‘A Beethoven symphony’, 
he writes, ‘is essentially a process; if that process is replaced by a presentation of frozen 
items, the performance is faithless even if executed under the battle cry of the utmost 
fidelity to the letter’ (265). Taken from an essay entitled ‘The radio symphony’, these 
comments on quotation listening continue many of the themes of Adorno’s earlier work 
such as his insistence that music of virtually every kind has become a series of disjointed 
sound fetishes, making ‘structural listening’ impossible. While one might not accept his 
blanket criticisms of popular music nor his insistence that the perception of large-scale 
structure is what matters most in musical reception, Adorno’s comments here are 
remarkably prescient in identifying how, in the age of recorded sound, chronology can be  
confounded and the integrity of the original diminished when we to come it via a later re-
working of it or via its abridged use in film, television, or other media. Perhaps the most 
prominent feature of quotation listening, however, is a special attentiveness to what we 
are hearing due to the fact that we recognise it but are not sure at first from where. This is 
illustrated by the following personal examples. 
    One of the most memorable experiences of quotation listening occurred in my early 
twenties before I’d been to many classical concerts. A friend had managed to get me free 
tickets for a production of the operas Cavalleria Rusticana and Pagliacci – or ‘Cav and 
Pag’ as this conventional pairing is sometimes known in the business. The first of the two 
examples of operatic verismo passed by enjoyably enough but without incident. Midway 
through Pagliacci, however, at the point where the travelling actor, Canio, breaks down, 
unable to apply his clown’s make-up for the evening’s performance because he has been 
cuckolded, I suddenly sat up. ‘That’s from a song by Queen’ I remember thinking to 
myself, before a split second later realising that it was Freddie Mercury who had 
borrowed this heart-rending aria from Leoncavallo and not the other way round.56 A little 
more knowledge at that point in my life of the history of recording would have meant that 
I’d been aware of this fact: Enrico Caruso’s 1904 recording of this aria, ‘Vesti la giubba’, 
was the first ever record to sell a million copies. Its afterlife in alternate versions and 
parodies was to be expected.  
    A second example – which continues the theme of clowns – concerns a chance hearing 
on the radio of a show tune composed by Stephen Sondheim. ‘Send in the clowns’ is 





from his 1973 musical A Little Night Music and is an anthem to romantic regret and 
disappointment. When I first heard the complete song, however, I knew nothing of this 
narrative context – the character Desirée suppressing her anger and frustration in short-
breathed lines, stoically expressing the ironies and disappointments of her life. I instantly 
recognised the melody but suspected – rightly as it turned out – that I’d heard a different 
version of it, seeing as I didn’t recognise any of the lyrics. After about five or ten minutes 
of humming the melody to myself, during which I felt the deliciously tantalising sense of 
knowing I knew it but not from where, I finally remembered: it was from an album I 
owned – and, I should confess, cherished – as a child. The album in question is U2’s 
Under a Blood Red Sky: a compilation of live recordings from their 1983 world tour. 
‘Send in the clowns’ is sung as a kind of middle eight that occurs two-thirds of the way 
through ‘Electric Co.’. Bono sings the merest snippet of Leonard Bernstein’s ‘America’ – 
but in a minor key – before segueing into the chorus of ‘Send in the clowns’ and then 
returning to the chorus of ‘Electric Co.’.57 
    Edward Said (1991) has written about ‘the unexpected pleasure of recognizing [a] 
piece [of music] from a different context’, which, he says, makes one ‘unusually 
attentive’ – though, like Adorno, he also laments ‘the comic, entirely parodistic 
familiarity with […] “alienated masterpieces” enabled by record players and electronic 
gadgets’ (76, 79, 80). For Said, it was hearing Alfred Brendel perform a set of Brahms 
piano variations that occasioned a sense of unusual alertness. Up to then, Said had only 
been familiar with the original chamber setting of the variations as part of Brahms’s 
String Sextet in B flat: ‘Strangely, I think the effort of correspondence held me much 
more rigorously to the music than is usually the case: I assimilated, I actively bound my 
hearing to, an earlier but still lively experience’ (80). The encounter was exemplary of 
Said’s experience of music as ‘an unceasing shuttle between playing and listening 
privately for myself and playing and listening in a social setting’ (76). Reflecting on the 
convergence of the two pieces via his private memories of the former and Brendel’s 
public recital of the latter, Said was left with a powerful sense of ‘how a set of disparate 
things coming together consolidate and affirmatively support each other’ (88). The 
incident illustrates how such forms of listening often acquire an oddly personal character, 
not necessarily because of any sentimental attachment we might have to the piece of 





music that we are now hearing in a different form but merely because we recognise and 
remember it and thus it feels personal – it becomes an index of one’s life. At the same 
time, these personal resonances, which occur as we delve into our past to resurrect what 
for us will always be the ‘original’ version, intersect with the overtly public meanings of 
the new version if it is heard in a social setting. We thus have an example of something 
anticipated in Proust: the way in which memory has acquired a quasi-spiritual value in 
our predominantly secular society. 
     
The ‘refrain’ in the work of Deleuze and Guattari 
The work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari provides an interesting theoretical insight 
into the role of stray musical fragments in contemporary society. In a chapter entitled ‘Of 
the refrain’ from their book A Thousand Plateaus (1987), they privilege the medium of 
sound because it suggests for them certain ways of thinking about the world, certain ways 
of being in the world which they find very attractive. In particular, they emphasise 
sound’s ability to travel between different milieux, in the process, opening these milieux 
up to new influences, ‘deterritorialising’ them.        
    Deleuze and Guattari’s interest in sound is focussed on what they call the ‘refrain’. 
According to their definition of it, a refrain is a mobile musical fragment or, more 
broadly, a sonic method of organising affective experience, making it cohere. They give 
three preliminary examples. Here is the first: 
 
A child in the dark, gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under his breath. He 
walks and halts to his song. Lost, he takes shelter, or orients himself with his little song as 
best he can. The song is like a rough sketch of a calming and stabilizing, calm and stable, 
center in the heart of chaos (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 311).  
 
The second example is as follows: ‘A child hums to summon the strength for the 
schoolwork she has to hand in’ (ibid.). And the third: ‘A housewife sings to herself, or 
listens to the radio, as she marshals the antichaos forces of her work’ (ibid.). Other 
notable examples of ‘refrains’ which they cite include bird songs (as well as Messiaen’s 
musical renderings of them); Wagner’s leitmotifs; and also ‘the little phrase from 
Vinteuil’ that so obsesses Charles Swann in the first volume of Proust. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, refrains help to locate humans – as well as non-humans such as birds – within a 





‘sonorous cosmos’, what Jane Bennett (2001) refers to as the ‘energetic and rumbling 
[…] dimension of things’ (166). 
    A refrain such as a tune one hums to oneself during a moment of boredom, relaxation, 
tension or joy has the effect of opening oneself to a world of other sounds and pulsating 
energies. At the same time, it establishes more securely one’s place within that sonorous 
world, giving oneself the confidence to go on. In common with other poststructuralist 
thinkers, one of Deleuze and Guattari’s primary contentions is that the most essential 
characteristic of human beings is their lack of an essence. The refrain is not to be 
understood therefore as something innately human but rather as something innately 
transitive, moving us beyond the merely human. It is an example of what in actor-
network theory is known as an ‘assemblage’; or what Bernard Stiegler (1998) terms a 
‘technic’ in the dual sense of a technique and a technology – a non-human agent via 
which humans’ interactions with the world are always already mediated.   
   A refrain is not, then, a personal expression. Instead, it expresses a ‘domain’ or plane of 
existence – a temporary pattern in the endless project of becoming (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987: 316). A refrain also expresses the beginnings of a domain’s dissolution, its 
transformation into a new pattern, or its reaching beyond one domain before coalescing 
with another. This relationship between sound and space can be figured in terms of three 
main categories of refrain: ‘territorializing’, ‘de-territorializing’, and ‘re-territorializing’. 
Sound is more inherently de-territorialising than other media – as anyone with noisy 
neighbours can attest to. It is more so than light, for example. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
world view, if it can be called that, is of ‘[t]he cosmos as an immense deterritorialized 
refrain’ within which any localised orders or territories are fleeting and contingent (327). 
It is a universe of emergent properties or ‘fuzzy aggregates’: as-yet inchoate patterns ‘of 
forces, densities, intensities’ that ‘are not thinkable on their own terms’ (378). Although 
elsewhere in their work desire is their basic social ontology – much like power is in the 
work of Foucault – in this particular chapter of A Thousand Plateaus, sound occupies a 
privileged place and is the chief metaphor for their vision of a polymorphous world of 
infinite becoming.  
    Deleuze and Guattari offer a potted history of Western art music in terms of the  
increasing de-territorialisation of its refrains. They stress, for example, the mobility of the 





Wagnerian leitmotif – perhaps contrary to Wagner’s intentions for it. In this connection, 
they give ‘the little phrase from Vinteuil’ in Proust as an example of a de-territorialised 
leitmotif: in simple terms, it changes its meaning and associations over time, as Swann 
hears and remembers it in new contexts and as his relationship changes to Odette, with 
whom it becomes associated. 
    Extrapolating from Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas, it could be said that recording has 
systematically de-territorialised music, in other words, it has allowed virtually all styles 
of music from all eras and all geographical regions to travel beyond their proper social 
milieux and be inserted into new contexts, new milieux, opening them up to their 
influence. To use a perhaps hackneyed but nonetheless useful example, one might think 
of the opening up of British society in the 1950s by American R & B and rock ’n’ roll, 
and the corresponding opening up of the US in the early 60s by the so-called ‘British 
invasion’. For an example from before the recorded era, one might look to the 
interchange that long existed between opera and street songs, sound travelling more 
easily between hierarchically-organised social spaces than people. Other examples are 
too legion to list but for a more concrete instance one might mention Eric B. & Rakim’s 
landmark hip-hop recording ‘Paid in full’ (1987), which brought the Hebrew poetry of a 
seventeenth-century rabbi and Yemeni-Jewish folk music to a global audience via its 
prominent sampling of Ofra Haza’s sumptuously evocative ‘Im nin’alu’.58 A sense of the 
de-territorialising effects of recording is to be found in this comment from Michael 
Chanan (1994), which anticipates the era of downloads and file sharing: ‘the ease of 
reproduction allows the circulation of music to escape the control of the market and 
discover new forms. In short, the old hierarchies of aesthetic taste and judgement may 
have broken down, but music continues to breathe and to live according to its own 
immanent criteria’ (18). 
    Part of music’s de-territorialising function – its movement between different milieux – 
is its ability to ‘catalyse’ various social interactions, sometimes in an overtly political 
way. Music evokes sympathy or channels anger. It swells a sense of belonging and adds 
pathos to loneliness. It can ‘lighten the mood’, or give people implicit instructions as to 
how they ought to behave, or give them licence to misbehave. Music ‘invades us, impels 
us, drags us, transpierces us’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 348). It brings people together 





or sets groups up in opposition against each other. Deleuze and Guattari refer to this latter 
aspect as ‘[t]he potential fascism of music’. ‘Flags’, they write, ‘can do nothing without 
trumpets’ (ibid.). So, in addition to de-territorialising or disaggregating, music can also 
produce banal and sinister re-territorialisations: ‘Since its force of deterritorialization is 
the strongest, [sound] also effects the most massive of reterritorializations, the most 
numbing, the most redundant’ (ibid.). The refrain’s ‘catalytic function’ is, then, both its 
ability ‘to increase the speed of the exchanges and reactions in that which surrounds it’ 
and ‘to assure indirect interactions between elements devoid of so-called natural affinity, 
and thereby to form organized masses’ (ibid.). It should be added that, by its entry into 
almost every nook and cranny of daily life, recorded music is able to catalyse social 
interactions all the more rapidly and effectively. This will be seen in the section that 
follows.  
 
Of theme tunes, chants, and jingles 
I would now like to give a more detailed account of three examples of what I call ‘stray 
refrains’. Though these examples stem from phonographic contexts, they are not limited 
to them. 
 
‘Mbube’     
The first example is a song that goes by three separate names, reflecting its migration 
between different continents and cultures. In many ways, it has become the definitive 
musical statement of African diasporic identity, though not in the sense of Africa as a 
point of absolute origins but rather as a node of dense genealogical influences. Recorded 
in the early decades of phonographic reproduction, the piece of music in question and the 
musical milieu from which it sprang was, in certain ways, already international in scope 
and outlook. 
    In its original incarnation the song went by the name ‘Mbube’ meaning ‘The lion’. It 
was performed by a six-man choir of Zulu migrant workers, The Evening Birds, who had 
moved from rural South Africa to work in the country’s newly industrialised cities. In 
1939, the group’s leader and songwriter, Solomon Linda, took a job as a packer in a 
record pressing plant in Roodeport. Linda’s group attracted the interest of the company’s 





talent scout, Griffiths Motsiela, who was also the country’s first black producer. The 
company’s owner, an Italian named Eric Gallo, was eager to open his business up to the 
black African market and so, somewhat bizarrely with hindsight, initially persuaded 
Motsiela to produce cover versions of country and western numbers from the American 
Midwest but sung in local languages: first Afrikaans, then Zulu and Xhosa. When ‘afro-
hillbilly’ failed to catch on, Gallo looked to South Africa’s emerging isicathamiya scene 
of male a cappella choirs, of which Linda’s group were the preeminent example. Thus in 
1939, Solomon Linda and the Evening Birds found themselves in Johannesburg in the 
only recording studio in sub-Saharan Africa. 
    The group had a distinctive visual appeal. Linda was the first leader of an isicathamiya 
choir to make it a point to dress members up in a uniform that spoke of indomitable urban 
sophistication: ‘The Evening Birds sported pinstriped three-piece suits, Florsheim shoes, 
and hats and indulged in a fast-paced, energetic choreography called istep that made 
performers look like resolute men defiantly walking the streets of the white man’s city’ 
(Erlmann 2003: 271). Such a visual presentation accorded with Linda’s songs, telling of 
the injustices of urban life in South Africa but also suggesting a determination to distance 
the group from their rural origins. Raised in the poverty-stricken labour reserve of 
Msinga in the vicinity of Pomeroy, Solomon Linda was well-versed in the local singing 
traditions of amahubo and izingoma zomtshado. But his musical ancestry was not solely 
African. As a boarder at the nearby Gordon Memorial School, he was exposed to the 
starched hymns of mission culture as well as the syncopated rhythms of the celebrated 
Negro spiritual troupe, The Virginia Jubilee Singers, who were touring Southern Africa at 
the time. 
    Undoubtedly, much of what is preserved on the recording of ‘Mbube’ was Solomon 
Linda’s own composition and, indeed, elements of the song that would be given 
increased salience in later versions were improvised by Linda on the spot. Yet, even 
before The Evening Birds’ 1939 recording, it appears that the song – or a precursor of it – 
had already been in transit in a manner that exemplifies the complex origins and shared 
heritage of melodies. According to the ethnomusicologist, Veit Erlmann (1996), who has 
written extensively on isicathamiya music,‘ “Mbube” was based on a wedding song 
which Linda and his friends had picked up from young girls in Msinga’, though the 





words presumably were Linda’s own as they celebrate an incident in which the young 
Solomon and his friends chased off lions that were stalking their fathers’ cattle (62). 
    The recording of ‘Mbube’ that would go on to sell over 100,000 copies in Southern 
Africa in the 1940s was The Evening Birds’ third take of the song. For this version, they 
departed from their normal a cappella arrangement, their producer Motsiela hurriedly 
dragooning a pianist, guitarist, and banjo player in exasperation at the failure of the two 
previous takes. A short, metrically-free introduction gives way to the main section of the 
song, a booming four-bar progression, I | IV | I4/6 | V7, in which the members of the 
choir repeat the line ‘Uyimbube!’, Zulu for ‘You’re a lion!’. The doo-wop feel of this 
harmonic framework drew upon Westernised styles of music that were popular at the 
time among the upper strata of urban black society in South Africa (Erlmann 1996: 66). 
In spite of not being especially original or African, the harmonic progression in ‘Mbube’ 
became canonic within Southern Africa, providing the template for much of the music 
that would follow. Linda’s innovation was to have more than one member of the choir 
singing the bass, thus departing from standard arrangements of the time in which there 
was one voice per part. This adaptation of ithicathamiya forms actually marked a return 
to traditional, pre-colonial choral practices of ceremonial performance genres (ibid.). The 
strengthened bass helped give The Evening Birds a territorial advantage over rival choirs, 
demarcating, by sonic means, a space for themselves within South Africa’s urban 
landscape. It also anticipated improvements in amplification and the invention of the 
electric bass that would contribute to the much greater prominence of bass lines in Afro-
American derived styles of popular music from the 1950s onwards. At the other end of 
the register is Linda’s own voice. His uncompromisingly rough and unrestrained falsetto 
soars above the foundation laid down by the bass and other voices. There is a sense of 
uncanniness hearing Linda improvise the melody that would one day be set to the words, 
‘In the jungle, the mighty jungle, the lion sleeps tonight’: the moment, in the last ten 
seconds of the recording, when one of the most popular and enduring tunes of the 
recording era, a truly global tune, takes tentative shape for the first time. Such a sense of 
unwitting momentousness is compounded by the knowledge that Linda died in poverty, 
and that neither he nor his family were ever properly remunerated for a composition that 
is estimated to have generated revenues in excess of $15 million.  





    The record made its passage across the Atlantic when the folk-song collector, Alan 
Lomax, passed on a box of discarded African 78s to Pete Seeger in New York. Seeger’s 
group, The Weavers, recorded a version of the song in 1952, adhering closely to Linda’s 
original arrangement. A signal difference, however, was in the wording of the song’s 
refrain: when transcribing the song, Seeger, misheard ‘uyimbube’ as ‘wimoweh’. 
‘Wimoweh’, as it was now called, took Linda’s song into the American pop charts, and 
its fame spread, culminating in The Weavers’ 1957 performance of it at Carnegie Hall. 
The song was covered by The Kingston Trio in 1959. Shortly after, songwriter George 
Weiss used Linda’s melody to pen the lyrics for ‘The lion sleeps tonight’. Weiss’s re-
named version of Linda’s composition  provided The Tokens with a hit in 1961, since 
which time the song has undergone hundreds of covers, copies and arrangements, and has 
been used in the scores of numerous films, most notably Disney’s The Lion King (1994 
for the film, 1997 for the staged musical) (Muller 2008: 5-6). ‘Mbube’/‘Wimoweh’/‘The 
lion sleeps tonight’ has become a standard for African singers as they take an 
increasingly prominent position on the global stage, but it has been through far more 
unlikely guises too, from Navajo powwows to New Zealand army band marches, 
indicating its status as a song the whole world knows. Its ability to be transformed and 
adopted as their own by each new group of people who encounter it stands as evidence of 
melody’s nomadic powers and is a fitting tribute to the Zulu migrants who first 
performed it and, indeed, to the African diaspora as a whole, the music of which 
continues to exert an influence on popular styles across the world.  
 
‘You’ll never walk alone’ 
Another song that has been recorded by multiple artists is ‘You’ll never walk alone’. It is 
now internationally famous as a football chant but since its inception in 1945 it has 
migrated across a diverse range of social territories. It is an example of a song whose 
lyrics have changed meaning depending on the context in which it is sung. It is an 
interesting song in the history of twentieth-century popular music because it evidences 
the interplay between official recorded versions and more or less impromptu, non-
professional renditions. In each performance, a different vision of community, a different 
collective identity, is communicated.  





    ‘You’ll never walk alone’ was the creation of one of the twentieth century’s great 
songwriting partnerships, Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein II. It first appeared in 
their 1945 Broadway musical, Carousel, and in the Hollywood film that followed in 
1956. It appears in the second act, sung by the character Nettie Fowler in order to comfort 
her cousin, Julie Jordan, after the death of Julie’s husband, Billy, in a failed robbery. (In 
this scene, Julie is carrying their unborn child.) The song is reprised in the musical’s final 
scene in which Billy and Julie’s daughter, Louise, now grown up, graduates from high 
school. For this reason, ‘You’ll never walk alone’ became a standard at graduation 
ceremonies across the United States, the tradition continuing to this day in some colleges. 
The lyrics of the song – ‘When you walk through a storm / Hold your head up high’, etc. 
– deal with triumph over adversity and are thus applicable to many different situations, 
not just the trials and tribulations awaiting recent graduates. In 1954, the R&B singer, 
Roy Hamilton, recorded a version of it, serving as inspiration for African-Americans in 
their struggle for civil rights (Ripani 2006: 78). 
    Outside of the States, the song is best known as a rousing match-day chant sung by 
football fans, especially, though not exclusively, by Liverpool supporters. The origins of 
the song’s long association with Liverpool Football Club is an interesting test case in 
what is an under-researched area: the role of recorded music at live sports events. In the 
1960s, the DJ at Liverpool’s football ground would play the top ten in ascending order, 
with the number one single being transmitted just before kick-off. For four consecutive 
weeks in 1963, this pop fanfare happened to be a recording of ‘You’ll never walk alone’ 
by the Merseybeat group, Gerry and the Pacemakers. Fans in the home stand would sing 
along every time the record was played, and when it dropped out of the top ten, they 
continued to sing it just before each game (Johnston 2008). In this way, the song became 
established as the club’s anthem, with the words ‘You’ll never walk alone’ later being 
incorporated into the club crest and being emblazoned above a pair of entrance gates to 
the stadium at Anfield. 
    There have been some fine choral arrangements of ‘You’ll never walk alone’ but of the 
numerous popular recordings of the song, including the 1956 film version and Gerry and 
the Pacemakers’ 1963 hit, most are impaired by the schmaltziness of their vocal 
deliveries. This is unfortunate as the song contains one of the great crescendos in popular 





music: the moment when the words of the title are reached, including the thrilling leap of 
a major fourth – from ‘you’ll’ to the first syllable of ‘never’ – when the title is 
immediately sung again. As a song whose lyrics are about collective support, an 
impression reinforced by the musical setting which rises up and up, iconically 
surmounting every obstacle, it is best heard when sung by a group of singers rather than 
by a single emoting pop star trying to impress upon us that they really mean it. And better 
still when one is part of the group singing it.  
    Perhaps the least sentimental and thus poignant version of ‘You’ll never walk alone’ is 
to be found on Pink Floyd’s 1971 album, Meddle. Not actually a cover version, it is 
instead a field recording from the Spion Kop terrace at Anfield, inserted as an aural 
montage early on in the track, ‘Fearless’, and then reappearing at the end of the song 
when the acoustic guitars gradually fade out to be replaced by the rousing voices of the 
Kop. The lyrics of ‘Fearless’ tread similar ground to those of ‘You’ll never walk alone’: 
‘You say the hill’s too steep to climb / Climb it’, etc. (The song dates from the days when 
the BBC Radio 1 DJ, John Peel, could remark without irony that what he liked about Pink 
Floyd was their optimism.) The song’s main guitar riff has a suitably intrepid feel to it, 
using an open tuning in G with chords being played energetically further and further up 
the fretboard before returning to the tonic. Dave Gilmour’s singing, on the other hand, is 
slow, gentle and laissez-faire; his received pronunciation in contrast to the markedly 
Liverpudlian accents of the Kop. The inclusion on a progressive-rock album of Liverpool 
fans chanting ‘You’ll never walk alone’ alters the song’s meaning again. In a sense, it 
‘de-territorialises’ it, taking it out of the confrontational politics of match-day so that its 
aesthetic qualities as a sonic artefact can be lingered upon. The sound of young, working-
class men spontaneously joining together in song has a poignancy and nostalgia that they 
could never have intended. For this reason, Pink Floyd’s use of ‘You’ll never walk alone’ 
can be counted among the classic field recordings of post-war Britain: a fascinating aural 
glimpse from the archive of everyday life. 
 
‘O sole mio’ 
‘O sole mio’ is another song that is internationally known yet, almost from its inception, 
its proper locale seems to have been the provincial and the mundane. Composed in 1898 





by Eduardo di Capua and Giovanni Capurro, ‘O sole mio’ translates from the Neapolitan 
dialect into English as ‘My sun’ and there have indeed been numerous English versions, 
many with altered lyrics: a hymn called ‘Down from his glory’ written in 1921; ‘There’s 
no tomorrow’ recorded by Tony Martin in 1949; and ‘It’s now or never’ by Elvis Presley 
in 1960.  
    A description of the song appears in the penultimate volume of Proust’s À la recherche 
du temps perdu. It is interesting to note that, less than two decades after its composition, 
the song was already seen as crushingly banal through being overplayed: ‘this trivial song 
which I had heard a hundred times did not interest me in the least degree’ (Proust 
1925/1968: 322). It is also firmly lodged within everyday life: a song one overhears or 
listens to absentmindedly as one gets on with the business of day-to-day life. The 
unnamed narrator of À la recherche, usually referred to by critics as ‘Marcel’, hears the 
song one evening in Venice as he sips a cool drink on the terrace of a hotel overlooking 
the canal. The number is sung – though not, we are led to understand, performed as such 
– by a musician on a boat that has stopped in front of the hotel. The essentially joyous 
character of ‘O sole mio’ is transformed by Marcel’s melancholic and anxious mood as 
he wavers in his decision to stay in Venice in pursuit of a sexual adventure rather than 
cede to his beloved mother’s wishes and join her on the train back to Paris: ‘Presently, 
she would be gone, I should be left alone in Venice, alone with the misery of knowing 
that I had distressed her, and without her presence to comfort [consoler] me. The hour of 
the train approached’ (320). In this context, the sole or ‘sun’ of the song’s title comes to 
stand for the setting sun and the fleeting opportunity Marcel has to be reunited with his 
mother before the train leaves: ‘The sun continued to sink […]. My irrevocable solitude 
was so near at hand that it seemed to me to have begun already and to be complete’ 
(ibid.). Marcel sinks further and further into a state of extreme lassitude, indecisiveness, 
and alienation. The living character of his surroundings is reduced to its ‘constituent 
parts’: ‘lifeless heaps of marble with nothing to choose between them’ and canal water 
that is merely ‘a combination of hydrogen and oxygen’ (ibid.). And the blustering brio of 
the Neapolitan song becomes a source of acute anxiety for him, ‘rising like a dirge for the 
Venice that I had known’ (322). 





    In addition to the link between the sun of the song and the actual sun (soleil) that is 
setting over Venice, there is in this passage a series of half-puns on the word sole: Marcel 
is left ‘alone’ (seul), ‘isolated’ (isolée) and in painful ‘solitude’ (solitude), acutely aware 
that his mother is not present to ‘console’ (consoler) him (Bowie 2001: 226). A further 
pun is made on the word ‘resolution’ (résolution) or, rather, the lack of resolution that 
Marcel feels listening to ‘O sole mio’. The melody itself actually resolves very neatly: 
after a brief modulation to a minor key, it returns to the tonic for the final cadence. But 
not so to Marcel’s ears: ‘none of the elements, familiar beforehand, of this popular ditty 
was capable of furnishing me with the resolution of which I stood in need’ (Proust 
1925/1968: 322). At best, it is able to function as a surrogate resolution, a way of 
distracting himself from making a decision, ‘anticipating […] each burst of melody’ and 
‘letting myself soar with it, and fall to earth again with it afterwards’ (ibid.). He mentally 
accompanies the singer, singing the words in his head as a substitute for ‘making a 
resolution’ as to whether he should stay or not, hence ‘the desperate but fascinating 
charm of the song’ for him as he lingers by the canal (323). This morbid compulsion ‘to 
listen to one more line of “sole mio” ’ intensifies when the singer gets to the end of the 
song and immediately begins again an octave higher (ibid.). What had, for Marcel, been 
merely a ‘dirge’ is now a ‘wail of despair’ as he remains paralysed by indecision (ibid.). 
The song’s repetition both by the singer and in Marcel’s head contributes to the latter’s 
sense of a lack of resolution (in both senses); the final cadence and silence that might 
signify decisiveness is denied him. The repetition of ‘O sole mio’ also makes it a 
pertinent example of music in everyday life, its persistence creating a musical impression 
of stasis or paralysis. 
    The song’s perceived lack of resolution can be related to another, less obvious pun that 
occurs in this chapter of Proust’s novel. Richard Goodkin (1991) suggests that Marcel’s 
repeated references to his own ‘sadness’ (tristesse) and ‘isolation’ (isolement) are a coded 
reference to a famously unresolved piece of music: the prelude to Tristan and Isolde, 
particularly its opening, containing the famous ‘Tristan chord’ (117). For Goodkin, the 
words triste and isolé – and, by extension, the prelude to Tristan and Isolde – function as 
a refrain in this passage, pervading Marcel’s tortured audition of ‘O sole mio’.59 The 
conceit is not as extravagant as it might seem: Marcel mentions the prelude to Tristan 





and Isolde in the chapter that follows, reflecting that ‘things offer only a limited number 
of their innumerable attributes, because of the paucity of our senses’ and that ‘a man who 
knew nothing of Wagner save the duet in Lohengrin would [not] be able to foresee the 
prelude to Tristan’ (Proust 1925/1968: 362). Furthermore, a writer with the kind of 
musical knowledge and sensitivity that Proust clearly possesses might be expected to 
have the prelude to Tristan in mind when writing about lack of (harmonic) resolution. 
Goodkin (1991) notes that the first sung pitches in Wagner’s opera correspond to an 
interval of a minor sixth – a recurrent leitmotif in his work, signifying unfulfilled longing 
– and that these pitches (G – E flat) in the solfége scale go by the names sol and mi, 
hence ‘sole mio’. (The connection is emphasised by Proust’s omission of ‘O’ from the 
title of ‘O sole mio’.) One can thus read in this passage how Marcel’s inner turmoil and 
artistic imagination render the harmonic structure of ‘O sole mio’ more ambiguous than it 
would be otherwise. The affective state he brings to the listening experience is deeply 
unresolved; he seeks a surrogate resolution in the tumbling melodic shapes of the 
Neapolitan song but finds instead a prolongation of his uncertainty and an intensification 
of his melancholy and desire. 
    In Britain, the original Neapolitan lyrics of ‘O sole mio’ are far less familiar than the 
English words that were put to the melody for a television ad for Cornetto ice cream.  
Originally airing on British TV in 1983, the advertisement has been through several 
incarnations, spanning three decades.60 In each, a stereotypical scene of everyday life in 
Italy is suspended when the protagonist glimpses a Cornetto ice-cream cone and bursts 
into the ‘sole mio’ melody: ‘Just one Cornetto, give it to me / Delicious ice cream / From 
Italy…’. One ad has a busker in a piazza suddenly switching melodies mid-song when he 
sees a beautiful young woman seated on the terrace of a café just about to savour her ice-
cream cornet, which, after a quick serenade, he cheekily exchanges for his microphone. 
Another has an opera tenor interrupting the recitative with an impromptu aria of ‘Just one 
Cornetto…’ as he duly plucks an ice cream from the hands of an audience member seated 
in the front row. But the most famous depicts a Venetian gondolier – an unintended 
Proustian subtext – singing the Neapolitan melody to his passengers in spite of Venice 
being hundreds of miles from Naples.61 These agreeably daft depictions of Italians 
spontaneously breaking into song were updated for an advertising campaign broadcast in 





2006 in which pedestrians, drivers, office workers and marathon runners are shown 
singing the Cornetto theme in central London. The irony here is that the singing voice in 
everyday British life has never been more silent. Song, it would seem, is no longer on our 
lips so much as in our ears and in our minds, broadcast to us in order for commercial TV 
channels to gain advertising revenue and for artists to benefit from the limited licensing 
of their compositions. Such depictions of spontaneous singing in the midst of daily life 
can be explained with reference to Richard Dyer’s argument regarding the utopian aspect 
of the Hollywood musical (Dyer 1977/1999). In Dyer’s view, the musical genre 
represents a solution to capitalism from within capitalism itself. Thus, in the case just 
cited, the problem of the routinisation of the commute to work and the sense of empty or 
wasted time it engenders is surmounted by an advertising campaign showing Londoners 
singing as they go about their daily lives; the feeling of utopia, the utopian affect evoked 
by the ad, stands in for the actual experience of utopia. And by association, the product 
being advertised shares in these same utopian qualities.      
    The memorability of the ‘Cornetto’ lyrics when married to the ‘sole mio’ melody is 
extraordinary: nearly thirty years after first hearing the jingle, I can still remember all the 
words. In spite of the fact that the ads are not currently being shown on British television, 
the melody to ‘O sole mio’ is never far from earshot: the tune is the most popular jingle 
for ice-cream vans throughout the whole of Europe. Ice-cream van jingles are one of the 
most literal examples of a stray refrain: as mobile melodic phrases, they cut through other 
sounds, announcing its presence in social space; it is an index of ice cream and – for 
young children at least – an announcement of the extraordinary in the midst of the 
everyday. The melodies themselves are deeply embedded within cultural memory, carried 
on a summer breeze like a cascading metallic echo from the outer reaches of what we can 
recollect from our infancy. In addition to ‘O sole mio’, such melodies in Britain include 
‘Greensleeves’, ‘Popeye the sailor man’, ‘Yankee doodle’, ‘The teddy bears’ picnic’, and 
a Brahms lullaby. 
 
Advertising jingles 
As testaments to the compositional skills of their anonymous producers, jingles are 
written in order to be remembered, with the result that they frequently live on in popular 





culture long after the disappearance of the products that they were meant to advertise. 
These commercial leitmotifs are among the most reified, compressed and ‘portable’ of 
musical forms, and thus serve to illuminate an age in which sonic meanings circulate and 
mutate at dizzying speed via music’s insertion within radically heterogeneous contexts.  
    The advertising jingle is a quintessentially North American invention, mingling a 
huckster’s passion for commerce, creativity and fun, and it is in the United States that the 
earliest and most significant contributions to the genre originated. The first jingles took 
the form of rhyming verses of the kind described by Mark Twain in his 1876 short story, 
‘A literary nightmare’ (subsequently re-titled ‘Punch, brothers, punch!’). The tale offers a 
wry view of the nascent advertising industry and its exploitation of rhyming verse for 
mnemonic purposes. The narrator of the story describes how, having casually read a set 
of such lines in the newspaper one morning, ‘They took instant and entire possession of 
me’ (Twain 1878: 5). His work, mealtimes, and bedtimes are all ‘ruined’ as the ‘jingling 
rhymes’ go round and round his head without respite (5-6). When he confides his plight 
to a friend, the local pastor, he inadvertently ‘infects’ him; the pastor, in turn, unwittingly 
passes on the ‘relentless jingle’ to his entire congregation (6-11). A particularly 
successful example of such a jingle was published in 1902 as part of the launch of a new 
breakfast cereal called Force, aimed at the new class of office workers for whom a 
cooked breakfast of eggs, meat, fried potatoes, and biscuits was considered too heavy 
(and too rural and unsophisticated). In its subsequent development, the campaign is 
deserving of the contemporary epithet, ‘viral’ marketing. The original lines read as 
follows: 
 
Jim Dumps was a most unfriendly man, 
Who lived his life on the hermit plan; 
In his gloomy way he’d gone through life, 
And made the most of woe and strife; 
Till Force one day was served to him –  
Since then they’ve called him ‘Sunny Jim.’ 
(Quoted in Fox 1997: 46). 
 
In later verses, readers of the Sunday papers in which the full-page ads appeared were 
introduced to Sunny Jim’s family, cook and janitor, as well as the girl upstairs taking 
singing lessons. Hundreds of verses appeared, an illustration of the portly figure of Jim 





adorned two eleven-storey buildings in New York, and he became the subject of songs, 
vaudeville skits, and musical comedies. Readers sent in their own unsolicited verses, and 
anyone with the name James and a cheery disposition risked being called ‘Sunny Jim’, 
while in Britain it became a common way of addressing young boys. 
    The claim to the first musical jingle is contested. A song published in 1905, ‘In my 
merry Oldsmobile’ functioned as a welcome and unpaid-for commercial for the 
Oldsmobile Motor Company, and was adopted as their theme song in 1908, before going 
on some decades later to feature in their radio ads (Jackson 2003: 11; Raph 1964: 316). 
But the first radio jingle was for Wheaties, another breakfast cereal, but one which, 
unlike Force, has endured through the decades. The jingle was first broadcast in 1929, 
sung by a barbershop quartet from Minneapolis (Booth 1981: 176). At the time, the 
manufacturer General Mills were thinking of discontinuing Wheaties but noticed a spike 
in sales in the regions where the jingle had aired so they decided to broadcast the 
commercial nationwide. Jingles had a marked presence on radio in the years of the 
Depression that followed, partly because, for companies such as the Radio Corporation of 
America (RCA), who had taken over the Victor Talking Machine Company, radio’s 
profit base in advertising proved a more reliable source of revenue than the sale of 
records and gramophones (Averill 2003: 82). Another reason was that jingles 
circumvented restrictions imposed on direct sales pitches on the radio. The 1940s saw the 
first mass-promoted singing commercials. In addition to airing on network radio over a 
million times each, ‘Pepsi-Cola hits the spot’ and ‘I’m Chiquita Banana’ were both 
jukebox hits and sold over a million copies each when they were released as gramophone 
discs (Booth 1981: 176-7; Jackson 2003: 13). As Mark Booth (1981) comments, their 
‘entry into playground folklore in a variety of parody forms, has been a signal ever since 
of what such jingles can achieve in making advertising copy intimate to the public’ (177). 
    An apogee of sorts had been reached. Jingles remained a popular form of advertising 
throughout the 1950s; ‘You’ll wonder where the yellow went when you brush your teeth 
with Pepsodent’ is the signal example of the era’s many mnemonic jingles, and was one 
of the first adverts to appear on commercial television in the UK. But in the 1960s, the 
influence of such jingles began to wane, and subsequent decades saw a slow decline in 
their presence on television and radio, and a corresponding switch towards the limited 





licensing of whole songs or pieces of music by existing artists. Before I look at the 
reasons for this shift as well as its implications for the production and consumption of 
recorded music, I would like to examine in more detail how advertising jingles actually 
function. In keeping with the semiotic paradigm introduced in chapter one, I will consider 
both the text itself, i.e. the musical jingle, and the context in which it is heard.  
    Advertising jingles demonstrate traits common to all music. In an article entitled, 
‘Music in advertising’, David Huron (1989) makes the claim that any music can be 
judged on the extent to which it manages to: (i) engage the listener’s attention; (ii) 
provide a sense of structure or continuity; (iii) be memorable; (iv) make use of language 
in order to contribute to its poetic or emotive appeal; (v) target a particular audience; and 
(vi) establish its credibility or authority. He adds that, ‘on a second-for-second basis, 
advertising music is perhaps the most meticulously crafted and most fretted-about music 
in history’ (572). 
    Huron offers the sobering reminder that the ‘true product of [commercial] broadcast 
media is the audience; and the true consumers are the advertisers’ (559). In this regard, 
the style of music used in an advert plays a crucial role in delivering up a target audience 
to the advertiser. If we take the example of the Pepsodent jingle, it can be perceived how 
its use of raised/lowered sevenths and syncopated rhythms characteristic of jazz marked it 
out, in the mid-1950s, as a piece of music with mainstream, cross-generational appeal in 
contrast to, say, rock ’n’ roll, skiffle, or classical music. This chimes with the fact that 
toothpaste is a product aimed at nearly all consumers. Huron writes that the style of the 
music in an ad ‘function[s] as a socioeconomic identifier – a device for addressing a 
specific audience’ (567). In his analysis of the Pepsodent commercial, Huron identifies a 
feature common among mnemonic jingles: the use of a cadence at the end of the jingle 
coinciding with the name of the product.62 Thus, in the case of the Pepsodent jingle, ‘the 
product name appears on pitches of the tonic major triad (E and C) which completes the 
cadence’ (563). Interestingly, this return to the tonic on the word ‘Pepsodent’ signifies 
the resolution of a problem signified a moment before by the harmonic tension or 
chromaticism on the word ‘yellow’. Taken as a whole, then, the jingle, ‘You’ll wonder 
where the yellow went when you brush with Pepsodent’ offers an easily graspable 
melodic shape that presents a problem (yellow teeth) and its solution (brushing with 





Pepsodent). To quote Huron, ‘The antagonist (“yellow”) and the resolution 
(“Pepsodent”) are […] tightly reflected in the musical setting’ (563; italics in original).  
    A brief semiotics of jingles can be offered with reference to the three main types of 
signs outlined in the work of C.S. Peirce. Firstly, the jingle is ‘iconic’ in that it embodies 
some of the sensuous qualities ascribed to the product or, rather, these qualities devolve 
from the music to the product so that a certain stylistic ‘fit’ is obtained between music 
and product. Secondly, the advertising jingle is ‘indexical’ insofar as it comes to be 
associated with, or to stand for, the product via the sheer fact of their co-presentation in 
the advert. This is bound up with the memorability of the jingle and, by association, the 
memorability of the product being advertised. On this point, Huron (1989) notes that: 
 
Consumers are known to favor products which elicit some degree of recognition or 
familiarity – even if it is merely the product’s name. It is one of the peculiarities of human 
cognition and audition that music tends to linger in the listener’s mind. Surprisingly, such 
musical lingering may occur even when the mind is an unwilling host. Thus, the association 
of music with the identity of a certain product may substantially aid recall (562). 
 
Finally, coming to the third type of sign, the jingle is also ‘symbolic’ in the sense that it 
sets words to music and that these lyrics have an abstract, propositional content, i.e. they 
say something explicit about the product. Thus, the ostensible claim of the Pepsodent 
commercial is that their toothpaste will whiten your teeth. A jingle’s ‘symbolic’ function 
is, however, inseparable from and, in many ways, subordinate to its function as index and 
icon, i.e. its purely musical functions as opposed to those operating via the words it sets. 
    A jingle’s discursive content, then, will usually be subordinated to its other functions. 
Mark Booth (1981) pursues the implications of this in his book, The Experience of Songs, 
drawing attention to the fact that ‘testimony on behalf of the product’ in a jingle ‘is 
different from spoken advertising testimony because of the nature of song. Jingles cannot 
have or even seem to have the discursive content of a talking commercial’ (177). This is 
because the singing commercial sacrifices the ‘appearance of the rational discussability 
of the product’ as well as ‘a certain claim to responsibility, a sense that the words can be 
traced back to their source’: ‘There is no apparent personal source of sung words [in 
radio or television adverts]. Spoken testimony comes from the pulpit or the witness chair, 
but sung witness is something that even the original, broadcasting performers seem 
merely to be joining in on’ (ibid.). This lack of a personal source whose testimony we are 





being asked to trust has important ramifications for how the jingle will be received: 
‘Because the words are sung words, they will to some extent be experienced as the 
subject’s own words, the more so the more effective the jingle’ (ibid.). (To use the 
poststructuralist idiom, the listening subject is ‘interpellated’ within the text of the song.) 
As with the ‘circular tootling’ of the jingles emanating from suburban ice-cream vans, 
there is a sense with sung commercials that their lines are in the public domain (O’Brien 
2004: 43): 
 
They are present in the mind as public words, verbal property not bearing the sign of 
ownership by someone else. Heard sung, they achieve […] the air of what we and the 
singer or singers joined in on, rather than of what so-and-so said. Recalled, they come in 
assembled jingling lines as common property objects, available to pass through inner or 
outer speech and so pass as one’s own (Booth 1981: 177-8). 
 
But, as Booth stresses, the mere fact of memorability ‘does not imply easy success for 
song in motivating sales’ (178). Instead, ‘direct payoff is doubtful’ as our absorption 
within the text of a jingle – or, what amounts to the same thing, our internalisation of it –  
does not guarantee for the advertiser that the audience will respond to the propositional 
content of the lyrics (178, 180). Our ludic responses to sung theme tunes and 
commercials, demonstrated most vividly by the verbal play that children make of 
successful jingles, means that ‘when we enter into jingles we may well not be listening to 
what the mind’s voice is singing’. Instead, what jingles ‘draw the mind into is play’ 
(180). 
    I’d like to return for a moment to Huron’s first criterion for judging the effectiveness 
of a jingle: that it should be entertaining or engage the listener’s attention. This presents 
an immediate problem for the advertiser because radio and television ads are usually 
consumed – if consumed be the proper word – in a very distracted state. Here the special 
contribution of sound to the medium of TV advertising becomes important. Due to the 
fact that a viewer/listener might often turn their gaze away from the screen during an 
advert, sound – and music in particular – give the ad a coherence it might otherwise lack. 
(It therefore helps it meet Huron’s second criterion of ‘continuity’.) Another way of 
stating this is that the ear, unlike the eye, is always open and its receptivity is multi-
directional. Partly because of this, the auditory channel in a television ad can be more 
significant in exerting unconscious effects on the viewer/listener. The distinction between 





implicit and explicit memory is an important one when considering the role of music in 
television adverts. Implicit memory is a type of memory in which previous experiences 
aid the performance of tasks or aid recognition but without these previous experiences 
being available to conscious awareness. To the human subject, it barely appears as a form 
of remembering at all since its storage and recall are unconscious.63 It is implicit memory, 
for example, that enables us to remember how to ride a bike or tie our shoelaces – 
examples that come under the more specific rubric of ‘procedural’ memory. A different 
type of implicit memory and one more relevant to our discussion of music in advertising 
is that manifested in the phenomenon of ‘priming’. Priming is essentially the activation of 
an unconscious context and is particularly important for recognition, as opposed to 
conscious recollection (Snyder 2000: 73). Thus, to return to our example of a television 
advert, product names and the music and attributes associated with them can establish 
their familiarity without the viewer/listener typically being aware how they came to know 
a product or the music associated with it; the distracted state in which reception of the ad 
typically occurs can actually make the advertising campaign more effective as brand 
recognition arises spontaneously and seemingly naturally. As Alexomanolaki et al (2007) 
comment, 
 
music and sound are not used in advertising merely because the medium of television 
allows this as an extra option. […W]hile the image may serve primarily to attract attention 
and enhance explicit recognition, elaboration, association, learning and recall of the 
advertised product, soundtracks may play a bigger part in influencing memories and 
associations in a more implicit manner via a priming mechanism (53). 
 
 
Writing in a different context but no less pertinently, Adorno (1938/1982) claims that 
‘[d]econcentration is the perceptual activity which prepares the way for the forgetting and 
sudden recognition of mass music’ (288). Because music in adverts is among that which 
is listened to least attentively, its familiarity when it is later recognised, perhaps in an 
entirely different context, seems all the more beguiling. 
    Alongside nursery rhymes and theme tunes, advertising jingles are often among our 
earliest musical memories. In his Proustian memoir of growing up in a family comprising 
a father who was a renowned DJ on New York radio and older brothers who were keen 





musicians, Geoffrey O’Brien (2004) renders this twilight world of the infant with 
exquisite precision: 
 
a child is defenseless against the incursions of the pre-recorded jingles that will become the 
earliest remembered artifacts of human civilization. Even before speech or the least 
glimmer of understanding they have already taken up residence. Years later – at the most 
inappropriate moments – they will rise unbidden to consciousness, those little songs that 
were the delight of infancy […]. “I like Bosco,” or the Wildroot Cream Oil song: these get 
their hooks in deeper than any subsequent hymn or love ballad, working their way into the 
circuitry while it is still forming. Here is substructure that will always be there (36-7).  
 
 
This kind of relationship to music will be analysed in more detail in chapter three when I 
come to examine involuntary musical memories. 
    Our adult indifference to jingles on TV – our tendency to ignore them or actively resist 
them by using the mute button – explains, in part, why their use in advertising campaigns 
has declined. By contrast, ads that use pop songs under limited license – limited by time, 
territory, and medium – give the viewer/listener something that might actively engage 
their interest. This is especially the case for younger audiences if the images are edited in 
such a way that they complement the racy tempo of the music as part of what Kay 
Dickinson (2003) terms an ‘MTV aesthetic’. For older audiences, a recognisable song 
might have nostalgic appeal, which, though jarring with the overt commercialism of the 
setting – David Beckham promoting the Vodafone network to the sound of the Mock 
Turtles’ ‘Can you dig it?’ – might be enough reason to stay with it. Even if the ads are 
scarcely attended to, there is a high chance that the music in question will be heard again 
outside the context of the ad and thus trigger associations with the product and a 
modicum of brand recognition. 
    In an article entitled ‘ “The new radio”: music licensing as a response to industry woe’, 
Bethany Klein (2008) cites a range of reasons for the surge in the number of pop songs 
being used in television advertising from about the early 1990s onwards. She writes that 
‘The growing presence of popular music in advertising takes place against a backdrop of 
significant organizational, legal and technological changes in both the radio and music 
industries’ (465). The most facile explanation for this upsurge would be that limited 
licensing of pop songs makes for both a quick payday and easy exposure for the 
musicians involved, but this does not really get at why, in the current economic and 





cultural climate, artists might be more inclined to license their work to advertisers than 
before. The answer to this question is that commercial radio has become more 
consolidated and incorporated with the result that many artists find themselves excluded 
from radio airplay altogether: ‘artists who formerly may have been denied airplay on 
some stations and granted airplay on others are now practically locked out of all’ (ibid.). 
Hence the description of film, television and computer game placements as the ‘new 
radio’, granting musicians access to audiences on a large scale in the way that radio 
proper once did (467).64 (This is obviously a more accurate description of the situation in 
the States, where public service broadcasting does not play such a prominent role as it 
does in the UK.) Klein cites the case of the Moby album Play (2000) which found its way 
into the pop charts following the placement of all 18 of its tracks (463). Ironically, music 
licensing is not just a way of  ‘reaching the ears of potential buyers’ but also a way ‘to 
reach the ears of radio programmers’, thereby ensuring further exposure and the kind that 
makes explicit mention of the artist and their work (467). Klein also draws attention to 
changes that are internal to the advertising industry, in particular the changing 
demographic among advertising ‘creatives’, which meant that, by the mid-1990s, there 
were more young men eager to see their taste in music reflected in the ads they were 
producing (463). This has led to the hitherto unlikely situation of advertisers 
championing alternative or underground music. The music industry has capitalised on 
these developments by diverting more of their energies into ‘synchronisation licensing 
departments’ in recognition of the enormous revenues that can be won from music use in 
ads, films, computer games, and on TV (469). In general, Klein is not sanguine about the 
new-found readiness of musicians of all genres and persuasions to license their music: 
‘Licensing to television commercials does not provide a solution to radio and music 
industry problems. At best, it provides different problems’ (476). 
    The limited licensing of pop music is, of course, part of a wider trend towards the use 
of pre-recorded music in screen media. Music used in this way has a range of mutually 
reinforcing functions. (i) It engages the viewer’s attention, especially if they recognise the 
music. (ii) It produces a sense of contemporaneity or nostalgia depending on whether it is 
an old or new song. (iii) It carries with it a loose set of cultural connotations based largely 
on the style or genre of the piece of music being played. (iv) It may also carry with it 





more personal associations for the individual viewer, which might engage their attention 
but might also detract from the association intended by the advertisers. (v) It produces 
effects of realism owing to the ubiquity of recorded music in everyday life; this is to say 
that the diegetic use of pre-recorded music in narrative film and television has become a 
signifier of the everyday. Scenes filmed in ‘the caf’ in the British soap opera Eastenders 
(1985- ), for example, are usually accompanied by fairly recent chart songs playing on 
the radio in the background, and have become a marker of an artist’s success in reaching 
a wider audience.      
    This chapter has demonstrated some of the ways in which music in the era of recording 
circulates – often in truncated form – between different social contexts. Some of the 
further implications of this dizzying mutation of musical meanings will be explored in 
chapter three when I come to examine involuntary musical memories. In the next section, 
however, I wish to elaborate more fully a semiotics of recorded music in everyday life 
and consider how this kind of semiotic analysis intersects with contemporary theoretical 
interest in affect.











Here is a message which everybody 
understands, but nobody can translate. 
(Reik 1953: 7) 
 
 
The ‘affective turn’ in cultural theory 
In this ‘interlude’, I would like to consider some of the implications of the recent surge of 
interest in theories of affect. In particular, I wish to examine what these theories have to 
contribute to an understanding of the role of recorded music in everyday life. I also wish 
to integrate such theories with prior semiotic models of musical communication, my 
contention being that in all cultural theory – and perhaps, most particularly, that 
concerning music – it is not the case that an analysis of affect, on the one hand, and 
signification on the other can or should be mutually exclusive. Rather, one implies the 
other. However, for reasons I shall come to, some of the existing models of how meaning 
is produced have tended to exclude the dimension of embodied feeling, or have had 
difficulty in accommodating it within their existing schemas, with the result that, in 
certain quarters, there has been an impatience with, or even indifference to, what have 
hitherto been some of the most established ways of theorising culture. 
    Before there was an ‘affective turn’, there was a linguistic one. It is my contention that 
the affective turn can only be properly understood in relation to the linguistic turn that 
preceded it. To be a little more precise, current theoretical interest in embodied feeling 
and emotion has largely been due to a sense that rather too much is excluded from the 
structuralist and poststructuralist paradigms, with their emphasis on discursive and 





significatory practices derived from, or analogically based on, the model provided by 
language. The dominance of the linguistic paradigm in cultural theory, then, and the 
methodological problems inherent in treating ‘natural’ languages as in some way 
analogous to a heterogeneous array of objects of study, has lead some theorists to look in 
other directions. This is exemplified by a polemically-entitled collection of essays, The 
Affective Turn. The book’s editor, Patricia Clough (2007), brings together work which 
shares a critical interest in ‘intensities’ rather than ‘meanings’ or ‘significations’. 
Similarly, body-technology ‘assemblages’ replace ‘texts’, while ‘information’ stands in 
place of ‘representation’.65  
    A figure who looms large in much work on affect is Gilles Deleuze. He is in some 
ways the founding father of contemporary affect theory in the way that Saussure was for 
structuralism. Indeed, Peter Osborne (2000) sardonically refers to Deleuze as ‘the great 
white hope of a non-Saussurean cultural theory, offering the prospect of a new beginning’ 
(46). In the anglophone world, one of the texts which exemplifies this Deleuzean slant to 
the affective turn – it being one of the most regularly cited – is Brian Massumi’s essay 
‘The autonomy of affect’. A translator of Deleuze and Guattari’s work, Massumi has 
been something of an ambassador for their oeuvre, especially in the years following 
Deleuze’s death in 1995. In this essay, he is concerned with delineating a Deleuzean 
notion of affect while, at the same time, citing some of Deleuze’s philosophical forebears 
in this area and suggesting possible avenues for future work. 
    Massumi begins by fastidiously insisting on a distinction between ‘affect’ and 
‘emotion’. ‘[E]motion and affect’, he asserts, ‘follow different logics and pertain to 
different orders’ (Massumi 1996: 221). Whereas affect is impersonal and pre-conscious, 
‘[a]n emotion is a subjective content, the socio-linguistic fixing of the quality of an 
experience which is from that point onward defined as personal’ (ibid.). An emotion is, 
then, an identifiable psycho-physiological state registered by the subject who experiences 
it, while affect is much more inchoate and provisional, escaping direct perception yet 
being the ground as it were for perception to occur. Indeed, conscious experience and 
affectivity form a loop, with one feeding into the other, the affective level being inferred 
as it were from the level of conscious experience. It is partly in order to avoid the 
conflation of ‘emotion’ and ‘affect’ that, when referring to the latter of the two terms, 





Massumi usually opts for the Deleuzean term ‘intensity’. ‘Intensity’, he writes, ‘is 
embodied in purely autonomic reactions most directly manifested in the skin – at the 
surface of the body, at its interface with things’ (219). As such, ‘affect’ or ‘intensity’ 
operates at a level distinct from that of ‘signification’: ‘There is a disconnection of 
signifying order from intensity – which constitutes a different order of connection 
running in parallel […]. Language […] is not simply in opposition to intensity. It would 
seem to function differentially in relation to it’ (218). Massumi urges that ‘Much could be 
gained by integrating the dimension of intensity into cultural theory’ (220). In this 
respect, he doesn’t want affect theory to simply eclipse textual or semiotic analysis but to 
complement it. As part of an analysis of an animated cartoon, he avers that ‘[a]pproaches 
to the [televisual] image in its relation to language are incomplete if they operate only on 
the semantic or semiotic level’ (220). He mounts an implicit attack on structuralism, in 
particular the study of systems of relational differences, urging that what is at stake in 
moving on from such models is ‘the new’: ‘structure is the place where nothing ever 
happens, that explanatory heaven in which all eventual permutations are prefigured in a 
self-consistent set of invariant generative rules’ (220-1).66 Instead, Massumi’s interest lies 
with what he calls the ‘event’: ‘the collapse of structured distinction into intensity, of 
rules into paradox’ (221). In dismantling taken-for-granted categories of thought, this 
‘collapse’ continues the work of deconstruction but in a way that eschews Derrida’s focus 
on language and scriptuality. 
    Massumi’s argument for the privileging of intensity over language is, in part, an 
historical one. In essence, his position is that affective modes of experience have come to 
predominate over discursive ones – that sensation has trumped reason. Contra Frederic 
Jameson, he claims that ‘postmodernity’ is characterised not by the ‘waning of affect’ but 
by an increase in it: ‘belief has waned for many, but not affect. If anything, our condition 
is characterized by a surfeit of it’ (ibid.). In what is, in many ways, a familiar 
Benjaminian narrative, he relates this waxing of affect to ‘late-capitalist, image- and 
information-based economies’, in particular, our absorption in a fully mediatised reality 
full of fast cuts, fast turnovers, sensory bombardment, and a culture of distractions. For 
Massumi, this is suggestive of a decline in linear, narrative thought and genres, and a 





corresponding increase in more provisional, affective modes of media production and 
consumption: ‘Everywhere, the cut, suspense – incipience’ (234). 
    The rise of affect, both as a mode of experience and as an object of enquiry, has been 
very noticeable and yet, at the same time, the adoption of a critical language specific to 
the study of affect has been tentative, piecemeal, and inconsistent. This can be observed 
in the field of cultural studies, in which a heterogeneous array of postgraduate work on 
affect currently abounds but has yet to filter down in any sustained way to undergraduate 
level and the way undergraduate courses are taught. Affect theory thus occupies an 
uncertain position within cultural studies’ present epistemological configuration. This 
becomes more obvious when one considers cultural studies’ historical trajectory. In an 
interview given in 1997, one of the doyens of cultural studies, Stuart Hall, traces three 
distinct paradigms within the history of his field: the first is a culturalist one, embodied in 
the work of Raymond Williams and his claim that ‘culture is ordinary’ as well as the 
related notion of culture as ‘a whole way of life’; the second is a semiological one: a shift 
towards a concern with signifying practices, as evident in both structuralism and 
poststructuralism; the third and most recent is a ‘Deleuzian one, which says that 
signification is not meaning, it’s all a question of affect’ (Hall 1997: 25).67 Interestingly, 
Hall is rather more tentative about the relative importance of this latest critical turn, 
remarking that he doesn’t see ‘a break in the regulative idea of culture as fundamental as 
the earlier one [i.e. ‘the structuralist break’]’ (ibid.). Perhaps the publication in the decade 
following this interview of a significant body of work on or relating to concepts of affect 
has been enough to change Hall’s mind, but it is striking the extent to which cultural 
studies as a field is still pervaded by the vocabulary of ‘significations’, ‘ideologies’, 
‘discourses’, ‘texts’, etc.68 Massumi’s call in his essay, ‘The autonomy of affect’, for ‘a 
cultural-theoretical vocabulary specific to affect’ has, to some extent, gone unanswered 
(Massumi 1996: 221). Perhaps this is partly to do with Deleuze and Guattari’s sometimes 
unconvincing or problematic borrowings from the lexicon of science and the difficulties 
of translating these into terms that don’t dissolve into an incomprehensible muddle. What 
this might signal then is the need for different, often older precursors. Two such theorists 
of affect are Walter Benjamin and Henri Bergson, both of whom connect to long-
established critical and philosophical traditions. The ideas of Benjamin and Bergson 





figure prominently in later chapters of the current work, while in the following section of 
this ‘interlude’ I turn to the writings of another theorist of affect, C.S. Peirce, whose work 
– rather like that of Bergson – remains under-represented in cultural theory. 
    In the midst of these critical developments which have seen a succession of theoretical 
paradigms, there have been fears that the affective turn might undo the gains made by 
prior critical work, with some writers seeing it as a potential relinquishment of the role of 
the engaged cultural critic in challenging the taken-for-granted ideologies and discourses 
that enable power to function more or less invisibly. In a paper entitled ‘The feminist 
intellectual: weariness, critique and the affective turn’, Sue Tate (2008) identifies ‘a risk 
of the individualising of experience, retreating into a personal world of affect/feeling, of 
the indulgence in a pleasurable but depoliticised cathartic release’: ‘I fear a turning from, 
perhaps a refusal of, ideological and representational critique […]: in turning to the 
affective, caught up in enthusiasm for the latest buzz term what might get thrown out?’ 
(2; emphasis in original). Therefore, rather than substituting existing critical approaches 
with an interest in affect, Tate advocates placing one ‘beside’ the other. Citing bell hooks 
and the work of Sara Ahmed, she argues that ‘individual emotion only moves into 
politics if linked to the “overall education for critical consciousness”. […G]etting to grips 
with structure and politics, being able to identify and consider how they mediate emotion, 
requires the understandings and methodological tools of critical theory, that bring the 
textual and ideological structures of meaning into visibility’ (4). 
    So a rapprochement should be sought between theories of affect on the one hand and a 
concern with signifying practices on the other. As Jeremy Gilbert (2007) writes, ‘we 
might argue that there is a significatory and affective dimension to all discourse/cultural 
practice’.69 In this regard, he stresses the idea of ‘ “discourse” as always in part a matter 
of transmissions of force as well as signification’, going on to suggest that ‘all discourse 
has to be understood as operating through the production of effects, rather than simply 
through the organisation of knowledge and meanings’.70 Comments such as these, taken 
together with Gilbert’s subsequent work, mark him out as being among the foremost 
proponents of the affective turn but one who refuses simply to jettison previous cultural 
theories, especially those regarding discursive practices.71 





    My own position should by now be clear: that a perceived antagonism or disjuncture 
between theories of signification and theories of affect is unnecessary and unhelpful, 
leading to various oversights and threatening to undo the critical work of recent decades. 
Yet, at the same time, there has been a paucity of theory and critical language that can 
bridge the gap. In terms of methodology and theoretical approach, the current study is an 
attempt to work within this fertile space between semiotics and affect theory. In this 
regard, music could be considered the perfect object of analysis, as it is never with music 
simply a question of either meaning or effects but the two together: ‘significatory affect’ 
or ‘affective significations’ if you will.72 In the following section, I offer a 
reconsideration of semiotics and, in the process, a way of (re-)connecting it to theories of 
affect via the work of Saussure’s somewhat overshadowed contemporary, the North 
American philosopher, C.S. Peirce. 
 
Sémiologie or semiotics?    
Peirce (1839-1914) and Saussure (1857-1913) were contemporaries who defined very 
similar areas of study but did so on opposite sides of the Atlantic. For Saussure, 
sémiologie – from the Greek, semeion (‘sign’) – was ‘a science that studies the life of 
signs within a society’ (quoted in Cuddon 1998: 805; Saussure 1983: 15). For Peirce, 
‘semiotics’ was a ‘formal doctrine of signs’ aimed at establishing ‘the characters of all 
signs used by […] an intelligence capable of learning by experience’ (Peirce 1960: 
2.227).73 It would seem that Peirce and Saussure demarcated the respective fields of 
‘semiotics’ and ‘semiology’ without knowledge of each other’s work: neither published 
particularly widely and their influence on a variety of academic fields has been almost 
entirely a result of their posthumous reception. It is tempting, then, to speculate what it 
was about the particular order of knowledge in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries that functioned to produce two bodies of work, one in English, the other in 
French, with such remarkable points of convergence. ‘Semiotics’ and ‘semiology’ were, 
in a sense, attempts at providing a more material and social model of the production of 
meaning than that proffered by the burgeoning field of psychology with its more 
atomised and interiorised approach to human subjectivity.74 In the words of the later 
Peirce, ‘all consciousness is sign-consciousness’ (Peirce 1992: xxxvi).75 As we shall see, 





Peirce’s statement here does not imply that all experience can simply be reduced to the 
effects of language or discourse.  
    In spite of the obvious similarities between their respective projects, there are 
significant differences too. I would like to delineate some of these as they have important 
methodological ramifications for the field of cultural studies and the study of music in 
particular. An initial difference is that Saussure limits the field of semiology to 
intentional acts of communication whereas Peirce does not. For Peirce, a sign is 
‘something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity’ so that 
the field of semiotics could include, for example, the study of cloud formations as signs 
of what the weather will be like or medical symptoms as diagnosable signs of illness 
(Peirce 1960: 2.228).76 For Saussure, by contrast, semiology is limited to the study of 
intentional, artificial devices, hence his primary interest in the linguistic sign (Eco 1976: 
15-16). 
    A further difference is that Peirce pragmatically simplifies the very idea of 
signification: the meaning of a sign becomes, at its most straightforward, its effect upon 
the person who perceives it. Stimuli are thus examined under the rubric of semiosis and 
treated as signs along with more conventional ‘symbols’. The precise nature of the 
responses they elicit are not merely single and unitary but form chains of signification, 
the effect of one sign or stimulus becoming a sign for something else and eliciting its own 
effects in turn. In Peircean semiotics, then, ‘a sign is not a self-evident idea or entity but 
is the catalyst for an effect’ (Turino 1999: 223). As will be seen, Peirce’s conception of 
meaning as a cascade of effects has significant ramifications for an understanding of 
affect. His semiotic is more amenable in this regard than Saussure’s narrower interest in 
conventional, consensually-created meanings as typified by natural languages. 
    Whereas for Saussure the sign is a dyad, for Peirce it is a triad or trichotomy made up 
of ‘sign’, ‘object’, and ‘interpretant’, ‘this tri-relative influence not being in anyway 














 signifier     signified   object         interpretant    
 
Figure 1: The Saussurean sign   Figure 2: The Peircean sign 
 
The relationship ‘sign-referent’ in the Saussurean register, i.e. the relationship between a 
sign and the actual thing it refers to, roughly corresponds to that of ‘sign-object’ in 
Peirce’s work. One can refine this comparison and say that ‘signifier-signified’ 
corresponds to ‘sign-immediate object’, i.e. the relationship between a sign and the 
concept it arouses, while ‘sign-referent’ corresponds to ‘sign-dynamic object, that is to 
say the relationship between a sign and the actual thing outside of the sign that is being 
referred to. The notion of the ‘interpretant’, however, is unique to Peirce’s semiotics and, 
as such, warrants further comment. In simple terms, the ‘interpretant’ is the effect of a 
sign upon the person perceiving it or its meaning for them.77 In this regard, the 
interpretant can be considered an ‘equivalent’ or secondary sign, ‘create[d] in the mind’ 
of the one who perceives the original sign (Peirce 1960: 2.228). There is thus a chaining 
of signs and interpretants, with interpretants functioning as signs in their own right 
together with their own objects and interpretants, and so on in a significatory cascade. 
    The initial sign establishes a chain of meanings and effects, many or even most of 
which will not be registered intellectually but will nevertheless play an important role in 
the semiotic process. A single stab of Hammond organ, for example, might have a deep 
gestural impact on the listener, scarcely capable of being verbalised. It might even set off 
sympathetic resonances in parts of the body. It could also have half-conscious 
synaesthetic meanings, sounding in some indefinable way ‘brown’ or ‘beige’, or like the 
texture of corduroy or velvet. Virtually simultaneously, vague cultural connotations 
might occur to the listener, such as ‘the 1960s’ or ‘1970s’ or ‘progressive rock’. Perhaps 
the title of a specific song will then come to mind: ‘Carry on my wayward son’ by 
Kansas. This could, in turn, be the trigger for a further chain of associations, including 
personal reminiscences, perhaps relating to the discursive content of the song lyrics. 





       sign      
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       In this example, three main types of interpretants as outlined by Peirce are readily 
observable. They are as follows: (i) ‘emotional interpretants’, i.e. unreflected-upon 
feelings or affects; (ii) ‘energetic interpretants’: physical reactions to a sign, such as a 
disposition to movement or an acceleration in the heartrate; and (iii) ‘sign-interpretants’, 
i.e. linguistic-based concepts (Turino 1999: 224). Because the meaning or effect of a sign 
– that is, the interpretant – is conjoined with other meanings and effects, there are, in 
operative terms, sign complexes or sign clusters. Peirce puts it thus: ‘In consequence of 
every sign determining an Interpretant, which is itself a sign, we have sign overlying 
sign’ (Peirce 1960: 2.94). Semiosis in Peircean terms is, then, a dynamic and potentially 
infinite process.78 Experientially, this means that clusters of signs will often produce very 
dense layers of signification-affect, or what could be called a ‘phenomenology of the 
sign’, with signs and their meanings being embedded in the sign user’s lived experience.  





    There is a connection to be made here between clusters of signs that operate at the 
level of lived experience and the model of the body outlined by Massumi – a model, in 
many ways, derived from the work of Bergson (1908/1988).79 Massumi (1996) claims 
that ‘[t]he body is as immediately virtual as it is actual’. He describes this virtual realm as 
a ‘pressing crowd of incipiencies and tendencies, […] a realm of potential’ (224; italics 
in original).80 For Massumi, the virtual body belongs to a level of affect that is not part of 
conscious experience but can be inferred from it. It is a ‘quantum’ level of 
‘undecidability’ prior to the manifestation of experiential outcomes. On the face of it, this 
might seem at odds with a Peircean notion of the sign, as it would seem that a sign that is 
not perceived or experienced is, in Peirce’s terms, not really a sign at all. It should be 
remembered, however, that many of the signs within Peirce’s semiotic lie on the 
threshold of conscious experience or even beneath it, as a kind of physical and affective 
undertow beneath our thoughts and impressions. This is to suggest that signs might have 
effects via the chaining of one sign to another but without intermediate signs in the chain 
being perceptible. 
    Another important difference between Peircean semiotics and Saussurean semiology is 
that the latter establishes the relationship between a sign and the thing or concept it refers 
to on a much more formal and contingent basis. This is to say that, in Saussure’s schema, 
the relationship between ‘signifier’ (the material aspect of the sign) and ‘signified’ (the 
concept referred to by the signifier) is arbitrary. It is a matter of convention, for instance, 
that the sound of the word ‘dog’ – its ‘acoustic image’ as Saussure termed it – refers to a 
furry, four-legged canine. Language and, by extension, other systems of signs studied 
under the Saussurean aegis are thus governed by relational differences rather than any 
intrinsic connection between a sign and what it refers to. In Peirce’s work, the kinds of 
signs just outlined belong to a particular category of sign defined by this conventional or 
arbitrary relationship between sign and referent; Peirce calls them ‘symbols’. There are, 
however, in Peirce’s semiotics, two other main categories of sign, ‘icons’ and ‘indices’, 
both of which are only arbitrary in their relationship to their referents to a certain degree. 
     Peirce’s trichotomy of the three basic types of signs – ‘symbols’, ‘indices’, and ‘icons’ 
– opens up the semiotic field to a much more capacious array of significatory-affective 
phenomena than Saussure’s semiology and its narrower concern with the linguistic sign. 





The first type of sign, a ‘symbol’, is a sign that is arbitrarily connected to its ‘object’ or 
referent. Symbols, which ‘include all general words, the main body of speech, and any 
mode of conveying a judgment’ are, in Peirce’s own description, ‘abstract’, ‘general’, 
‘conventional’ and ‘arbitrary’ (Peirce 1960: 3.360). The link between a symbol and its 
referent ‘depends upon a habit’ as, otherwise, there is nothing in any way obvious about 
the connection between the two (ibid.). As schoolchildren, we have to learn, for example, 
what the following means: 5 + 8 = 13. But with a little practice, we quickly learn to read 
the numbers and we substitute the words ‘plus’ and ‘equals’ in our mind’s ear for their 
corresponding symbols.  
    The second kind of sign, an ‘index’, is physically, spatially, or temporally connected 
with its object through causality, contiguity, or co-occurrence. In Peirce’s words, it is a 
sign which ‘marks the junction between two portions of experience’ (Peirce 1955: 108).  
Peirce sometimes limits his definition of an index to signs that are directly affected by the  
objects to which they refer, as in the example he cites of a weathervane (109).81 In cases 
such as this, there is a causal connection between a sign and its object, for example, 
between the direction in which a weathervane is pointing and the direction of the wind. 
At other times, Peirce defines the index in much broader terms as ‘[a]nything which 
focusses the attention’, e.g. a ‘pointing finger’ or a sudden cry to alert someone of danger 
(1955: 108, 9). Elsewhere, he defines it as a sign whose action ‘depends upon association 
by contiguity’ (108). Peirce includes in the category of indices ‘all natural signs’, e.g. 
dark clouds as a sign that rain is imminent, as well as ‘physical symptoms’, e.g. jaundiced 
skin and eyes as a sign that one might be suffering from a liver condition such as acute 
hepatitis (Peirce 1960: 3.361). An index is often related to its object via temporal 
reference as when a footprint or fingerprint indexes the fact that someone has been 
present; most of the clues that a detective will look for are of this kind as they 
retrospectively link a suspect to a crime scene. 
    The third type of sign, an ‘icon’, is similar to its object or referent. Peirce defines this 
type as ‘a sign which stands for something merely because it resembles it […]. Icons are 
so completely substituted for their objects as hardly to be distinguished from them’ 
(3.362). He gives the example of a naturalistic painting, perhaps a portrait or still life: 
‘there is a moment when we lose consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of 





the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream’ (ibid.). The level 
of resemblance between an icon and its object can sometimes, however, be quite weak. 
Words which we use to mimic the sounds of animals – ‘woof’, ‘miaow’, ‘cock-a-doodle-
doo’, etc. – are of this kind, as evidenced by the fact that they tend to vary from one 
language to another even though there are recognisable similarities. By contrast, an 
animal sound produced by a skilled mimic is a much more accurate copy. 
    As can be seen, Peirce’s work encompasses a much greater range of significatory 
phenomena than Saussure’s. The semiologist Émile Benveniste (1981) defines Peirce’s 
project as that of ‘distributing all of reality, the conceptual, and the experiential into 
various categories of signs’. This involves the construction of a potentially vast and 
unwieldy theoretical scaffolding. We have already seen how each element in the basic 
trichotomy of sign-object-interpretant can be subdivided into further trichotomies. Peirce 
continued the process until he arrived at well in excess of a hundred different 
permutations. Perhaps, then, because of the scale of Peirce’s taxonomical ambitions, 
there needs to be a certain amount of pruning of his analytical system. As another 
semiotician, Robert Scholes (1983), notes: ‘the great usefulness of semiotics […] will not 
be found in its elaborate analytical taxonomies, but rather is to be derived from a small 
number of its most basic and powerful concepts, ingeniously applied’ (xi). This is the 
approach I aspire to throughout the current work, including the section that follows, 
where I turn to the semiotics of music.  
    Before I do so, it would be well to highlight the fact that the choice between semiology 
and semiotics, between Saussurean and Peircean notions of signification, is a choice that 
cultural theorists haven’t yet made or even considered to any great extent, in part because 
the affective turn has led to a suspicion of what, in Peirce’s case at least, is wrongly seen 
as a preoccupation with language as an explanatory model. Peirce’s work presents the 
possibility of maintaining the critique of texts, discourse and ideology, which was 
enabled by the Saussurean moment, while at the same time, expanding our notions of 
‘signification’ to include areas of experience such as affect, or the ‘neglected’ senses of 
sound, touch, smell and taste, which have not proved amenable to analysis by 
linguistically-orientated methodologies.  
 





Musical semiotics, musical affect              
The differences between Saussure’s and Peirce’s models of signification become quite 
stark when we apply them to music. Many critics have noted that Saussurean analysis, i.e. 
analysis in terms of the arbitrary relation of signifiers (sign vehicles) to their signifieds 
(the concepts they refer to), is unsuitable for the study of music.82 The reasons for this 
unsuitability can be briefly stated as follows. Firstly, the musical sign presents the 
problem of being a signifier without a readily identifiable signified, i.e. music is syntactic 
without being obviously semantic. This is neatly expressed by Lévi-Strauss (1969): 
music, he says, ‘is the only language with the contradictory attributes of being at once 
intelligible and untranslatable’ (18).83 As a non-propositional form of communication, 
music’s referential powers are almost entirely connotative rather than denotative, which 
makes the question of musical meaning oblique and elusive. Another way of putting this 
is to say that music ‘is not, logically speaking, a language, for it has no vocabulary’ 
(Langer 1957: 228). A second reason why Saussurean semiology is poorly suited to the 
task of musical analysis is that, in music, there is no stable minimal unit of signification, 
i.e. no equivalent of the phoneme. Instead, the ‘museme’, as it is sometimes called, 
continually shifts between musical parameters so that signification occurs via often-
simultaneous alterations in pitch, rhythm, tempo, timbre, and dynamics.84 In this respect, 
music is closer to paralanguage than language itself, this being a third reason for the 
inadequacy of Saussurean musical analysis. In musical communication, as with tonal and 
physical gestures, many things are capable of being ‘said’ at the same time, without 
reliance on a system of arbitrary and differentially-governed signs. To quote 
Mendelssohn, ‘If you ask me to explain a piece of music, I can’t do it, not because music 
is too vague, but because words are too vague’ (quoted in Chanan 1999: 131).85 
    In keeping with a view of the efficacy of a trimmed-down version of Peirce’s 
semiotics, I would now like to give a summary of the three main types of signs that he 
identifies, as applied to music. It should first be noted that ‘icons’, ‘indices’, and 
‘symbols’ often function together in a single semiotic system, and the example provided 
by music is no exception. As will be seen, however, icons and indices greatly 
predominate. 





    Examples of ‘symbols’ in music are contentious as, strictly speaking, music does not 
possess the denotative function that is the distinguishing characteristic of this type of 
sign. Roland Barthes tentatively suggests Bach’s The Art of a Fugue as one such 
example, in that its series of fugues and canons, each in a different key, constitute a 
quasi-mathematical commentary on the entire system of diatonicism: a sort of meta-
music. In reality, though, Bach’s final work merely ‘feigns self-interpretation’ as, like all 
music, it cannot be used to formulate propositions in the way that words or mathematical 
symbols patently can (Barthes 1977: 179). Umberto Eco (1976), for his part, moots 
‘trumpet signals in the army’ as an example of a musical sign with ‘an explicit denotative 
value’ but this is a rare case (11). Fanfares might seem to be a similar example, whether 
they are of the regal and brassy kind or of the chintzy sort that announces the arrival of a 
guest on a television chat show or awards ceremony, but on closer inspection they are not 
‘symbols’ but ‘indices’ (as too, I suspect, are most of the trumpet calls that Eco alludes 
to). In other words, they ‘index’ a person or event by habitual co-occurrence rather than 
by being part of an abstract code. The semiotic distinction between connotation and 
denotation can be invoked here: such bursts of music ‘connote’ the events or people they 
accompany or presage but do not, in any real sense, name or describe them. Leitmotifs 
are a similar example. 
    Although music does not, other than in very limited cases, function ‘symbolically’ in 
the Peircean sense, it is often entwined with a semiotic system that does: language. A 
combination of words and music often results in what the musicologist, Richard Norton 
(1984), refers to as ‘semantic domination’, whereby the meaning of a piece of music is 
circumscribed by its title or by the text it sets. Norton uses the example of the 
Renaissance caccia or hunting song to illustrate how this works: 
 
Without words, we are of course impressed with the vigorous melodic and rhythmic 
activity of the two upper ‘hunting’ voices, as they proceed apace in canon over a steadily 
moving bass line: some physical thing or event is being set forth in musical gesture. 
Without words, however, it is difficult to identify this activity with any precision. Is it a 
quail hunt, a sailing party, or a house on fire? All of these events are busy affairs, with a lot 
of running or moving about. But with the addition of the text […] we discover that a 
particular human behaviour is being imitated in music (174-5).    
 





Here the iconic and symbolic levels of signification function in unison, so that music 
which sets verses about a hunting party actually sounds like one. Norton also cites the 
example of John Dowland’s Lachrimae, or Seaven Teares Figured in Seaven Passionate 
Pavans [sic] (1604), an instrumental piece written for viol consort and lute, which 
reflects the cult of melancholy that had been so prevalent in Elizabethan court circles. 
Dowland gave each section of the sequence its own title: ‘old’ tears, ‘renewed’ tears, 
‘sighing’ tears, ‘sad’ tears, ‘forced’ tears, ‘lover’s’ tears, and ‘true’ tears. The opening 
motif of a falling fourth recurs throughout the sequence of seven variations, thus 
functioning as the tonal embodiment of the falling tears of the title. As Norton notes, 
‘The music is for instruments, but the title secures an affective state for the listener’, 
helping to establish the work’s reputation as among the saddest pieces of English music 
ever written (175).  
   Especially poignant examples of the intertwining of words and music occur when song 
lyrics draw explicit attention to the form of the music, as in the Cole Porter song, ‘Ev’ry 
time we say goodbye’ (1944). The line, ‘But how strange the change from major to 
minor’ does indeed occur on a modulation from a major to a minor chord, producing an 
effect of lilting sadness and tender regret. A similar effect is to be found in ‘Hallelujah’ 
by Leonard Cohen (1984).86 The first verse describes each of the song’s harmonic 
changes one by one:  
 
I heard there was a secret chord 
That David played and it pleased the Lord 
But you don’t really care for music, do ya? 
Well, it goes like this, the fourth, the fifth, 
The minor fall and the major lift –  
The baffled king composing Hallelujah. 
 
Such devices, at their most successful, suggest an uncanny sense of a song composing 
itself as we hear it.87 
    We have already mentioned musical ‘indices’, the next type of musical sign. Turino 
(1999) refers to them as ‘signs of experience and emotion’, in that a musical index refers 
to its object via their co-occurrence as part of the actual events of one’s life (234). Later, 
when one hears the music in a different context, the presence of the sign, i.e. the music, is 
enough for their objects to be recalled. So, for example, the theme tune from a familiar 





film or television programme is enough to trigger a recollection of the latter, even in its 
absence. The epitome of a musical index is music for special occasions: birthdays, 
weddings, funerals and other rites of passage. The collective nature of these rituals helps 
to emphasise the strong emotional significance that can attach to such pieces of music. 
Turino stresses that indices are signs of experience rather than signs about experience, 
like symbols. This can lend them an unreflected-upon sense of authenticity: 
 
Indices are experienced as “real” because they are rooted, often redundantly, in one’s own 
life experiences and, as memory, become the actual mortar of personal and social identity. 
When given indices are tied to the affective foundations of one’s personal or communal life 
– home, family, childhood, a lover, war experiences – they have special potential for 
creating direct emotional effects because they are often unreflexively apprehended as “real” 
or “true” parts of the experiences signified (229). 
 
    The reader will remember that the next type of sign, the ‘icon’, resembles in some way 
or other the object to which it refers. The primary iconic connection in the present context 
is between a musical sign and the human voice. Music’s processual shapes and mobile 
forms are analogous to the sounds of emotional speech. As Turino (1999) suggests, 
‘common musical devices such as a rising melodic line, accelerando, and crescendo may 
create tension and excitement in a listener because they sound like so many human voices 
we have heard rising in pitch, speed, and volume when the speaker becomes excited’ 
(227). It is important to stress that the perceived likeness between a section of music and 
the ‘musicality’ of speech – its ‘prosody’ to use the proper linguistic term – is a ‘felt’ 
connection; that is to say, it is not usually registered in terms of language-based thought 
but is experienced instead as a chain of affects.88 
    Another iconic connection can be perceived between music and gestures or other 
physical movements. The tempo-marking andante (literally ‘going’) draws attention to 
this link, as it is supposed to be walking pace. Obviously, rhythm is a key component of 
the connection here, but the correspondences between music and bodily movements 
encompass other musical parameters too (Middleton 2000: 105). For example, in 
virtually every musical culture there is a perceived link between pitch values and physical 
space, so that a ‘movement’ in pitch suggests a corresponding movement in physical 
space, though it should be mentioned that the assignation of values can vary quite 





markedly from one culture to another: pitches that are heard as ‘high’ in the Western 
musical tradition are perceived as being ‘low’ in Arab, Greek and Jewish music, and vice 
versa (Nattiez 1990: 122).  
    A further object to which a musical icon can refer is an emotional state, hence Susanne 
Langer’s description of music as ‘a “logical picture” of sentient, responsive life’ (Langer 
1957: 222). Langer’s point here is that music does not express the inner life of our 
emotions so much as formulate and represent it: ‘Because the forms of human feeling are 
much more congruent with musical forms than with the forms of language, music can 
reveal the nature of feelings with a detail and truth that language cannot approach’ (235; 
emphasis in original). This iconic process via which music is able to represent emotional 
states has a long and complex history, which I’ll return to in a moment.    
    When a piece of music functions intertextually, evoking for the listener the memory of 
other pieces of music, this too is an iconic connection as there is a perceived resemblance 
between sign and object, between the piece of music being listened to – or a fragment of 
it – and part of another piece of music. This kind of connection could be at the level of 
any one of a number of musical parameters – the particular timbre of a singer’s voice 
evoking the sound of their voice on other recordings, a melodic or rhythmic phrase, a 
harmonic progression, etc. – or a combination of them. These kinds of relations between 
pieces of music are very common in popular music, in which musical materials are 
continually being recycled, and they are sometimes acknowledged by performers when 
they segue between one of their own songs and a similar song.89 In the classical world, 
musical quotations establish similarly iconic links between separate musical materials. 
    Musical icons also operate intratextually. This is to say that part of a piece of music 
can sound like another part of the same piece. These kinds of connections are almost 
universal in all styles of music as they are essential in order to establish the identity of a 
piece, i.e. its formal characteristics as well as its distinctive set of timbral qualities. A 
typical example would be when a melody is introduced and then taken up by a different 
instrument, or when a melody is repeated but inflected in various ways. Only in very rare 
cases, when repetition is rigorously avoided as in some serialist compositions, does a 
piece of music not refer to itself in this way, yet even in such cases, it is more a question 





of degree as some repetition is inevitable, for example, repetition of timbre, as in one of 
Schoenberg’s Piano Pieces. 
 
An ‘archaeology’ of musical signification 
The icon is a sign that establishes a connection with its referent via the similarity of 
pertinent features. While not being arbitrary, this perceived similarity is, to some extent, 
culturally coded (Eco 1976: 204).90 In music, the connection between an icon and its 
referent can feel immediate, spontaneous, and natural, but there often lies beneath such 
meanings a submerged history or cultural unconscious that requires ‘unearthing’ if the 
ideological ramifications of musical signification are to be perceived.  
   The example given earlier of the iconic connection between height and pitch is  
instructive in this regard. The French composer and musicologist, Jacques Chailley 
(1963), notes that in the early history of Western music this connection had not yet been 
fully established. He compares two liturgical chants from the Middle Ages, both of which 
set the text ascendit Deus as part of the Ascension Day mass. One might expect both to 
make use of ‘ascending’ pitches in setting this phrase but, in fact, only the later example 
does. When the first chant was composed, the linguistic convention by which a high pitch 
is called ‘high’ and a low pitch ‘low’ was not yet firmly in place, probably in connection 
with the fact that a system of notation representing the relationship between pitches in 
spatial terms – the precursor to staff notation – was still a relatively recent innovation 
(411).91 
    What, then, seems like a ‘natural’ connection is, in fact, a culturally acquired one. The 
music psychologist, Robert Francès (1958), claims that ‘before getting any musical 
education, children do not in any way situate high and low sounds in space’ (310). I 
remember a song I learnt at nursery or primary school (or perhaps from the television?) in 
which the words for different parts of the body were set to music: ‘Heads, shoulders, 
knees and toes, knees and toes’. As we touched the various parts of our bodies, the 
melody we were singing mapped, albeit in rough terms, their relative vertical positions, 
so that the higher notes were sung on ‘head’ and ‘shoulders’ while the lowest notes were 
reserved for ‘knees’ and ‘toes’. This type of icon is referred to by Peirce (1960) as a 
‘diagram’, in which an analogous relation of the parts belonging to sign and object is the 





basis for their similarity, as in the example of a map (3.361-3). In this sense, the song is a 
rudimentary version of the African-American spiritual, ‘Dem dry bones’, which uses 
successive modulations to go from the lower body to the upper body and back down 
again: ‘Your knee bone connected to your thigh bone / Your thigh bone connected to 
your hip bone / Your hip bone connected to your back bone’, etc. As Nattiez (1990) 
comments regarding the implicit sense of ‘musical spatialism’ inculcated by such songs, 
‘we never believe so strongly in the naturalness of things as when we have become 
totally conditioned to them’ (121). 
    The conventions governing the perceived resemblances between styles of music and 
emotional states have a long history, going back at least as far as the ancient Greeks. As 
with Medieval plainchant, Greek music was organised around the ‘modes’: a set of 
scales, each with its own distinctive arrangement of notes. (Only two such ‘modes’ 
remain in today’s diatonic system, albeit with slightly altered tuning: the ‘major’ and the 
‘minor’ keys). The doctrine of mimesis held that each of the modes imitated a mood or 
emotional state. Plato and Aristotle, for instance, claim that the Mixolydian mode is 
sorrowful while the Dorian, by contrast, sounds courageous and grandiose.92 The act of 
mimesis was two-fold in that the mode would imitate a discrete set of emotions while 
arousing in listeners an emotional state which was, in turn, an imitation of the music.93 
One suspects the Greeks would have been responsive to the Peircean notion of a sign as a 
catalyst for a chain of effects. 
    Similar analogies have been made between emotional states and the various keys of the 
diatonic system, but this is an altogether more fanciful procedure, seeing that the 
relationships among notes within all major scales follow the same pattern, and likewise 
for all minor scales. This has not stopped composers such as Charpentier, Lavignac, and 
Rameau from making such analogies, though the epithets they attach to the same key 
often vary quite markedly: G minor is described by Charpentier as ‘severe’, whereas for 
Rameau it suggests ‘tenderness’, while for Lavignac it sounds ‘melancholy’ (Nattiez 
1990: 125). Nattiez (1990) notes that ‘tonal codes are quite numerous in Europe up to the 
twentieth century, and depend for their essence on a process of mental analogy’ (124). On 
closer inspection, such codes often appear to derive from pre-existing associations 
between famous pieces of music and the titles given to them: another example of 





‘semantic domination’. Lavignac describes F major as a ‘bucolic’ and ‘pastoral’ key, no 
doubt because Beethoven chose it for his Sixth Symphony, the ‘Pastoral’. The tuning of 
instruments, making them easy or difficult to play in certain keys, also contributes to 
these kinds of associations. For instance, the most ‘pastoral’ of instruments, the horn, was 
best played in a key around F major prior to the invention of its valved version, hence 
Beethoven’s decision to name his Sixth Symphony in the way he did (Hewett 2010).    
    Undoubtedly, the most important moment in the codification of emotion in Western 
music occurred during the Renaissance when composers of madrigals were formulating 
the tonal ‘language’ that would be used in the first operas. The Cuban music critic, Alejo 
Carpentier (1972) writes: ‘the madrigal composer managed to create a whole rhetoric of 
expression which consisted, for example, in causing the voices to rise when singing about 
heaven and to fall when singing about hell, in weaving “chains of love” with intervals of 
a third, or in writing in a silence for a “sigh” ’ (1097). This new musical ‘language’ was 
based on relations between tonic and dominant, that is to say between a chord constructed 
on the first note of the home key and a chord built on the fifth note of that key. A return 
to the tonic represented emotional and dramatic resolution, whereas moments of tension 
were signified by movement away from the tonic, especially when dissonance was 
employed, as in the work of Gesualdo. In the dramatic settings of early operas such as 
L’Euridice (1600) by Peri or Monteverdi’s Orfeo (1607), the singers’ physical gestures 
allowed for the emotional content of musical phrases to be rendered even more explicitly. 
Christopher Small (1998) argues that the type of iconic musical phrases just described did 
not represent emotional states per se but rather the kinds of physical gestures, both bodily 
and vocal, with which they were associated (148). Once the connection with music was 
firmly established, audiences could understand the significance of such ‘musical 
gestures’ outside of the textual and dramatic settings of madrigal and opera within which 
they’d first been heard. The foundations were thus laid for the more ‘abstract dramas’ of 
concert music, including the nineteenth-century symphony (147). 
   In the twentieth century, classical Hollywood cinema continued these processes of 
iconic semiosis, installing late romanticism as the de facto style for the signification of a 
range of emotions in screen entertainment. The origins of this extend back to the 
erroneously-named ‘silent’ era, when musicians in the movie theatre would accompany 





the action on screen, partly in order to divert attention from the whirring noise of the 
projector. A system of music cue sheets proved to be the most reliable way of 
synchronising music with the moving picture. These cue sheets plundered popular song 
and the classical repertory in order to provide pianists, organists and small orchestras 
with suitable music for accompanying narrative films. Chanan (1996) notes that ‘[t]he 
cue sheet system […] institutionalized what had already become an established informal 
practice, in which a repertoire of well-known music was coded by a loose impressionistic 
iconic association’ (263). Familiar music, he writes, ‘provide[d] a ready-made emotive 
vocabulary […], used to trigger off established response patterns, to reinforce the 
conventionality of the plot and the genre’ (265). He adds that ‘[t]he effects of this kind of 
classification of music for the screen would reach beyond the cinema. It has created a 
way of hearing which insists on associating music forever with pictures; and a way of 
hearing which annihilates listening’ (265). In being co-opted in order to render the 
affective meaning of moving images less ambiguous, classical or classical-style music 
has itself been rendered less ambiguous. For those who never hear it in any other context, 
it has become a monolithic set of conventional signs which is usually there, as such, in 
order to be ignored. The distinction introduced earlier between affect and emotion is apt 
here, as it would seem that the kind of signification produced by a classical Hollywood 
score tends towards the production of emotion rather than affect, i.e. a ‘socio-linguistic 
fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as 
personal’ (Massumi 1996: 221). In eliciting an audience’s identification with the 
subjective experience of the characters on screen, such scores thus tend to reproduce an 
ideology of the bourgeois humanist subject: the individual as bounded, unitary, 
transparently self-aware, and autonomous. This occurs in spite of the ostensibly 
collective nature of consumption within the cinematic medium.  
    Musical signification, especially the culturally-coded connection between music and 
emotional states, therefore has a very ‘sedimented’ history, with the result that musical 
meanings often appear ‘natural’ or ‘obvious’, or as unmediated effects directly caused by 
the sound stimulus itself rather than via its cultural construction. What I have presented 
here is – in the Foucauldian sense – an ‘archaeology’ of musical signification, in which I 
have attempted to lay bare some of the normally submerged historical foundations and 





dense genealogies determining how music produces meaning for us today. The parallels 
with everyday life are apposite in this regard. Like musical signification, the everyday 
hides its own history, and thus explicitly ideological meanings are lost to those long 
processes of semiotic coalescence and sedimentation via which culture is able to pose as 
nature. In both cases – music and everyday life – this sedimentation is a form of deep or 
implicit cultural memory, a cultural unconscious, which needs to be ‘dug out’ if its 
meanings are to be examined in the light of day.










Involuntary Musical Memories 
* 
 
Music is playing inside my head 
Over and over and over again –  
My friend, there’s no end to the music. 
 
         Carole King,  




To talk of ‘involuntary memory’ is to already be within the discourse of psychology with its 
attendant construction of the bounded individual – an individual who has commonly, though 
problematically, been taken to be the repository of memory (Radstone and Hodgkin 2003: 3). 
It was Hermann Ebbinghaus, in his book, On Memory, published in 1885, who first made the 
formal distinction between voluntary and involuntary remembering (Rose 2003: 122-3). 
Ebbinghaus’ emphasis on quantitative precision marked his work off from the more 
speculative and introspective psychology that had preceded it, and indeed, from the ancient 
ars memorativa or ‘art of memory’, which had had a pervasive influence in Western culture 
since at least the time of the Greeks and their designation of Mnemosyne as the mother of the 
Muses (Yates 1966: xi, 6). 
    Ebbinghaus (1885/1964) notes that while some ‘mental states’ must be ‘call[ed] back into 
consciousness by an exertion of the will’, others return, ‘even after years, […] with apparent 
spontaneity’ (1-2). As an example of one of these ‘mental states’ that are ‘reproduced 
involuntarily’, he cites the spontaneous recall of music: ‘Melodies may become a source of 
torment by the undesired persistency of their return’ (2-3; original emphasis removed). 
Clearly, Ebbinghaus was interested – albeit bemusedly so – in the peculiar susceptibility of 





the human nervous system to spontaneous musical activity. He contrasts music with visual 
stimuli in this regard: ‘Forms and colours are not so importunate; and if they do return, it is 
with noticeable loss of clearness and certainty’ (3). His explanation for this falls back on a 
somewhat hackneyed distinction between the visual arts as representational and the musical 
arts as expressive: ‘The musician writes for the orchestra what his inner voice sings to him; 
the painter rarely relies without disadvantage solely upon the images which his inner eye 
presents to him; nature gives him his forms, study governs his combination of them’ (ibid.). 
On the related subject of emotions, he notes that some kind of sensuous trigger, such as a 
piece of music, is usually needed for their recall: ‘It is with something of a struggle that past 
states of feeling are realized; when realized, […] this is often only through the 
instrumentality of the movements which accompanied them’ (ibid.).  
    Ebbinghaus’ concern with the interiority of experience, as reflected in this passage and 
throughout his treatise on memory, marks him out as a man of his age: someone who, in 
responding unconsciously to the twin forces of industrial and urban modernity, helped to 
construct our now taken-for-granted view of the fragile, buffeted individual as their correlate. 
His nascent conception of involuntary memory as an internalised response to stimuli in our 
immediate environment was greatly expanded upon in the work that followed in the early 
twentieth century.      
 
Proustian memory  
The actual phrase mémoire involontaire appears for the first time almost thirty years after 
Ebbinghaus’ study, in the work of Proust.94 And it is with Proust that the concept of 
involuntary memory is usually associated; indeed, it is often referred to as ‘Proustian 
memory’. Proust’s grand theme throughout the eight volumes that comprise À la recherche 
du temps perdu is the notion that sensuous experiences can prompt spontaneous 
reminiscences and thus aid the recovery of ‘lost time’. 
    The most famous of these incidents is described in the first chapter of the first volume. 
Returning home one day, cold and tired, the narrator is given a cup of lime-blossom tea by 
his mother together with a little cake called a madeleine in the shape of a scallop shell. He 
dips a morsel of the cake in a spoonful of tea and raises the mixture to his lips. A moment 
later he feels ‘[a]n exquisite pleasure […], something isolated, detached, with no suggestion 





of its origin’ (Proust 1913/1992: 51). The sensation is overwhelming, ‘filling’ the young 
Marcel ‘with a precious essence; or rather this essence was not in me, it was me’ (ibid.). He 
tries to recapture this feeling of being lifted out of time and freed from ‘the vicissitudes of 
life’, but in vain (ibid.). Each successive mouthful produces a diminishing sensation, and he 
is unable to force the memories associated with the taste of the tea and cake to arise in his 
mind even though he can feel them as an inarticulate ‘essence’ in his body. Eventually 
however, involuntary remembering takes over again and ‘the memory reveal[s] itself’: ‘The 
taste was that of the little piece of madeleine which on Sunday mornings at Combray […], 
when I went to say good morning to her in her bedroom, my aunt Léonie used to give me, 
dipping it first in her own cup of tea or tisane’ (53). In being able to suddenly feel again the 
aura of the days he spent as a child staying with relatives in the countryside, the narrator 
marvels at how ‘taste and smell’ encapsulate ‘the vast structure of recollection’ (54). 
    The other instances of involuntary memory in the novel share a similar degree of sensuous 
specificity. Only one of them is a visual memory per se, providing a clue as to the peculiarly 
embodied nature of involuntary remembering. The visual sense tends to play, at best, a 
supporting role in such spontaneous reminiscences, no doubt because it is the most 
objectifying of the senses and is thus unsuited to the sudden recall of memories in which 
remembering subject and remembered object are fused into a single ‘essence’. 
    The ‘little phrase by Vinteuil’ that so obsesses Charles Swann in the first volume of À la 
recherche acts as a trigger for a set of involuntary associations, though it is not an 
involuntary musical memory of the kind I will be examining later (262). This is to say that 
we are not given to understand that Swann hears the phrase from Vinteuil’s sonata ‘in his 
head’; only that it prompts various reminiscences of his love for Odette when he hears it 
performed. Once the connection is established in Swann’s mind between Odette and the little 
phrase, it becomes ‘the national anthem of their love’, especially in that Swann asks her to 
play it for him (ibid.). It functions as ‘a token of his love’, suggestive of intense emotions, 
both happy and sad, hopeful and disenchanting, its meaning changing depending on how 
Swann is feeling in relation to Odette, the object of his obsession (ibid.). In the different 
ways just described, the phrase belongs to the two categories of signs that Peirce terms 
‘icons’ and ‘indices’: it refers via its resemblance to the intensity of his feeling for Odette, to 
Odette herself via its contemporaneity with her, as well as to the era in his life when he 





became so infatuated by her. It is at this complex, implicit, and highly suggestive level of 
signification – in contrast to the explicitness of language – that the snatch of music operates 
upon Swann. We are told that ‘he sought in the little phrase for a meaning to which his 
intelligence could not descend’ (285). 
    The catalysts for involuntary reminiscences in the other volumes of the novel are as 
follows. In À l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleures (1919), ‘the cold, almost sooty smell’ of a 
public lavatory on the Champs-Elysées reminds the narrator of his uncle’s little sitting room 
at Combray, ‘which had […] exhaled the same odour of humidity’ (Proust 1919/1960: 93). 
He describes the initial sensation as ‘a pleasure not at all of the same character as other 
pleasures, […] a consistent pleasure on which I could lean for support, delicious, soothing, 
rich with a truth that was lasting, unexplained and certain’ (90). In spite of its profound 
impact on him, he postpones at this still-early stage in the novel ‘the attempt to discover why 
the recollection of so trivial an impression had given [him] so keen a happiness’ (ibid.). 
Involuntary memory offers an experience of repletion but, as yet, remains mysterious for the 
young Marcel. 
   The next spontaneous reminiscence occurs in a later volume, Sodome et Gomorrhe (1921), 
and demonstrates the increasing intellectual, emotional and artistic maturity of the narrator. 
In a state of exhaustion, the narrator returns to his hotel room and reaches down to take off 
his boots when he is suddenly reminded of how his grandmother had removed his boots for 
him when they were staying in the exact same room of the Grand Hotel in Balbec. A vivid 
memory of his deceased grandmother coincides with the ineluctable realisation that she is 
gone: ‘I had only just, on feeling her for the first time, alive, authentic, making my heart 
swell to the breaking-point, on finding her at last, learned that I had lost her for ever […]. I 
felt that I did not really recall her save by grief’ (Proust 1921/1929: 220, 222). He breaks 
down in sobs of tears, able fully to mourn her passing for the first time in spite of her having 
died more than a year previously. His two trips to the hotel – the first accompanied by his 
grandmother, the second without her – exist in a superimposed, synchronic relationship, so 
that the ‘peculiar odour of the over-scented soaps’, for example, ‘seem[ed]  to belong at once 
to the present moment and to my past visit’ (229). 
    In the climactic volume, Le temps retrouvé (1927), the narrator’s involuntary 
reminiscences come in quick succession during a visit to the Guermantes mansion. Upon 





arriving there for an afternoon party, the narrator stumbles on some uneven paving-stones in 
the courtyard outside and is returned to the baptistery of St. Mark’s in Venice, where he had 
also stood on a paving stone that was slightly lower than its neighbour. Once inside the 
mansion, he has to wait in a little sitting room used as a library until the end of a piece of 
music which was being played in the main reception room, ‘the Princess having given orders 
for the doors to be kept shut during its performance’ (Proust 1927/1970: 224). He describes 
how ‘A servant, trying unsuccessfully not to make a noise, chanced to knock a spoon against 
a plate and again that same species of happiness which had come to me from the uneven 
paving-stones poured into me’ (224-5). For Marcel, the noise is identical to one he had heard 
during a trip back to Paris when his train had broken down: a hammer being struck against 
one of the huge iron wheels. In spite of the very different settings, he experiences the same 
sense of ‘heat combined with a whiff of smoke and […] the cool smell of a forest 
background’, and feels himself ‘to be in the railway carriage again, opening a bottle of beer’ 
(225). In the midst of these reveries, a butler brings him a glass of orangeade and a selection 
of little cakes and biscuits. The starchiness of the napkin that he wipes his mouth on is 
enough to transport him once more. The texture of the napkin recalls that of a towel he had 
used to dry his face on during the first day of his arrival at Balbec. Another memory of the 
coastal resort of Balbec is brought back to him by ‘the shrill noise of water running through a 
pipe’; it reminds him of the sound emitted by a pleasure steamer (232).95 Then, while 
browsing the Prince’s collection of first editions, Marcel discovers a book by George Sand – 
François le Champi – which his mother had read to him as a child: ‘This was a very deeply 
buried impression that I had just encountered, one in which memories of childhood and 
family were tenderly intermingled and which I had not immediately recognised. […T]his 
book which my mother had read aloud to me at Combray until the early hours of the morning 
had kept for me all the charm of that night’ (248). 
    This ‘trembling chain of memories’ is decisive in affirming the narrator’s vocation as a 
writer. He realises that the subtle, delicate motions of the self that accompany spontaneous 
memories parallel those of artistic inspiration (ibid.; 238). Here, the distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary remembering is crucial: ‘the truths which the intellect apprehends 
directly in the world of full and unimpeded light have something less profound, less 
necessary than those which life communicates to us against our will in an impression which 





is material because it enters us through the senses but yet has a spiritual meaning which it is 
possible for us to extract’ (239). Each of the sensuous objects that the narrator chances upon 
during the novel allow for the recovery of ‘a fragment of time in the pure state’, ‘something 
that, common to the past and to the present, is much more essential than both’ (230). Such 
involuntary memories represent ‘the discovery of our true life, of reality as we have felt it to 
be, which differs so greatly from what we think it is’ (242). Here again, Peircean semiotics 
helps make the contrast sharper. Whereas voluntary memories typically rely on some kind of 
verbal formulation, and are thus remembered via recourse to those abstract and arbitrary 
signs that Peirce terms ‘symbols’, involuntary memories are ‘iconic’ and ‘indexical’: a spoon 
chinking on a plate resembles the distant sound of a hammer being struck against the wheel 
of a train; via this connection, this sound refers also to all the other sensuous details 
associated with the original experience of sitting in a railway carriage as a train pauses next 
to a forest on its way to Paris. During the course of such reminiscences, Marcel experiences a 
semiotic cascade, as the meaning or effect of one sign becomes the catalyst for further 
meanings, effects and reminiscences, and so on. In addition to forming chains of signs, these 
spontaneous memories also arise as tightly-bunched clusters, more palpable than linguistic 
signs: 
 
An image presented to us by life brings with it, in a single moment, sensations which are in fact 
multiple and heterogeneous […]. An hour is not merely an hour, it is a vase full of scents and 
sounds and projects and climates, and what we call reality is a certain connection between these 
immediate sensations and the memories which envelop us simultaneously with them (253-4). 
 
Our experience of the present is inevitably suffused with intimations of the past. At certain 
moments too, when past and present share the same identity, the Proustian rememberer is 
offered a sensation of ‘pure’ time: time as a synchronic structure folded back on itself, yet 
vivid, sensual and immediate, releasing one from the meaningless continuum of time 
conceived of in linear terms.        
 
Proust & Bergson 
Critics sometimes used to speculate that Proust was introduced to the concept of involuntary 
memory by his cousin-in-law, Henri Bergson. Such a connection is now thought to be 
unlikely; in any case, Proust strenuously denied Bergson’s influence. In an interview, Proust 





insisted that the distinction between voluntary and involuntary memory was one that Bergson 
had not made (Loshitzky 1995: 215). Nevertheless, there are certain parallels between their 
conceptions of memory. As Walter Benjamin (1973) notes, ‘the mémoire pure of Bergson’s 
theory becomes a mémoire involontaire’ in Proust’s work (111). Bergson’s view is that 
memory, in its ‘pure’ form, is inaccessible to consciousness; it can only be grasped in the 
form of ‘images’, which arise as a result of one’s active engagement in the sensuous world: 
 
that a recollection should reappear in consciousness, it is necessary that it should descend from 
the heights of pure memory down to the precise point where action is taking place (153). 
[M]emories need, for their actualization, a motor ally, […] they require for their recall a kind of 
mental attitude which must itself be engrafted upon an attitude of the body (Bergson 
1908/1988: 120). 
 
Thus, in Bergson’s work, the ground is already laid for a phenomenology of memory: a 
conception of remembering as a sensuous and embodied activity in which subject and object 
interpenetrate. This conception, on the face of it at least, would appear to feed into the work 
of Proust, and certainly does into Benjamin’s work, as well as that of Deleuze. 
    However, there are certain differences between Bergson’s and Proust’s conceptions of 
memory. In his book on Baudelaire, Benjamin criticises Bergson for failing to attend to the 
historically-constructed nature of memory while praising Proust for avoiding this failing. For 
Benjamin (1973), there has been ‘a change in the structure of […] experience’; fleeting and 
contingent forms of reminiscence become, for him, emblematic of urban and industrial 
modernity (110). In his eulogy to Proust, he claims that the concept of mémoire involontaire 
‘bears the marks of the situation which gave rise to it; it is part of the inventory of the 
individual who is isolated in many ways’ (113).96 Benjamin acknowledges that the very 
notion of ‘experience’ implies ‘certain contents of the individual past [being] combine[d] 
with material of the collective past’ so that, in the final analysis, an individual’s experience is 
found to depend upon a collective support (ibid.).97 He notes, however, that, in Proust, one 
doesn’t find overtly collective forms of remembrance – ‘rituals’, ‘ceremonies’, ‘festivals’, 
etc. – so much as solitary reminiscences arising as ‘a matter of chance’ (112-3). 
    I’ll return to the work of Bergson, Benjamin and Proust in order to look for clues as to 
how and why we spontaneously remember fragments of music but, first, I’d like to give 
some examples of what, in a literal translation from the German Ohrwurm, have also been 
referred to as ‘earworms’ (Sacks 2007: 42).   





Involuntary musical memories: two examples 
I’d like to recount two celebrated examples of involuntary musical memories, separated 
from each other by a period of some eighty-odd years. The differences between them 
illustrate the unprecedented changes, both to memory and to musical culture, that 
occurred during the intervening period. 
    In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud recalls an incident that had happened 
immediately prior to his so-called ‘revolutionary’ dream. He was at Vienna’s 
Westbahnhof, waiting for a train to take him to Aussee for his summer holidays, but had 
arrived while an earlier train was still standing in the station. Suddenly, Count Thun, the 
aristocratic head of government, barged onto the platform, curtly brushing aside the ticket 
inspector, who hadn’t recognised him, and boarded the train for Ischl where he had an 
audience with the Emperor. The Austrian politician had recently been ridiculed by 
opposition journalists, who had branded him Count Nichtsthun or ‘Count Do-nothing’, 
Thun being the German word for ‘do’. The train for Ischl pulled out and Freud, having 
already purchased a first-class ticket for his train but without a reserved compartment, 
scrutinised the platform in order to see if anyone else would claim preferential treatment, 
in which case he had decided he would loudly protest and claim equal rights. Keeping a 
look-out in this manner, he became aware that he had been humming a tune, which he 
recognised as being from The Marriage of Figaro: ‘Se vuol ballare, signor contino / Il 
chitarino le suonerò’ (‘If the Count wants to dance, I’ll call the tune’). Freud’s 
unconscious resentment towards the aristocracy had surfaced from his lips in the form of 
Figaro’s aria (Freud 1953: 208-9; Chanan 1994: 89). 
    In this example of Freud’s hummed reprise of a Mozart aria, the association with 
Count Thun and his imperious behaviour resided in the lyrics attached to the melody. 
Freud cites similar instances in his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1917), such 
as that of a young man who had been ‘absolutely haunted’ by the song of Paris from 
Offenbach’s Helen of Troy until it was pointed out to him in analysis that, at that time, a 
‘Helen’ and an ‘Ida’ were rivals for his affection. Freud avers that ‘the tunes which 
suddenly come into a man’s head can be shown to be conditioned by some train of 
thought to which they belong, and which for some reason is occupying his mind without 
his knowing anything about it. […T]he connection with the tune is to be found either in 





the words which belong to it or in the source from which it comes’. Freud goes on to 
speculate that in the case of musicians, however, ‘the musical value of the tune may 
account for its suddenly emerging into consciousness’ (Freud 1917/1933: 89-90). If one 
is to make the admittedly rash analogy with language, music, on this account, would 
possess both a syntactic level and a semantic one, quite apart from any programmatic 
setting or lyrical content it may have (Osmond-Smith 1972: 31).  
    By his own admission, Freud had little personal interest in music, though a large 
measure of professional curiosity with regard to musicality. Like many a good Viennese, 
however, he was a regular opera-goer. Occurring just before the turn of the century, his 
own psychoanalytically-inflected incidence of involuntary musical memory belongs to an 
era in which music was heard in specific social contexts and supported by various sets of 
culturally-embedded meanings and associations. The solitary listener had yet to be 
invented, although the apparatus that would facilitate its construction, Edison’s 
phonograph, had already been patented back in 1877.         
    Our second example of involuntary remembering brings us much closer to the present 
day. In 1985, two young but experienced climbers, Joe Simpson and Simon Yates, set out 
to ascend the unclimbed West Face of the remote Siula Grande in the Peruvian Andes. 
Their ordeal, after Yates was forced to cut the rope on his fellow climber or almost 
certainly die with him, is the subject of the docu-drama, Touching the Void, based on 
Simpson’s book of the same name. The preternatural lucidity of Simpson’s delirium as he 
spends the next three days struggling back to base camp with a broken leg and no food or 
water holds a particular fascination due to the way it unsettles the calm psychological 
insights of the first-person narrative. Simpson experiences an eerie sense of dissociation 
from his own internal dialogue, feeling himself guided by what he refers to as ‘the voice’ 
(italics in original). And he, of course, experiences frequent involuntary musical 
memories: 
 
I awoke with a start – ‘Get moving…don’t lie there…stop dozing…move!’ The voice 
came through the wandering idle thoughts of pop song lyrics, faces from the past, and 
fantasies of empty value (Simpson 2004: 157; emphasis in original). 
 





Here again, as with the examples that Freud cites, song lyrics figure prominently in 
Simpson’s tortured reverie, but now they are bereft of all association and social context. 
Instead of presenting a psychoanalytical puzzle that can bring to light the submerged 
contents of the unconscious, these snatches of pop songs are merely puzzling, their very 
arbitrariness and contingency eluding interpretation. In spite of their occasional 
vividness, there seems to be no reason why Simpson should remember these particular 
song lyrics and not others. He even has an active dislike of one of the songs that pops into 
his head: 
 
Somehow I couldn’t get its insistent chant out of my mind as, irritably, I set to work […], 
trying to forget the words,… ‘Brown girl in the ring…Tra la la la la…’ A part of me 
performed tasks without conscious decision, as if already told what to do, while the other 
part insisted on vocalising a stupid meaningless song through my every thought (161). 
 
With Simpson’s absurd self-imposed aural torture, we are now firmly in the era, not just 
of solitary listening, but of what Anahid Kassabian (2002) has called ‘ubiquitous 
listening’. Whether or not we choose to fill our lives with it or not, music assails us from 
every quarter. Significantly, Simpson’s most nagging musical reminiscence is of a song 
that, we must assume, he hadn’t chosen to hear or learn. As Simon Frith (2001) has 
astutely remarked, pop music, such as Boney M.’s version of ‘Brown Girl…’, is ‘the 
music we listen to without meaning to; the songs we know without knowing how we 
know them’ (104). Simpson (2004) surprises himself at his capacity for the recall of 
another pop song, this time one more to his liking: ‘I found that I could vocalise all the 
lyrics word-perfectly, yet I was sure I had only been able to remember the refrain in the 
past’ (160).98





    In traversing the passage from Freud to Simpson, from performance to recording, and 
from ritual listening to ubiquitous listening, the nature of involuntary musical memories 
has changed. Introspective analysis has, to some extent, been replaced by inexplicability; 
and tradition, by contingency. Yet, in spite of this changed context characterised by flux 
and heterogeneity, the question still arises of how, why and with what significance 
melodies are spontaneously remembered. Two theories can be posited: one historical, the 
other broadly ahistorical. Firstly, the ahistorical one. 
 
Unconscious musical icons 
In spite of a strongly formalist strand within writings on music, as exemplified by 
Hanslick’s claim that ‘the beauty of a musical work is specifically musical’, a lot of 
research suggests that music is intimately bound up with somatic and affective rhythms, 
and not just as a matter of convention (Hanslick 1854/1974: 12; emphasis in original). 
Reflecting upon his own experiences, the psychiatrist, Anthony Storr (1992), observes 
that ‘the music which comes unbidden to my mind usually has physical and emotional 
effects of a positive kind. It alleviates boredom, makes my movements more rhythmical, 
and reduces fatigue’ (125). He draws the speculative conclusion that music in the head 
might be biologically adaptive. It is certainly possible that it played a role in the survival 
of Joe Simpson, goading him on as if it were his own internal muzak.99 
    In his book, Music and Communication, Terence McLaughlin (1970) agrees with 
formalists such as Hanslick that musical structures are ‘strictly speaking meaningless’, 
but adds that ‘the fact that they are translated in the brain into the general lingua franca 
of all other patterns [i.e. electrical impulses] allows us to see the similarities between […] 
musical patterns and […] the more personal ones which form the constant undercurrent 
of our thoughts’ (87). Involuntary musical memories would, on this view, be partly 
synaesthetic in origin, occurring as a result of musical patterns having previously 
activated and synthesised non-musical patterns stored in our brains. In this regard, David 
Osmond-Smith (1972) describes music as an example of what he calls an ‘unconscious 
icon’: ‘an abstract form standing in close relation to the basic patterns to which a wide 
variety of experiences have been reduced in the brain, and thus effecting a synthesis 
among them’ (40). This accords with Freud’s intuition that the musical value of a tune 





rather than its lyrics may sometimes account for its suddenly popping into consciousness, 
except that, unlike Freud, one would not expect this phenomenon to be confined merely 
to those with a special aptitude for music, especially in an era such as our own in which, 
due to mechanical reproduction, music is so very much more widespread. 
    So ‘earworms’ can partly be explained as being ‘unconscious musical icons’, i.e. they 
unconsciously resemble and are triggered by patterns of stimulation within other sensory 
modalities. Without our being aware of it, such musical phrases are similar in some way 
to a feature of our immediate environment. The spontaneous recall of fragments of music 
is, then, part of that cross-talk of the senses known as synaesthesia. This explanation 
accords with the growing body of evidence pointing to the ‘multisensory organization’ or 
‘integration’ of the brain (Howes 2006: 382). As Calvert, Spence and Stein (2004) claim 
in their introduction to The Handbook of Multisensory Processes, 
 
even those experiences that at first may appear to be modality-specific are most likely to 
have been influenced by activity in other sensory modalities, despite our lack of awareness 
of such interactions. […To] fully appreciate the processes underlying much of sensory 
perception, we must understand not only how information from each sensory modality is 
transduced and decoded along the pathways primarily devoted to that sense, but also how 
this information is modulated by what is going on in the other sensory pathways (xi-xii).  
 
So, just as listening to a piece of music can evoke vague impressions of people, places, 
physical movements, colours, etc., it would seem that these same things qua stimuli are 
able to evoke memories of music, especially when there is something overtly rhythmic 
and/or gestural about them. I have noticed, for example, how a tune that pops into my 
mind while I am walking down the street usually corresponds in its tempo to the tempo of 
my steps. One is reminded here of Bergson’s description of ‘memories need[ing], for 
their actualization, a motor ally, and […] requir[ing] for their recall a kind of mental 
attitude which must itself be engrafted upon an attitude of the body’ (Bergson 1908/1988: 
120).  
    The fact that these kinds of iconic processes are usually unconscious can be explained 
by the idea introduced in interlude I: that a sign is a catalyst for a chain of meanings and 
affects, the intermediate ‘links’ of which are sometimes imperceptible – though their 
existence can be inferred from the actual effects they produce, i.e. the other signs they 
give rise to.100 Resurfacing memories of pieces of music might then ‘signify’ without the 





object they ‘refer’ to being immediately obvious: the resemblance between sign and 
referent, between musical response and non-musical stimulus, is not consciously 
perceived. 
    Unconscious musical icons are strongly conditioned by the musical culture into which 
one is born. This is to say that not just any musical phrases are able to be remembered 
spontaneously but only those that have been internalised at a deep affective and gestural 
level. Hence, for the spontaneous rememberer in Western musical cultures, involuntary 
musical memories will be almost exclusively diatonic, perhaps simpler even than this: 
limited to harmonic progressions between the tonic, dominant and subdominant, as in a 
typical nursery rhyme.  
    This would explain why Joe Simpson had ‘Brown girl in the ring’ stuck in his head 
during his ordeal in the Andes. The song originated as part of a children’s game in 
Jamaica, and has been sung for centuries.101 Players form a ring by holding hands and 
one girl or boy goes into the middle and starts skipping around to the song. The girl or 
boy is then asked ‘Show me your motion’, at which point the child in the centre does a 
little dance. If asked ‘Show me your partner’, he or she picks a friend to join him or her 
inside the circle (Lomax et al 1997). Such simple melodies, together with the gestures 
that accompany them, form a musical bedrock: a ‘harmonic background’ as it were, 
which is spectrally present throughout all of a person’s subsequent musical 
experiences.102 It is not surprising then that Simpson, soaked in his own urine, and in a 
state of almost infantile helplessness, should be psychically stripped to his musical core: 
in this case, a melody that modulates in the most naïve fashion between tonic and 
dominant, before a simple turnaround (on ‘she looks…’) through subdominant, dominant 
and tonic. In this way, the different levels of Simpson’s identity in Touching the Void 
roughly correspond to Freud’s tripartition of the psyche: the disassociated ‘voice’ 
Simpson hears in his mind is his superego; the narrative voice is his ego, mastering 
experience retrospectively; while the tunes he hears in his mind are his id. 
    Simpson’s experiences are also explained by what Julia Kristeva, borrowing from 
Plato, terms the chora: the bodily site of the first signifying processes of the foetus. As 
Kristeva (1986) states, ‘the chora precedes and underlies figuration and thus 
specularization, and is analogous only to vocal or kinetic rhythm’ (94). This ‘kinetic 





functional stage […] precedes the establishment of the sign’ in that there is not, as yet, 
any meaningful distinction between subject and object (95). ‘[T]he linguistic sign is not 
yet articulated as the absence of an object’, which is to say – simplifying somewhat – that 
the referents of any potential signifying system have not yet been experienced as absent 
so there is therefore no need for signs which refer to them. Kristeva hypothesises ‘that 
certain semiotic articulations are transmitted through the biological code or physiological 
“memory” and thus form the inborn bases of the symbolic function’ (96). In other words, 
language is founded upon a type of prenatal semiosis. If one can talk validly of unborn 
infants being inducted into some kind of signifying system while still in the womb, it 
seems reasonable to assume, as Kristeva does, that this primordial semiotic is comprised 
of movement and sound. Indeed, there is a substantial body of evidence suggesting that 
babies are able to recognise pieces of music they have heard in the womb (Levitin 2006: 
223-5).103 For example, a young infant will turn his or her head towards a speaker playing 
a song he or she heard in the last three months of gestation, but will disregard a song that 
wasn’t heard during that period. As musician and neuroscientist Daniel Levitin (2006) 
observes, ‘It appears that for music even prenatal experience is encoded in memory, and 
can be accessed in the absence of language or explicit awareness of the memory’ (225). 
Those other ambient sounds that are filtered through the amniotic fluid play a key 
influence as well: the tonal and rhythmic gestures of the mother’s voice, for example, her 
conversations, and all the other patterned sounds of her daily life. In the absence of any 
visual cues, these assume a proto-musical significance. In her study of poetic language, 
Kristeva (1986) detects the chora in the ‘air or song beneath the [literary] text’ (97). For 
the involuntary rememberer such as Simpson, the chora is the incessant song beneath his 
thoughts and actions. 
     
Unconscious cribbing 
The reader will remember Proust’s claim that involuntary remembering is akin to artistic 
inspiration. Sometimes in musical culture, the boundaries between the two blur and what 
is at first thought of as an original composition is later revealed to be an unconsciously 
cribbed version of an already-existing piece. An anecdote from a biography of Manuel de 
Falla illustrates the ease with which this can happen. When Falla was composing Nights 





in the Gardens of Spain (1911-15), the opening theme apparently came to him quite 
spontaneously, yet one day, he met Amadeo Vives, who told him that, oddly enough, he 
had written a zarzuela which began in exactly the same way. This coincidence troubled 
Falla until the explanation suddenly came to him: 
 
he and Vives lived on two different floors of the same house in the Calle Serano in Madrid. 
On the pavement below, an aged blind violinist had every day come and played these notes 
on a badly tuned violin. Constant repetition had fixed the notes in their minds so that, 
without realizing it, they had both written them as their own (Pahissa 1954: 94). 
 
We have here another example of a ‘stray refrain’ as described in chapter two – a mobile 
musical fragment, the quotidian or ‘everyday’ character of which allows it to circulate 
between different social and artistic contexts. In such cases of unconscious cribbing, one 
is tempted to assign agency to the musical meme itself rather than to the composers who 
were its more or less passive conduits.104 
    In the music industry, unconscious cribbing, or ‘cryptomnesia’ as it has also been 
called, can result in legal wrangles over alleged plagiarism. Paul McCartney was so 
surprised at the ease with which he composed the melody to ‘Yesterday’ (1965) – 
apparently while dreaming – that, before finishing the lyrics, he sang it to several friends 
and others in the business to be sure he hadn’t inadvertently ‘stolen’ it from someone 
else: ‘Eventually it became like handing something in to the police. I thought if no-one 
claimed it after a few weeks then I could have it’ (quoted in Cross 2005: 464-5). Rod 
Stewart was less fortunate with his song, ‘Do ya think I’m sexy?’ (1978), for which he 
was successfully sued by the Brazilian singer, Jorge Ben. Stewart denied intentionally 
copying the refrain to ‘Taj Mahal’ (1972), claiming that he must have heard Ben’s song 
while at the Rio carnival but without consciously registering it. 
    One of the most interesting disputes of this kind was that concerning George 
Harrison’s ‘My sweet lord’. In the 1976 court case, Harrisongs Music Ltd. versus Bright 
Tunes Music Corp., the latter claimed that the former Beatle had infringed upon the 
copyright of a song called ‘He’s so fine’, originally recorded by The Chiffons back in 
1963. Harrison lost the case and was ordered to pay £260,000 in damages. The judge 
conceded, however, that Harrison had probably copied the combination of motifs, 
including a distinctive grace note, unconsciously. The case established a legal precedent 





for copyright cases in the United States whereby alleged cryptomnesia is treated no 
differently from deliberate plagiarism. Embittered by the decision, Harrison claimed that 
if ‘My sweet lord’ was a copy of ‘He’s so fine’, then it was a copy of numerous other 
songs too. Quite candidly, he admitted modelling his song, not on The Chiffons’ hit, but 
on what certainly seems to be a more likely source, the gospel number, ‘Oh happy day’ 
by The Edwin Hawkins Singers (Riley 2006).  
    Harrison’s comments highlight the underlying similarities between a vast array of 
Western music across different genres. The roots of all pop music, for example, are often 
said to be found in the twelve-bar blues which itself derives from a ‘Gregory Walker’ or 
passamezzo moderno chord progression dating back to the fifteenth century. More 
concretely, the chord progression in Pachelbel’s Canon in D Major, composed around 
1680, has since been used in countless pieces of music, including many contemporary 
pop songs (ibid.). 
    The boundaries, therefore, between unconscious cribbing on the one hand and the 
replication of generic ‘deep structures’ on the other are far from clear. The introduction in 
some sectors of the recording industry of ‘hit-prediction software’ takes advantage of this 
ambiguity. Companies such as the ominously named Platinum Blue Music Intelligence 
and their chief rival, Polyphonic HMI, claim to be able to predict whether or not a song 
will be a hit using a method called ‘spectral deconvolution’ (Burkeman 2006: 57). 
Platinum Blue’s software can allegedly ‘ “listen” to a song and, within 20 seconds, 
extract 40 pieces of information about its deep structure – its “fullness of sound”, the 
instruments it uses, its chord progression, the cadences of melodies and more’ (ibid.). 
Having done this for hits spanning the entire history of recorded music, Platinum Blue 
found that about four-fifths of them belonged to clusters of other hits, thus sharing 
observable though not always immediately obvious characteristics. In other words, ‘80% 
of all pop songs that had ever been hits shared a relatively small number of underlying 
structures’ (ibid.). The likelihood of a song being a hit is thus determined by whether or 
not it belongs to clusters of hits from the past. Such software was used to foretell the 
success of the first single to top the UK charts on download sales alone, Gnarls Barkley’s 
‘Crazy’ (2006), as well as that of the James Blunt song, ‘You’re beautiful’ (2005), 
described by journalist Oliver Burkeman as ‘a song that manages to burrow itself into 





your brain, where it circles eternally, despite a relatively unexciting chord sequence and 
the odd, unpromising timbre of Blunt’s voice’ (59). Interestingly, hits from different 
genres frequently share the same cluster, confirming what musicologists have long 
claimed regarding the common roots of much Western music. 
   The point to stress is that, when we listen to a piece of music, there is, to some degree, 
an unconsciously-evoked spectral presence of all the other music we have heard to which 
it is similar. Rather than being aberrant, this kind of thoroughgoing intertextuality is 
fundamental to how we listen and respond to music, especially in terms of the patterns of 
expectations it sets up, and how deviations from these patterns – often quite minute ones 
– are able to trigger affective responses.105  
 
A culture of overstimulation 
Thus far, we have examined one main theory as to why involuntary musical memories 
occur: the idea that they are triggered by analogous patterns of stimulation in other 
sensory modalities. In the remainder of this chapter, I would like to examine a second, 
complementary theory, which emphasises to a much greater extent the historical 
constructedness of involuntary remembering. The theory hinges on the idea that 
involuntary recollection is, as Walter Benjamin (1929/1999) proposes, ‘much closer to 
forgetting than what is usually called memory’ (238). This is to say that a spontaneously 
remembered tune results from having heard a melody in a state of distraction – certainly 
without committing it to memory – and then, in effect, forgetting that one has heard it. 
When the tune returns unbidden, it is all the more uncanny because we don’t properly 
remember hearing it before (Mowitt 2006: 17).  
    This notion finds support in the work of Freud. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(1920), he draws a radical ontological distinction between memory and consciousness, 
claiming that the two are incompatible. For Freud (1920/2003), ‘consciousness arises 
instead of a memory trace’, acting in effect as a shield against excessive stimuli (64; 
emphasis altered).106 This means that we involuntarily remember that which 
consciousness has been unable to screen out. Memory fragments are thus, for Freud, 
‘often strongest and most enduring when the process that brought them into being never 
entered consciousness at all’ (ibid.).107 In an age of ubiquitous and deconcentrated 





listening, this would explain why the music in our heads can be so random, banal, and 
annoying: it represents the internalised reflection of a culture of overstimulation. 
    For Benjamin, in his book on Baudelaire, this process follows a dialectical logic. 
Consciousness becomes better at registering the nervous shocks of urban existence, thus 
neutralising their traumatic effect, and allowing for stimuli of yet greater intensity 
(Benjamin 1973: 115-7). I would argue that what is at issue in this shock-training is the 
symbolic transformation of sense impressions, from raw sense data into ones for which 
we have some pre-existing schema (Langer 1953: 127). To know something in the 
abstract, whether it be via language or some other semiotic system, is to be at least partly 
protected from it in the concrete. For example, the clarinet wail that opens Gershwin’s 
Rhapsody in Blue (1924) is an iconic sign in that it sounds like the thing it represents – an 
ambulance- or police-siren – yet it is also abstract in that it transforms its source material 
into music. To hear a siren after Gershwin is not the same experience.108 
    To conclude, I wish to make a slight modification to Benjamin’s comments. Sensory 
overstimulation might result in a heightened consciousness which can better parry 
nervous shocks, but perhaps consciousness can only do so much. The excessive stimuli of 
urban life might also result in an increased volume of involuntary memories, our 
overburdened minds becoming saturated with the resurfacing memories of unregistered 
impressions. Yet perhaps these unbidden rememberings are themselves a form of 
protection against external energies. Involuntary musical memories would therefore be a 
kind of psychic buffer, establishing rhythms of body and affect – an interior soundtrack – 
amidst the ever-encroaching rhythms of social reality.










Recorded Music & Nostalgia 
* 
Now, good Cesario, but that piece of song, 
That old and antique song we heard last night; 
Methought it did relieve my passion much, 
More than light airs and recollected terms 
Of these most brisk and giddy-paced times. 
Come, but one verse.  
(Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, act II, scene IV, lines 2-7) 
 
Pan & Syrinx 
In Ovid’s version of the myth of Pan and Syrinx, the forest nymph Syrinx is fleeing from 
Pan but is forced to stop at the bank of a deep river.109 Unable to cross, she beseeches her 
sister water-nymphs to change her form so that the lustful goat man will not be able to 
steal her highly-prized maidenhood. When Pan tries to grab her, he finds nothing but 
reeds in his hands and, sighing in disappointment, the soft air of his breath stirs in the 
hollow tubes and produces the first music. Charmed by these sweet tones which recall the 
sound of Syrinx’s voice, the god exclaims: ‘hoc mihi concilium tecum […] manebit’ 
(‘This union, at least, shall I have with thee’) (Metamorphoses I, 710).110 Pan joins 
together these reeds of unequal length with wax and, in so doing, fashions the first 
example of the instrument that will bear Syrinx’s name, both for the Greeks and for 
Romans such as Ovid. For us, the instrument is known as the pan pipes. 
    As part of a brief meditation on the origins of tonality, Ernst Bloch (1959/1986) finds 
evidence in this myth that ‘music begins longingly and already definitely as a call to that 
which is missing’ (1059; emphasis in original). Yet, at the same time, ‘[t]he vanished 
nymph has remained behind as a sound’ (1060). Thus, music is, at once, an invocation to 
the absent beloved and a fantasy of her presence. As with Orsino in Twelfth Night, it both 





satisfies and stimulates the lover’s wistfulness, binding him ever more surely within the 
nostalgia that was already present at music’s inception, when Pan first blew across the 
open tops of a handful of reeds. 
 
A history of the concept of nostalgia 
The word nostalgia suggests classical roots, its two component parts being derived from 
ancient Greek: nostos means ‘return home’, while algia is ‘pain’ or ‘longing’, hence the 
rough translation ‘homesickness’. However, the term was actually coined in Switzerland 
in the early modern period, and thus the word’s pseudo-Greek provenance was itself the 
expression of a certain wistfulness for a more Arcadian world. ‘Nostalgia’ originally 
referred to a medical condition suffered by Swiss mercenaries who were stationed for 
long periods away from their homeland. Johannes Hofer, the physician who coined the 
term in 1688, identified nostalgia as a disorder of the imagination in which the patient 
incessantly fantasises about home. The condition, according to Hofer’s diagnosis, was 
organic in origin, resulting from the constant motion of nerve fibres that stored 
impressions of one’s native land (Wilson 2005: 21-2). Outbreaks of nostalgia were 
induced by sensuous reminders of home, especially gastronomic or auditory ones: a bowl 
of soup reminiscent of one that mother used to make, or a folk melody originally heard 
resounding among crystalline Alpine valleys. An epidemic of nostalgia among Swiss 
soldiers serving in France was allegedly triggered by their exposure to ‘a certain rustic 
cantilena’ that would normally have been sung by Swiss shepherds as they drove their 
herds to pasture (Boym 2001: 4). The Swiss were not the only soldiers to be adversely 
affected by musical reminders of home: Scottish highlanders who heard the sound of 
bagpipes were said to be prone to such crippling bouts of nostalgia that their military 
superiors decided to ban them from playing, singing or whistling any native tunes. 
    Such early diagnoses of nostalgia depended on there being an indexical link between a 
folk tune or some other potent sensuous trigger and a sufferer’s home. Rather than 
leading to a Proustian sense of ‘time regained’, such sensuous reminders of home evoked 
a powerful sense of what, in the process of migration and exile, had been lost. In a 
passage from his Dictionary of Music (1755-1767), Jean-Jacques Rousseau reflects on the 
relationship between auditory impressions and nostalgia, particularly the latter’s origins 





not merely as mal du pays but mal du Suisse. Rousseau notes that certain rustic sounds 
such as cowbells are, for a Swiss person, associated with the joys of youth but that, once 
he or she has been transplanted from their native mountainside to the lowlands, these 
same sounds are apt to fill him or her with a sense of bitter regret. Rousseau perceptively 
points out that, in such instances, music ‘does not act precisely as music, but as a 
memorative sign’: it is attended to not so much because of what it is but because of what 
it stands for due to its prior embeddedness in the everyday life of the Alps (Rousseau 
1779: 267). 
    Hofer’s codification of nostalgia as a medical condition in the early modern period was 
itself a symptom of modernity. Though his diagnosis of nostalgia as a neurasthenic illness 
might seem eccentric to us now, Hofer’s concern with the effects of a change of 
environment upon the individual’s nervous system places his work in a long line of 
psychiatric and psychological studies extending up to the present in which governmental 
concern with the physical and emotional regulation of the self is a key dimension.111 
    There were other co-existing notions of nostalgia – such as the romantic nationalism of 
the eighteenth century, which took the form of a hankering after an allegedly more 
authentic and organic identity rooted in the geography of one’s native land – but the 
prevailing definition of nostalgia was that it was a disease and this remained the case 
until towards the end of the nineteenth century. At this point, doctors claimed that 
nostalgia had been ‘cured’, and attributed its disappearance largely to technological 
progress – in particular, advances in transportation and communication. The term was 
subsequently de-medicalised and ‘[n]ostalgia […] moved from a pathology to an emotion 
of wistful longing for the past’ (Wilson 2005: 22). In broad terms, then, the meaning of 
nostalgia changes during the period in which Western societies industrialise and their 
populations become chiefly urban. It ceases to mean ‘homesickness’, a longing for a 
particular place, and becomes instead, a longing for a particular time. This is to say 
nostalgia loses its spatial meaning and gains a predominantly temporal one (Wernick 
1997: 219; Wilson 2005: 22-3). Svetlana Boym (2001) traces the origins of this temporal 
aspect of nostalgia back to the era in which Hofer first coined the term: ‘The diagnosis of 
the disease of nostalgia in the late seventeenth century took place roughly at the historical 
moment when the conception of time and history were undergoing radical change’ (8). 





Among these changes was the diminished importance of Christian eschatology. Various 
dates had been prophesied for the end of the world –  among them 1660, 1666, 1673, 
1688, 1694 and 1697 – but they came and went more or less without incident so that, 
after a clutch of inflated warnings, the arrival of doomsday no longer seemed imminent 
and time instead seemed to stretch out to infinity (Danelek 2009: 37-8). What filled the 
gap between the present moment and eternity was ‘progress’: economic, industrial, 
social, and scientific. A crucial change in Britain, for example, was that in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, the population didn’t fall back as had always happened before 
due to plague or famine but kept growing – as it has continued to do ever since. Boym 
(2001) makes the point that ‘progress’ and ‘nostalgia’ are interrelated, both being 
‘dependent on the modern conception of unrepeatable and irreversible time’ (13). 
‘Nostalgic manifestations are side effects of the teleology of progress’ (10). In this way 
too, nostalgia is symptomatic of modernity. More specifically, it is, as Catherine 
Cameron and John Gatewood (1994) argue, ‘a psychological adaptation to circumstances 
of rapid cultural change during which individuals fear becoming obsolete’ (11). 
    As belief in progress began to falter towards the end of the twentieth century, nostalgia 
increased but, as a concept, it also underwent subtle changes. Rather than being just a 
response to the headlong pace of change, it became a form of mourning for hoped-for 
change that never occurred. As Boym (2001) writes: ‘The twentieth century began with a 
futuristic utopia and ended with nostalgia. Optimistic belief in the future was discarded 
like an outmoded spaceship sometime in the 1960s’ (xiv). This trend can be understood 
as part of a pervasive cultural shift from a future-orientated perspective to a past-
orientated one. Andreas Huyssen (1995) describes this as a ‘transformation of temporality 
in utopian discourse’, a ‘shift from anticipation and the future to memory and the past’, 
which he dates from around the 1960s (92).112 He claims that ‘[n]ostalgia […] is not the 
opposite of utopia, but, as a form of memory, [is] always implicated, even productive in 
it’ (88). Similarly, Boym (2001) writes, ‘Nostalgia itself has a utopian dimension, only it 
is no longer directed toward the future’ (xiv). Nostalgia has thus become a continuation 
of utopian thought but via a retrospective orientation rather than a prospective one. 
    Running throughout all these different inflections of nostalgia is the attempt to 
establish a stable sense of identity – both privately and publicly, individually and 





collectively (Davis 1979: 105). When nation-building is at stake, this can take the form of 
the construction of a mythical past, which often intersects with more private and personal 
dreams and ambitions. Agnes Heller (1979) describes ‘a typically bourgeois feeling: the 
problematic individual looks back with painful yearning and respect to the [allegedly] 
non-problematic individual’ of earlier times (184). As in all such fantasies, the image of 
oneself existing in a previous historical era has a pleasing unity and wholeness about it, 
which is at odds with the vagaries, vicissitudes, and mental and emotional flux that 
characterise day-to-day living. In this regard, the nostalgic person wants what cannot be 
had – the continuity of identity, a kind of frozen permanence extending from the past into 
the present and beyond into the future. Nostalgia is, then, to quote Susan Stewart (1993), 
‘a sadness without an object, a sadness which creates a longing that of necessity is 
inauthentic because it does not take part in lived experience’ (23). Yet if we accept the 
argument that there is now a surfeit of nostalgia in our culture, it might be claimed that 
nostalgia is today an integral and intimate part of lived experience, indeed part of the 
temporal structure via which everyday life and the subjects who experience it are 
constituted.  
 
Tonality, colonialism, and nostalgia 
The conception of nostalgia as a longing for a particular place, i.e. as ‘homesickness’, is 
roughly contemporaneous with the rise of tonality. This, I would argue, is no mere 
coincidence. In broadly the same early modern period, tonality developed as the musical 
analogue of nostalgia, in which a tonal ‘centre’ is understood as the ‘place’ to which all 
subsequent thematic developments eventually return. In a similar way, the later 
conception of nostalgia as a longing for the past is roughly contemporaneous with the 
introduction of sound recording at the end of the nineteenth century. Phonography 
offered the nostalgic possibility of bringing back the past – or a literal aural reproduction 
of it. It is notable that, in its early years, Edison’s phonograph was used not only to listen 
to music but to hear again the voices of the deceased, whether they were famous writers 
reading from their works or the orations of presidents and prime ministers. It can be seen 
therefore that each of the two main conceptions of nostalgia – longing for home, longing 
for the past – overlaps with each of two major changes in musical culture: firstly, the 





widespread adoption of tonality in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and, 
secondly, the introduction of recording towards the end of the nineteenth century. While 
these changes in the conception of nostalgia are not causally linked in any direct way to 
the corresponding changes in musical culture, they are nevertheless part of the same 
episteme or order of knowledge – the same overall conception of time, history, and 
identity. In what immediately follows, I’d like to examine the first of these changes in 
musical culture and its relation to nostalgia understood as ‘homesickness’, and in a later 
section I’ll look at the second change.        
    The rise of tonality in western European culture brought with it an explicitly spatial 
conception of music distinguished by the existence of a ‘home’ key in relation to which 
other keys are subordinate or peripheral. In producing a ‘yearning’ to return to the 
harmonic centre or tonic, tonality mimicked nostalgia. The sense of forward movement 
produced by the progression from one harmony to another was understood as ending in a 
cadence that returned the listener to where he or she had begun. In large-scale forms, this 
manifested as the ‘recapitulation’ that rounded off a sonata form, or the conventional 
return to the ‘home’ key for the final movement of a symphony. In order to better 
understand how this new musical system was able to evoke a sense of longing to return 
home, a brief excursion into music theory is needed.  
    Tonality could more precisely be described as ‘triadic harmony’: a musical system 
based on the relationship between a central chord or harmony known as the ‘tonic’, and 
the chords or harmonies which it is most closely related to – the ‘dominant’ and the 
‘subdominant’. If one takes the example of a keyboard instrument, a chord can be built 
on the note middle C in the middle of the keyboard by adding the notes E and G, thus 
making the ‘triad’ C-E-G. In the key of C, this becomes the harmonic centre or ‘tonic’. 
The ‘dominant’ – a triad built on the note G, hence G-B-D – represents a movement away 
from the tonic; on a piano or other keyboard instrument, it would be played on keys 
found to the right of those keys used for the tonic. The ‘subdominant’ is the mirror image 
of the dominant in that it is played on keys found the same distance to the left of the 
tonic. In our example of the key of C, these notes would be F-A-C. When these chords 
are played in sequence, the subdominant and dominant create a sense of expectation of a 
return to the tonic, especially if a fourth note is added to the dominant triad. Thus, in the 





key of C, the chord G-B-D-F or ‘G7’ will set up a very strong anticipation of a return to 
the triad C-E-G. (‘Seventh’ chords such as G7, so-called because they contain the seventh 
note above the chord’s root note, exaggerate the sense of propulsion already implicit in 
the Western tonal system. Such chords are very common, for example, in rock ’n’ roll.)  
    It should be pointed out that this new system of tonality generated a much greater 
sense of forward movement than the modal system that preceded it. The medieval 
‘modes’, deriving from the tuning systems of antiquity, were a set of unrelated musical 
scales. Because each mode had its own unique or ‘untempered’ system of tuning, it was 
impossible to ‘move’ or modulate from one mode to another in the course of a single 
piece of music. Furthermore, separate wind instruments had to be made for each of the 
different modes. Medieval modality, then, to ears such as ours, accustomed to centuries 
of tonality, produces a curious sense of stasis: it doesn’t seem to ‘go’ anywhere but 
instead – and this, perhaps, is part of its charm for us today – it appears to be trapped in 
time, as if it were waiting for modernity to begin. 
    In the tonal system, by contrast, the dominant and subdominant are closely related to 
the tonic so that one can easily change key, for instance, from the key of C to the key of 
G. This will involve a new note being added – one not found in the home key; in our 
example, this note would be F sharp. Because this note is not found in our original key, 
an element of tension or ambiguity is introduced. As successive modulations are 
performed, changing to keys that are ever more ‘distant’ from our original home key, 
containing more and more notes that are alien to it, the sense of tension and uncertainty 
increases; we have, as it were, moved further away from the harmonic ‘centre’ of the 
tonic and our ‘position’ is now unclear. The resolution of this tension or ambiguity via a 
return to the tonic will be perceived as all the greater for the extent of the ‘movement’ 
away from it, the overall result being a more narratorial sense to the music. This adding 
of extra notes in order to represent a movement to the harmonic peripheries is called 
‘chromaticism’ (literally, ‘colouring’). 
    In the way it defines a ‘home’ key or harmonic centre in relation to which other tonal 
regions are considered distant, alien, or exotic, the history of tonality is, in a certain 
sense, unthinkable outside of the history of colonialism. As Timothy Taylor (2007) 
writes, ‘tonality is as informed by modern western notions of center and margins, 





dominant and subordinate, as any other cultural form in western culture’ (29). Spatially, 
then, the stable centre of the tonic functioned as the analogue of the imperial metropolis 
in contrast to the chromatic peripheries of the colonies. Chromaticism – the use of notes 
not normally found in the ‘home’ key – became a much favoured device for representing 
the racialised and gendered other. In Bizet’s Carmen (1875), for example, exotic-
sounding melodies and harmonies are employed in order to signify the tragic heroine’s 
sexual and racial alterity; the threat to Western hegemony and patriarchy posed by 
Carmen is dealt with symbolically by the return to the tonic, and literally by her being 
murdered by her jealous lover (McClary 1991). In this manner, tonality provided a means 
of (mis)representing colonial subjects at the same time as it helped to construct a specious 
identity for Europeans as their superior counterparts. 
    The attempted dissolution of tonality in the work of Arnold Schoenberg and other 
arch-modernists has ambiguous or ambivalent consequences in relation to the history of 
colonialism. Rather than subverting the binary opposition of centre/periphery, 
coloniser/colonised, atonality has been interpreted as potentially effacing the cultural 
memory of colonised peoples for whom the tonal language of the coloniser became – for 
better or worse – a way of preserving distinctive elements of their own cultural traditions 
(Lewis 2006: 279). This can be heard very vividly in the music of African-Americans 
whose West African ancestors had been brought across the Atlantic as human cargo on 
slave ships. Although the melodies that the first slaves brought with them were modal 
rather than tonal, these melodies gradually became encoded within the structures of 
tonality while retaining distinctive inflections of pitch such as blue notes, as well as a 
rhythmic subtlety and sophistication, both of which echoed the music’s origins. 
Therefore, in spite of – or, rather, because of – tonality or triadic harmony having arisen 
in conjunction with the history of slavery and colonialism, it cannot simply be erased 
without also erasing in certain cases the often fragile histories of (post)colonial subjects. 
The recycling of musical materials remains a key element in African-American music, 
whether this takes the form of improvisations around a pre-existing jazz melody or a 
sample of a James Brown track, yet this musical recycling has little to do with nostalgia 
as it is usually understood, and more to do instead with the preservation of cultural 
heritage via its constant reinvigoration. 





    Music continues to encode migration, exile, and diaspora: a sense of the place that has 
been left behind, and the values and lifestyle that obtained there, as well as the uncertain 
process of adaptation to a new environment. This is part of what Edward Said (1991) 
describes as ‘the transgressive element in music’: ‘its nomadic ability to attach itself to, 
and become a part of, social formations, to vary its articulations and rhetoric depending 
on the occasion as well as the audience, plus the power and the gender situations in which 
it takes place’ (70). Such music is nostalgic in the original sense of expressing a certain 
homesickness, but will not often be recognised as such unless there is a collective effort 
to remember. Tango, for example, though nominally an Argentinian style of music, is 
actually a much more complex historical hybrid, encoding, on one level, the passage of 
European migrants across the Atlantic and the circumstances of their arrival as an 
underclass in Buenos Aires, and, on another more indirect but no less profound level, the 
enforced migration to the Caribbean and the Americas of West African slaves, with 
whom the word tango and the genre’s habanera-style rhythm seem to have originated. 
Perhaps for this reason, tango tends to elevate nostalgia to a transcendent idea, preserving 
a poignant sense of the irretrievability of prior places and eras save in symbolic guise. 
     
Recorded music, nostalgia, and autobiographical memories 
As we have seen, the meaning of nostalgia changes during the period in which Western 
societies industrialise and their populations become chiefly urban, ceasing to mean 
‘homesickness’, a longing for a particular place, and becoming instead a longing for, or a 
fond reminiscence of, a particular time. Nostalgia, in other words, gains a predominantly  
temporal meaning rather than a spatial one. Music answers to this change. An ineluctably 
temporal art form, the sovereign role of which is to create a sense of virtual time, it is the 
perfect matrix for this new temporal form of nostalgia. To quote Simon Frith (1996), 
‘[m]usic allows us to stop time, while we consider how it passes’ (149). This is all the 
more poignant in the case of recorded music, which, as stated earlier, belongs to the same 
historical order of knowledge as our still-current conception of nostalgia as a hankering 
after the past. In a passage from Don DeLillo’s novel Underworld, the recently-
cuckolded Albert Bronzini and his sister, the terminally-ill spinster Laura Bronzini, sit in 
silence listening to some piano works by Saint-Saëns on the gramophone: 






And this was the other thing they shared, the sadness and clarity of time, time mourned in 
the music – how the sound, the shaped vibrations made by hammers striking wire strings 
made them feel an odd sorrow not for particular things but for time itself, the material feel 
of a year or an age, the textures of unmeasured time that were lost to them now (DeLillo 
1997: 229). 
 
As with all music, a record sets forth what Langer (1953) calls ‘the dynamic forms of 
subjective experience’ but does so with greater pathos for the music not having to be 
played oneself or experienced as part of a social occasion (114). The solitary listener is 
able to reflect with greater clarity – and, perhaps too, with greater melancholy – on the 
experience of time passing, and indulge his or her wish for the return of what has passed. 
    Autobiographical memories evoked by hearing an old record again can be very 
powerful. As a sensuous trigger for recall, recorded music shares much in common with 
various smells and tastes, the specificity of which is linked to a particular time and place. 
The very arbitrariness of hearing a piece of music again after a long intervening period 
appears at odds with its ability to reactivate ‘the vast structure of recollection’ (Proust 
1913/1992: 54). Why should we feel and remember so much from seemingly so little? No 
doubt the answer lies in recorded music’s sensuous particularity as a medium – the way, 
for example, it makes it possible for us to distinguish shades of nuance between different 
recordings of the same song or movement. Furthermore, like an aroma, or indeed like the 
taste of Proust’s famous madeleine cake dipped in tea, music is able to evoke so much 
more than its bare content might at first suggest. Its incommensurability with visually-
orientated notions of representation allows music to stand for, not so much the event 
itself, but, instead, the environment in which we experienced it. In this regard, it seems 
that music is less commonly associated with a particular incident in one’s life than with a 
rather more general mood or era. Music’s potential as a trigger for recall may be quite 
general – it probably won’t help us remember names, dates or facts however important 
they might be to us – yet it induces an acute sense, which we are very reluctant to 
dismiss, that we have been transported back to a previous era in our lives to partake once 
more of the precise sensuous atmosphere in which otherwise patchily-remembered events 
took place. 
    To a very large extent, these musically-evoked reminiscences rely specifically on 
recorded music. Though, in the era before the invention of the phonograph, live 





performances could certainly trigger memories of the situations in which other 
performances of the same music had been heard, there are several factors about the nature 
of recorded sound that makes it much more likely to be bound up with nostalgia: firstly, 
the simple fact of preservation, allowing for music to be reproduced now, in every one of 
its sonic dimensions, exactly as it was heard then; secondly, the way in which recorded 
music now pervades almost every sphere of everyday life, thus making a specific 
recording much more likely to be heard and heard again, both out of choice and by 
chance; and thirdly, the fact that, via compilations, re-issues, and the licensing of already-
existing music for use in film and television, the record industry actively promotes 
nostalgia almost as much as it does novelty.  
    For all of these reasons, autobiographical musical memories assume greater 
importance in the era of recording. Reminiscences of this kind are often accompanied by 
intense emotions, especially when they are connected to the memory of loved ones who 
have passed away. In a BBC documentary, an elderly woman, Monica Smallwood, 
reflects upon how the song, ‘Till the clouds roll by’, seems to ‘encapsulate’ the whole of 
her childhood. Her mother had once sung it to her during a family picnic as she sheltered 
Monica from a passing storm. Upon hearing the song again after an interval of many 
years, Monica says ‘I recognised it straightaway. It took me right back to that particular 
day […]. I think I felt almost on the verge of tears’. Since her rediscovery of the song, it 
has become invested with seemingly magical powers: ‘I can’t go back in time, literally, 
but I can when I hear that song, briefly, in my imagination’ (Savage 1994). Another 
interviewee recalls her deceased husband’s last birthday when they listened together to a 
song she had requested for him on the radio, ‘How great thou art’ by Elvis Presley:  
 
It was a golden moment, […] a kind of reward for our lives together […]. I knew he 
wouldn’t be with me much longer but that was a highlight of the whole life that we spent 
together […]. You get some music that you listen to and you forget but not that. If ever I 
hear it, I go through that lovely feeling again (ibid). 
  
    As first-hand witnesses discover when they compare their version of events with the 
divergent testimonies of others, autobiographical or ‘episodic’ memories are ‘highly 
susceptible to distortion, especially with repeated recollection’ (Snyder 2000: 75). There 
is a well-observed tendency for stories to become embellished in the retelling but, more 





than this, it would seem that in remembering personal experiences, we don’t remember 
the original event but the last time we remembered it: ‘recalling an episodic [or 
‘autobiographical’] memory is itself an episode that becomes remembered, and this copy 
of the memory replaces the original. There is, after all, no way to distinguish between a 
memory, and a memory of a memory’ (ibid.). A difference, however, does seem to be 
evident in the way that frequently recollected memories are accompanied by a diminished 
emotional reaction. In terms of musical memory, this means that songs associated with a 
particular event or era in one’s life, if heard repeatedly, will cease to trigger a strong 
affective response, whereas ones heard by chance after a long intervening period will. 
Instead of the regurgitated ‘golden oldies’ played ad nauseum on commercial radio, it is 
the lesser-known album tracks and obscure ‘one-hit-wonders’ that open the floodgates of 
reminiscence, hence the appeal in Britain of TV shows like Top of the Pops 2 (which 
outlived its parent chart show): it stuck solely to hits that time and radio playlists had 
forgotten. The banal, the naff, the cheesy – and the sometimes rather good – had never 
been so evocative. 
    As we can see, music – and recorded music in particular – acquires extra layers of 
meaning via the listener’s emotional and autobiographical interaction with it during the 
course of his or her life. Association or connotation in this regard constitutes a secondary 
layer of musical meaning, superimposed upon a primary layer which, in itself, has no 
literal meaning. This is true other than in cases where the meaning of a song is drastically 
reduced to its lyrical content. As if to illustrate music’s connotative powers, the former 
BBC Radio 1 DJ, Jo Wylie, had a slot in her show called ‘Changing tracks’ in which 
listeners were invited to request songs which had special associations for them. The idea 
was that the listeners’ stories added an extra layer of significance to songs whose 
meaning and affective force might have been dulled due to their being overplayed. 
Listeners were thus able to share in music’s autobiographical function by hearing familiar 
songs through the filter of other listeners’ life stories. This tendency for pieces of 
recorded music to accrue associations based on the circumstances in which we (re-)hear 
them can be illustrated more concretely with reference to a couple of famous films. In A 
Clockwork Orange (1971), Alex begins as a devout, if debauched, Beethoven aficionado. 
By the end of it, there is a certain piece of the German composer’s work that he can’t 





listen to without feeling violently ill. In the intervening period he has, of course, been 
‘brainwashed’ or subjected to ‘aversion therapy’ but what does this consist in? He has 
been taught to associate violence – and, by accident, Beethoven – with convulsive 
sickness or overwhelming nausea. This has been achieved by his being forced to watch 
violent images – accompanied by a soundtrack of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony – after 
being injected with drugs that induce a debilitating sense of ill-being. After repeated 
‘treatments’, this acute sickness returns when triggered by merely the suggestion of 
violence – or a few bars of Beethoven. In other words, the ‘Choral’ Symphony and 
violence carry different associations for Alex now. Their meaning for him has changed, 
though, of course, they are substantively the same.113 Similarly, in Casablanca (1942), a 
song once associated by Rick with his most impassioned romance has been transformed 
into one associated with the most bitter heartache and regret. It is an association that he 
does not wish to be reminded of, hence his injunction that Sam should never play ‘that 
song’. 
    The connotative meanings that pieces of recorded music acquire over time are never 
entirely private but enfold within them public meanings too. This is particularly true of 
pop songs, which, because of their time-bound nature function very effectively as 
markers or indices of historical eras and events: ‘Rock around the clock’ (1954) by Bill 
Haley and the Comets as the inaugural moment of British post-war youth culture, for 
example, or The Sex Pistols’ ‘God save the Queen’ (1977) as the proscribed soundtrack 
of Elizabeth II’s Silver Jubilee. In remembering where, when and with whom we first 
heard historically significant recordings, we locate our life story within an historical 
framework, imbuing our personal reminiscences with the significance of public memory. 
An apparently straightforward example, but one that, I suspect, contains its own 
intricacies and complexities smoothed over by frequent re-telling, was related to me by a 
friend. Her parents met for the first time one evening in June 1967 at a party where her 
dad was working as a disc jockey. Eager to show off his record collection to the young 
woman who would one day become his wife, he put on his copy of The Beatles’ Sergeant 
Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band, which had just been released that week. Thus, an 
album that, in retrospect, has been constructed as being emblematic of the ‘summer of 
love’ also serves in this case as an index of the beginning of a relationship. The apparent 





ease with which such memories can be recalled belies the actual complexity involved in 
such retrieval, especially in terms of the intertwining of different kinds of memory: 
personal and collective, internal and external, real and false. What, on the face of it, 
appears to be an individual memory or at least a familial one, relies, on closer 
examination, upon a much broader foundation. As a mass-produced artefact with an 
indexical relation to the summer of 1967, Sergeant Pepper provides a strong collective 
and external basis for the retrieval of personal, autobiographical memories: an aide-
memoire of the kind that Soviet neuropsychologist A.R. Luria (1973) likens to a knot in a 
handkerchief (31). This collective and external support for such reminiscences is 
reinforced by the frequent revivals and reappraisals of The Beatles’ eighth studio album 
in the media. The most orchestrated and intensive of these was on 1 June 1987, a date 
that, as journalists were quick to note, chimed with the album’s already-nostalgic opening 
line: ‘It was twenty years ago today…’.114 The sustained critical acclaim and discussion 
that the album has generated over the years thus serves, in mnemonic terms, as a 
powerful trigger or ‘cue’ as well as a form of ‘rehearsal’, eliciting and strengthening 
memories of previous media coverage and, indeed, previous listenings and their 
associated personal reminiscences. The mediatised rehearsal of Sergeant Pepper as a 
significant cultural site dovetails quite neatly with the numerous recapitulations by my 
friend’s family of their tale, giving wider technological support to what for them are 
already well-established collective memories amongst their circle of intimates. But here I 
must sound a note of caution regarding the veracity of these kinds of memories, if not this 
particular one. In urban industrialised societies, in which love matches and their 
contingent origins – or star-crossed destiny for the more romantic – are the norm, the 
story of ‘how we met’ has become one of the most frequently recounted tales among 
groups of friends and their families. Such rehearsal makes it one of the easiest of stories 
to recall but also among the most prone to embellishment and distortion as what we tend 
to remember is not the event itself but the last time we recounted it. 
 
Pop music, nostalgia, and the absent rememberer 
As mentioned above, pop music has a particularly strong relation to nostalgia. Simon 
Frith (1996a) makes an illuminating comparison between pop music and art in this 





regard. Whereas ‘art’ is supposed to have lasting value, most ‘pop’ is intended to be 
ephemeral, yet this often means that ‘time-bound pop is, paradoxically, more evocative 
than timeless classical music’ (3). Frith is particularly interested in why ‘some [pop] 
records are more obviously “nostalgic” than others’ (ibid.). He prefaces his answer to this 
question by delineating a particular conception of nostalgia:   
 
Nostalgia describes a mood – a way of thinking about the past, a regret for the present, a 
mixture of pleasure and loss, an indulgence in the wish that things were different […]. It is 
the essence of nostalgia to remember – or fantasise – a time of innocence, a time when we 
didn’t know what would happen to us, a time before disappointment (ibid.). 
 
‘To be nostalgic’, Frith writes, ‘music doesn’t just have to be old – to have associations – 
it must articulate those associations in the right way’ (ibid.). (He cites much of The 
Beatles’ output as nostalgic ‘even on first hearing’.) ‘A nostalgic judgement’ is, in Frith’s 
conception, ‘a historical judgement’, framed both ‘personally’ and ‘socially’ in terms of 
regret and disappointment or, at the very least, a certain surprise at the way things have 
worked out. The point he is making is that certain recordings are able to represent ‘a time 
of innocence’ better than others because we couldn’t have known then what we and the 
music would later become. This relates to the particular trajectory of pop history, which, 
as Frith notes, ‘is always a matter of decline, not progress’, at least, that is, when seen 
from a ‘folk’ or romantically-inclined point of view: ‘Music that bursts through from “the 
people” inevitably loses its power and sweetness as it becomes self-conscious and 
ambitious, more “knowing” both commercially and artistically’ (5). This can be seen in 
the career trajectories of individual performers. From the moment at which he or she 
enters public consciousness, a pop or rock artist is perceived as gradually losing the naïve 
spontaneity and élan with which they were once credited. When we chance to hear one of 
their early recordings, we thus feel a sense of innocence that serves as a poignant 
reminder of what has changed – to them, to us and to the world around us. 
    Recollected experience often feels more real or authentic than it did at the time. 
Nostalgia in this pejorative sense of a romanticised view of one’s own past is intimately 
connected to our sense of identity, our ability to project back on the past an unchanging 
inner self who was there, in some sense, to record what happened. This, I wish to argue, 
is an illusion but it is an extraordinarily compelling one and is integral to processes of 





recollection rather than a distortion of them. This is to say that human memory is 
essentially reconstructive rather than representational. To quote the neuroscientist, John 
McCrone (2008), ‘Long-term memory is effectively a myth’: 
 
A memory is anything but static. Resurrecting a memory trace appears to render it 
completely fluid, as pliable and unstable as the moment it was first formed, and in need of 
fixing once again into the brain’s circuitry […]. Simply retelling a tale may be enough to 
change that memory for good (267). 
 
In order to present this argument regarding the illusoriness of a stable rememberer and 
how this relates to nostalgia, I am going to refer, firstly, to a note by Freud on an 
apparatus which he invokes as a metaphor for memory and, secondly, to a commentary 
by Derrida. It should be signalled at the outset that both Derrida and Freud continue a 
long tradition of invoking writing or inscription as a metaphor for memory. Plato (360 
BC/2009), for example, describes the mind as a wax tablet ready to receive impressions, 
and Locke (1689/1996) presents the similar formulation of the mind as a tabula rasa, 
while Nietzsche (1876/1997) characterises memory as a palimpsest: a single manuscript 
that has been etched over innumerable times with different texts. Freud’s metaphor for 
memory is similar to these but is ingenious in that it accounts for both the storage of older 
memories as well as the inscription of new ones on a surface that remains pristine in spite 
of the repeated etchings upon it. The apparatus he has in mind is a Wunderblock (or 
‘mystic writing-pad’ as it is translated): a wax tablet over which is laid a sheet of waxed 
paper plus another sheet of transparent polythene that one etches on with a stylus, the 
grooves being ‘visible as dark writing upon the otherwise smooth whitish-grey surface of 
the celluloid’ (Freud 1925/1961: 229).115 When the double covering-sheet is raised from 
the wax tablet, the writing disappears, and the device is ready to receive new impressions. 
The transparent sheet is analogous to perception and the wax tablet underneath it to 
memory and the unconscious. In spite of the ingenuity of his metaphor, Freud 
acknowledges that it is imperfect: ‘once the writing has been erased, the Mystic Pad 
cannot “reproduce” it from within; it would be a mystic pad indeed, if, like our memory, 
it could accomplish that’ (230).116  
    In his commentary on Freud’s essay, Derrida (1978) stresses the fact that the originary 
experience itself – i.e. that which, later, is recalled – lies outside of the logic of 





inscription, representation, and signification; hence, it does not have any explicit meaning 
for us until it is remembered. ‘Everything begins with reproduction’, he writes. Memories 
– as inscriptions or engrams – are ‘repositories of a meaning which was never present 
[…]. The “perceived” may be read only in the past, beneath perception [i.e. beneath the 
transparent sheet of the Wunderblock] and after it’ (211, 224). The original event cannot 
be accessed by the subject, the ‘I’, who experiences it, even while it is happening. This is 
because it ‘happens’ outside of the logic of inscription – outside of language – within 
which a subject could arise. All that can be accessed is the engram or memory trace left 
behind.117 In a certain sense, then, all autobiographical or episodic experience is ‘always 
already’ nostalgic, the retrospective projection of an illusory rememberer being its 
necessary condition. 
    It is important, I would say, not to interpret Derrida’s argument as implying a position 
of extreme nominalism or anti-realism. According to my reading of him, Derrida is not 
claiming that the originary experience – the object of memory – never happened. Instead, 
he is suggesting that it cannot be accessed save via its inscription or translation. This is 
because originary experience – such that can be inferred, anyway – is prior to or askance 
from subjecthood; it is a space of ‘non-“I”-ness’, prior to inscription, and hence outside 
of the logic of signification, i.e. ‘without meaning’. It is a space of oblivion but before 
there was anything to forget – the casual, unthinking becoming of day-to-day life.  
 
Of retro and revivals 
The tendency for experience to feel more real or authentic when it is recollected extends 
to vicarious experience, when, for example, we dwell nostalgically on how much more 
enriching and fulfilling it might have been to live in an earlier decade. This kind of 
nostalgia as it manifests in popular culture is encapsulated by the word ‘retro’. Retro, in 
all its many guises, is a way of coming to terms with the modern past, including that 
which extends into one’s own lifetime. Yet it also implies a radical break between past 
and present: it typically makes the modern past seem innocent, naïve, optimistic; a time 
of unbounded promise, which, however, we have not been able to live up to in the present 
(Guffey 2006: 163-4). Its kitsch and playful exterior notwithstanding, retro is, then, like 





other forms of nostalgia, a type of mourning. If it is to be considered a ‘rebirth’ or 
‘revival’, retro is stillborn. 
    Post-1945, there have been many revivals in popular music. For two early examples, 
one might cite the folk and trad-jazz revivals of the 1950s and early 1960s, but it is 
perhaps the rock ’n’ roll revival of the 1970s that set the pattern most clearly for 
subsequent revivals. The first point to emphasise is that it was a revival of an entire 
decade, the ‘Fifties’ – albeit with a certain amount of overspill either side into the late 
1940s and early 1960s. This raises certain historiographical questions regarding the 
inherent simplification and homogenisation of this mode of periodisation. Elizabeth 
Guffey (2006) points out that ‘Historians had sliced epochs of time into decades since the 
early nineteenth century’ (115). Cultural histories of the 1920s, for example, casting it as 
an era of flappers, foxtrots and bobbed hair, were published a mere year or two after ‘the 
Jazz Age’ had ended, proving that ‘chronological decades could be used to chart the 
recent past, and especially its popular culture, without having to digest its complex 
character’ (ibid.). Similarly in the late 1960s and 1970s, the 1950s could be evoked via a 
shorthand of monumentalised iconic tropes: Brylcreemed quiffs, leather jackets, hot rods, 
Hula Hoops, and high school hops. These tropes draw attention to the extent to which 
retro is, in essence, a fetishisation of youthful consumer goods (109). As Guffey remarks, 
‘1950s retro was […] oblivious to McCarthy hearings and “duck-and-cover” bomb drills’ 
(116). As a result of such simplification, ‘many of those who lived through the period had 
difficulty reconciling the revival with their own memories’ (ibid.).  
    A second point to stress is that the timing of the rock ’n’ roll revival was significant, 
coming as it did a mere fifteen to twenty years after the original moment. (One can cite 
two inaugural moments: the first, Bill Haley’s 1968 tour of Britain culminating in his 
rapturous reception by a sell-out audience of teddy boys at the Albert Hall; the second, 
the appearance on the last day of Woodstock in 1969 of the rock ’n’ roll group Sha Na 
Na, with their greased ducktails and tightly choreographed performance of fifties hits.) 
To quote Guffey, ‘the revived past began to collapse into the present’ in a way that has 
become the norm ever since (105). Although it is tempting to see this incessant recycling 
of popular culture as part of a postmodernist narrative within which it is implied that 
revivals follow ever closer on the heels of what is being revived, I would argue that retro 





nostalgia has a more stable temporal rhythm. I term this the ‘fifteen- to twenty-year 
thesis’: the notion that a period of approximately two decades, i.e. one generation, needs 
to have elapsed for a revival to begin in earnest as the most enthusiastic proponents of 
retro culture will usually be those who were born just after the original historical 
moment.118 By contrast, those who had been young adults at the time are apt to be 
‘astonished that this is the past already’ (116).119 A further point that the rock ’n’ roll 
revival demonstrates is that, in spite of a certain campness as evidenced most clearly by 
the group Sha Na Na, the popular culture of the past, when seen through the lens of retro 
nostalgia, often appears to be more vibrant and authentic. In the case of rock ’n’ roll, this 
‘authenticity’ equates to an identity that was taken to be white, working-class, 
heterosexual and overtly masculine, in reaction to the more racially- and sexually-diverse 
culture of disco. By the end of the 1970s, there was in this respect a certain amount of 
overlap between the rock ’n’ roll revival and punk, such as in the music of rockabilly 
groups like The Stray Cats. 
    Retro revivals begin as an articulation within present-day culture, expressing 
uncertainty about the future as much as they do wistfulness for the past. In this respect, 
the 1950s revival must be seen against the backdrop of the 1970s: in the US, defeat in 
Vietnam and the Watergate scandal; and more widely, recession, rising oil prices, and a 
reactionary unease vis-à-vis the progressive social movements of the 1960s. It would be a 
mistake, however, to assume that retro revivals are always conservative or rearguard. 
Nostalgia is an intervention within culture and politics that can be used by both the Right 
and the Left – as acknowledged, for example, by E.P. Thompson (1963) in The Making of 
the English Working Class. Commenting on the situation of the proletariat in the mid-
nineteenth century, Thompson identifies their ‘deep-rooted folk memory of a “golden 
age” or of “Merrie England” ’ as deriving ‘from nostalgia for the pattern of work and 
leisure which obtained [three or four generations earlier] before the outer and inner 
disciplines of industrialism settled upon the working man’ (357).   
    Revivals in popular music are part of larger cultural cycles. The emergence of new 
artists, their movement from the musical margins to the ‘mainstream’, is inevitably 
followed by a waning of interest in them once they have become established stars. A 
generation later, however, when fashions in hairstyles, clothing, songwriting, and  





production have come full circle, and the old records begin to sound surprisingly fresh 
again, they achieve an unlikely rehabilitation (Frith 1996a: 5). Remarking on one such 
comeback – that of Burt Bacharach in the 1990s – Geoffrey O’Brien (2004) writes:  
 
In such a process, the myth of the original career is amplified by the myth of the return. 
Each step of the comeback is charted as part of a legendary progression: years of glory, 
years in limbo, years of triumphant return. The past is symbolically brought into the present 
so that […] latter-day devotees can gain access to a realm of lost bliss. By a back derivation 
typical of pop revivals, the fantasy glamor of the original songs is translated into a 
description of the era in which they originated, as if life in the early ‘60s had been a live-




    One might argue that pop music has become more retro or historicist in recent decades, 
referencing prior musical styles via various forms of quotation, allusion, and pastiche. A 
symptom of this is the fact that new artists are increasingly described in relation to the 
artists from other eras that they sound like, rather than in relation to the ‘scene’ which 
they are a part of; historicism has, to some extent, trumped geographical rootedness. In 
the globalised world that phonography has helped to produce, pop musicians are less easy 
to define than they were in terms of location – ‘Merseybeat’, ‘Madchester’, etc. – as their 
music will almost inevitably breach spatial (as well as temporal) boundaries. In reflecting 
upon his career as a music journalist and theorist of popular music, Frith (1996a) 
identifies ‘the sense that all pop music is a matter now of recalling the past. We 
distinguish between […] current British acts […] by tracing the past pop sounds and 
figures to whom they variously refer’ (5-6). One might add that an assumed knowledge 
of influences and lines of descent has become a firm part of what it means to be a fan of a 
certain kind of popular music, albeit sometimes in an atomised way devoid of genuine 
social and historical context, as evidenced by the ‘top 10’ or ‘top 50’ lists of ‘seminal’ 
singles and albums to be found occupying the pages of the popular music press. 
    This view that pop music has become more nostalgic or historicist might, however, be 
an effect of age. Perhaps pop music itself is not more backward-looking, it’s just that it 
appears to have become so to the ears of listeners who have lived through previous 
‘musical life cycles’ (Frith 1996a: 5). Younger pop audiences are often only dimly aware 
of the precursors or influences upon the current sounds that they are listening to. Being 





only ten years old in 1984, for example, I couldn’t have realised how indebted a song like 
Wham!’s ‘Wake me up before you go-go’ was to Motown records of the 1960s. But as 
pop audiences approach middle age, they become aware – sometimes painfully – of how 
current musicians have drawn upon records from the past. There is thus a certain 
nostalgic condescension or hypocrisy in the reaction of an older generation (thirties, 
forties, etc.) towards a younger one (teens, twenties). One thinks of Jack Black’s 
character in the film of High Fidelity (2000), berating customers at the record shop where 
he works for not owning a copy of Psychocandy by The Jesus and Mary Chain or Dylan’s 
Blonde On Blonde, or how his milder colleague, Dick, gets the desired reaction from one 
of the store’s younger customers when he puts on a song from the 1970s by Stiff Little 
Fingers: ‘Is this the new Green Day?’ 
 
Cultural dementia, commodified nostalgia, and pop music  
At the heart of the phonographic technologies introduced in the late nineteenth century 
and the musical culture of the succeeding century which they played such an important 
role in shaping, there is a paradox: recording functions to preserve musical performances 
but, in doing so, it makes them seem more evanescent by linking them to particular 
historical moments. We now routinely assume that a popular song encapsulates a distinct 
era in our cultural history whereas, before the advent of recording, a song was much more 
likely to represent the continuation of a tradition and was, as such, a defence against 
transience rather than its embodiment.  
    Musical recordings are, then, a means of preserving and remembering but are equally 
implicated in the manufactured processes of obsolescence and forgetting, and this is 
especially so in the case of pop music. To quote Jonathan Sterne (2003): ‘Inasmuch as we 
can claim that it promoted permanence, sound recording also helped accelerate the pace 
of fashion and turnover in popular music’ (288). In what follows, I wish to demonstrate 
the productive interplay that occurs in the culture of pop music between preservation and 
obsolescence, novelty and nostalgia, remembering and forgetting. In order to do this, I’d 
like to make an analogy between the status of memory in popular culture and the findings 
contained in one of the ground-breaking works of clinical psychology. 





  The study of modern diseases of memory begins in 1881 with the publication of Les 
maladies de la memoire by Théodule Ribot. A pioneer of French positivist psychology, 
Ribot noted that sufferers from the condition he termed ‘senile dementia’ lose their most 
recent memories first and their oldest ones last. His findings were counter-intuitive in this 
regard. One might expect that the older the memory, the harder it would be for a person 
with memory loss to recall it, yet the reverse turns out to be true: old memories are 
preserved while recent ones are lost (Ribot 1887; Rose 2003: 127). Ribot explained this 
phenomenon in terms of the stronger associative links between older memories which are 
often reactivated and therefore more closely linked with other memories (Ribot 1887; 
Draaisma 2004: 234). When applied to popular culture, ‘Ribot’s law’ – that the oldest 
memories are the least prone to loss – offers an explanation for the widespread tendency 
for people to value more highly the cultural products of their youth.120 As one gets older, 
the music of one’s youth inevitably exists within a richer and more developed network of 
autobiographical associations than today’s instantly ‘forgettable’ sounds. Reissues, 
revivals, and ‘oldies’ radio-programming reinforce this process, functioning as a form of 
rehearsal whereby a relatively limited repertoire of hits from yesteryear are made yet 
more memorable via their periodic repetition.121 The upshot of this is that we are all 
affected, to a greater or lesser degree, by what might be called ‘cultural dementia’. 
    This tendency for people to value more highly the popular culture of their youth can 
also be explained by the so-called ‘reminiscence effect’, which in many ways extends 
Ribot’s model in order to take into account how people without any obvious pathology 
remember their lives. The ‘reminiscence effect’ refers to the fact that a person’s most 
significant memories in later life will tend to cluster around the period when he or she 
was about twenty years of age, a time when young people often invest very heavily in 
musical culture – financially, psychologically, socially, and affectively (Draaisma, 2004: 
173).122 Thus, certain songs or genres of popular music come to be associated with, what 
in retrospect, tends to be felt as the most vibrant era of one’s life: a time when a greater 
concentration of memorable events occurred, including events that shaped our 
personalities for the rest of our lives. Turino (1999) emphasises the fact that, at a semiotic 
level, such pieces of music are not simply signs about our lives, they are signs of them, 
and as such, are sometimes uncritically granted a value denied to other music (236). 





    This retrospective shaping of how we hear and respond to ‘our’ music neatly dovetails 
with the economic imperatives of the record industry. As in other industries, record 
companies actively encourage obsolescence via the creation of new musical fashions and 
playback formats. Yet at the same time – and in this respect the record industry is fairly 
unique – recording companies expect to make a loss on most of the products they issue. 
In other words, most new artists fail to make a profit for their paymasters. This means 
that, in order for their business to be viable, record company executives must recoup 
profits from a handful of economically successful artists. It is at this point that nostalgia 
enters the frame. Profits are maximised via numerous compilations and reissues, often 
targeted at a demographic who are perhaps not expected to buy very much new music but 
instead want to ‘relive’ their youth. There is a sense, then, that the record industry is 
Janus-faced in promoting, on the one hand, novelty, obsolescence and forgetting, and on 
the other, nostalgia, preservation and reminiscence. Our experience of pop culture 
throughout our lives, in particular our identification with the music we hear, occurs via 
the dialectical interaction of these two sets of principles.










Music & Mimesis 
* 
They said, ‘You have a blue guitar, 
 You do not play things as they are.’ 
 
 The man replied, ‘Things as they are 
 Are changed upon the blue guitar.’ 
           
(From ‘The man with the blue guitar’ by 
 Wallace Stevens (1937/1953: 42).) 
 
A mimetic art 
As we saw in chapter one, mimesis is the innately human urge to copy, mimic, or imitate 
in such a way that what is copied is actively remodelled in the process. Mimesis is thus 
creative imitation and is the primary means through which reflective self-consciousness 
engages with and transforms the sensuous world. Furthermore, mimesis is what connects 
humans most intimately to the non-human world, via relations of reciprocity and mutual 
recognition. In this ‘interlude’, I would like to trace the origins of mimesis and its 
connection to music, and then make a case for the usefulness of the term, arguing that it 
deserves to be a key concept in cultural studies.123 The reason why it has not already 
become so appears to be due, in part, to the Frankfurt School’s somewhat oblique usage 
of it.124 Though it is clearly an important concept in their work, it is slotted into their 
writings in the midst of already convoluted arguments, debates and theoretical work, and 
is rarely given conceptual space of its own. This has hampered the application of it to 
other objects of study not of immediate interest to Adorno, Horkheimer, Benjamin, et al. 
    In chapter one, I demonstrated how the phonograph can be understood as a mimetic 
technology in common with other forms of mechanical reproduction introduced in the 
nineteenth century such as photography and moving pictures. Even in the absence of 





phonographic devices, there are – I wish to argue – good grounds for claiming that music 
is an essentially mimetic art. Certainly, this was a view that held enormous sway in 
antiquity from the fifth century BC onwards. Of particular importance in this regard is 
Damon, an Athenian musical theorist whose ideas were to have a marked influence on 
Plato and Aristotle. In spite of there being much uncertainty regarding the details of 
Damon’s life and work, it is generally agreed today that he inaugurated a system of 
theorising in which a specific character or ēthos is ascribed to musical works, as well as 
to the tunings, scales, and melodic patterns from which they are derived (Halliwell 2002: 
238). According to this kind of theory, a melody might summon up for the listener an 
impression of courage or fortitude, for example, at the same time as it made him or her 
feel more courageous. There is thus a two-fold mimesis here: firstly, the music is mimetic 
of the physiological, emotional, and gestural qualities associated with, in this case, 
courage; secondly, the listener recognises and responds affectively to the patterns of 
sound that constitute the music, in a deeply introversive sense, ‘mimicking’ it. 
    For many writers coming after Damon, though not all, the mimetic qualities of music – 
its power to evoke the complexity of psychological experience – were self-evident and 
unquestioned.125 Yet closer to our own time, in the era of art music’s ascendance in the 
Western world, it has frequently been claimed that music has no such powers of 
representation, imitation or expression, and that its defining feature vis-à-vis other art 
forms is its abstract nature as a pure form without a content.126 The signal example of 
such an argument is provided by the nineteenth-century critic Eduard Hanslick. Hanslick 
was something of an éminence grise in Vienna’s musical circles, and the infamous 
‘Rogue’s gallery’ appended to his major publication On the Musically Beautiful (1891) 
functions as a series of sharp raps across the knuckles of those with the vulgarity to 
suggest that music has a content or expresses something. Hanslick’s polemic is succinctly 
put by one of the chapter titles in this book: ‘The representation of feeling is not the 
content of music’ (Hanslick 1891/1986: 8). In case the reader is in any doubt as to his 
position, he continues thus: ‘The representation of a specific feeling or emotional state is 
not at all among the characteristic powers of music […]. The ideas which the composer 
produces are first and foremost purely musical ideas’ (9-10). To a degree, his formalism 
was justified by the overliteral interpretations of composers’ works that had abounded 





throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and were only just beginning to 
loosen their verisimilitudinous grip by the time Hanslick sat down to write the first 
edition of his book in the 1850s. In particular, pieces of music suffered from what the 
musicologist Richard Norton (1984) has termed their ‘semantic domination’ by the titles 
and texts ascribed to them. 
    Whereas I would agree with Hanslick and others that music is not a representational art 
in the sense that it cannot denote extra-musical referents in the way that visual or literary 
arts clearly can, I would preserve music’s designation as a form of mimesis on the 
grounds that what it connotes most powerfully is precisely that which cannot be seen: 
experience itself. Music’s referent is our life as thinking, feeling, embodied creatures 
shaped by the forms of sociality we inhabit. The problem with perceiving this referent is 
that we are it. To quote Adorno (2004) on the matter: ‘We don’t understand music, it 
understands us’ (x); or, similarly, Lévi-Strauss (1969): ‘music has its being in me, and I 
listen to myself through it’ (17). Musical mimesis, unlike visual representation, offers no 
gap between subject and object. There is no distance or perspective. Instead we are 
immersed in the myriad patterned waves of air molecules, or else the music is ‘in’ us, 
resonating within an auditory apparatus and nervous system acutely attuned to its 
vibrations. Furthermore, the connotative possibilities of musical meaning are too 
shimmeringly evanescent for us to be able to grasp them with anything approaching 
denotative certainty. At best, we ourselves – as individuals and as a society – become the 
meaning of a piece of music.    
 
The origins of ‘mimesis’ 
The shadowy origins of the term mimēsis have given rise to a certain amount of 
confusion concerning music’s relationship to it. While we may still, for other reasons, 
wish to claim that music is a mimetic art, we cannot – as was once the case – afford it a 
uniquely privileged status in this regard by seeking recourse to linguistic history. In a 
1954 book, Die Mimesis in der Antike (‘Mimesis in Antiquity’), the historian of aesthetics, 
Hermann Koller, performed an etymological sleight of hand that made it seem that the 
word mimēsis in ancient Greek had specifically musical roots.127 Based on early usages in 
Delian hymns, as well as in the work of Pindar and Aeschylus, Koller was led to give the 





rather too narrow definition of mimēsis as ‘to represent through dance’ (Gebauer and 
Wulf 1995: 27). From that starting point, he made the assumption that the term originated 
sometime between the seventh and fifth centuries BC with the emergence of the 
Dionysian cults, for which the island of Delos was an important site. Mimēsis in this 
context would have referred to the ritual acts performed by the priest and other devotees 
– dancing, music, and singing. In addition to these speculations, Koller took the 
unwarranted step of placing Damonist music theory at the centre of his account of 
mimēsis’s origins: a move that has been strongly rebuffed by Koller’s critics.128 
    If mimēsis’s roots are not to be found in the cult worship of Dionysus and its ritual 
interweaving of music and dance, then a clue to its real origin is given in the word’s 
spelling. In their magisterial study of the term’s history, Gunter Gebauer and Christoph 
Wulf concur with Koller’s critics that mimēsis in fact stems from mimos or ‘mime’. More 
specifically it originates with the mimes that were performed in Doric Sicily, probably as 
entertainments at banquets for wealthy men. Although the details are sketchy, it seems 
that these performances consisted of portrayals of somewhat stereotyped personality 
traits: Gebauer and Wulf (1995) offer cowardice as an example (29). In this regard, they 
were intended to present the more humble actuality of commoners rather than the world 
of the aristocracy. Mimos, in this context, refers specifically to the gestural depiction of 
character traits, though such presentations were often accompanied by music and 
rhythmic movement. In spite of this artistic origin, albeit a somewhat lowly one, Gebauer 
and Wulf downplay the aesthetic importance of the word family to which mimēsis 
belonged. Instead, they stress that, by the fifth century BC, the concept still referred to 
the adoption or emulation of the characteristics of another person or thing, rather than the 
notion of art as imitation: the first clear aesthetic usages only begin with the work of 
Xenophon and Plato (ibid.). 
    So music is present at mimēsis’s inception but as an auxiliary to mime rather than as 
something significant in itself. This early connection between music and mime was 
perhaps not entirely arbitrary, and might go some way to furnishing an understanding of 
precisely what it is that we value in music that we don’t normally value in ambient noise. 
Before we explore this further, however, it should be pointed out that the term from 
which our contemporary word ‘music’ is derived – mousikē, meaning literally, ‘art of the 





Muses’ – had a much wider range of meanings in ancient Greece, encompassing dance, 
recitation, the work of Homer and Hesiod, lyric poetry, and more besides. In his pre-
history of ‘the Western European world-view’, Logological Investigations, Barry 
Sandywell (1996) writes that, in the fifth and sixth centuries BC: 
 
‘Music’ had a meaning that is close to what eighteenth-century Germans intended when 
they spoke of Bildung, the cultivation of the arts and, more especially, the cultivation of the 
self. Thus Aristotle speaks of the ‘anthropon mousikon’ – literally ‘the musical man’ – in 
the sense in which he would refer to the ‘civilized’ or ‘cultivated individual’. Here 
‘becoming civilized’ is synonymous with becoming ‘musical’ (1, 232).  
  
The quite different meaning of mousikē makes sense when one remembers that ‘music’, 
as we are accustomed to think of it today, would have been inseparable from a range of 
other artistic practices, most obviously poetry and dance, but also mime. In fact, one 
single practice often combined what we would now consider to be many separate 
aesthetic elements. For example, religious hymns and tragic choruses took the form, in 
effect, of slow circle dances in which the rippling movements of the participants were as 
one with the cadence of the words they sang (232). Thus, in such rituals, the meaning of 
the ‘text’ was supported by a very considerable gestural and affective undertow, and 
would have greatly surpassed the meaning of those written remnants that have come 
down to us in the work of Homer for example. 
 
Music, the body, and gesture 
This early intertwining of music with poetry, dance, and mime still informs many of our 
commonplace, yet all-too-often unexamined, notions of what music means. At root, what 
we hear in music is a gestural language, whereby patterns of sound mimetically trace the 
still deeper patterns of human physiology, thought, and social relations. To quote 
anthropologist John Blacking’s addendum to Varèse’s famous definition, music is not 
merely ‘organised sound’ but ‘humanly organised sound’ (Blacking 1995; emphasis 
added). This anthropological organisation of airwaves is fundamentally mimetic in that 
what music reproduces are the ‘processual shapes’ we all inhabit (Middleton 2000: 105). 
    The mimesis involved here takes several forms. Firstly, music is mimetic of the 
autonomic rhythms of the body – heartbeat, breathing, muscular tension and relaxation – 





especially as entailed by the manifestation of affect (Chanan 1999: 131). In certain pieces 
of music, this type of emulation can be quite overt or, what often amounts to the same 
thing, is established by convention so that it can be hard not to hear a mimetic 
connection. For example, critics have heard in the slow final movement of Mahler’s last 
symphony, the Ninth, the faltering rhythms of the heart condition that would kill him, 
hence the movement’s slightly fanciful status as Mahler’s ‘farewell to life’.129 To take a 
similar instance from the world of pop music, the effect of lulling intimacy to be heard in 
The Beach Boys’ ‘Don’t talk (put your head on my shoulder)’ is achieved, in large 
measure, by the song’s languorous ‘lub-dub’ bass line, which – together with the song’s 
lyrics – evokes the sound of a lover’s heartbeat heard while resting one’s head on their 
chest. Perhaps what is most curious about these kinds of examples is, not the fact that 
music can mimic certain functions of the autonomic nervous system, but that, in doing so, 
it has a direct effect upon them. One’s pulse and respiration rate are particularly 
susceptible to musical influence, quickly altering in response to the rhythmic and melodic 
contours of what one hears.130 Furthermore, music puts one’s breathing rate and heart rate 
in sync with those of other listeners, hence the uncanny experience of a concert hall full 
of people all holding their breath at the same time. In situations in which the musicking 
takes an overtly collective form, such as an audience clapping along in unison, the 
synchronising effects can be even more marked. In cases such as these, then, music is 
properly mimetic – as opposed to passively reflective – in the sense that, in imitating 
internal bodily rhythms, it also acts upon them.  
    A second example of music’s mimetic powers is in connection with what is broadly 
termed paralinguistic communication: gesture, facial expression, intonation, etc.131 The 
word ‘prosody’ preserves this primordial connection: deriving from the Greek for ‘a song 
sung to music’, it now refers to the ‘musicality’ of spoken language, its patterns of stress 
and intonation. Simply put, music mimics – albeit in a way that differs markedly from 
one musical culture to another – non-lexical social interaction, those primordial modes of 
communication that take place in the absence of words or in addition to them. Moreover, 
music itself is an important example in its own right of precisely this kind of 
communication. In his wonderfully polemic book, Musicking, Christopher Small (1998) 
argues for a definition of music, not as a neo-Platonic abstraction, but as a paralinguistic 





exploration and affirmation of human relationships, in which an extended circle of 
participants or ‘musicants’ – not just musicians – are engaged. Music, in Small’s view, 
should be treated primarily as a verb – ‘to music’ – rather than as a noun. He produces 
the following distillation of musical communication in all its evocative grandeur and 
kindred expression: 
 
The language of musicking is the language of gesture that unites the entire living world, 
and unlike verbal languages it has no set vocabulary or units of meaning. Being gesture-
based, it can deal with many concerns, even apparently contradictory ones, all at the same 
time, while words can deal with matters only one at a time (184).  
 
An example from the life of Beethoven serves to highlight this connection between 
paralinguistic and musical communication. The anecdote in question was recounted by 
one of Beethoven’s former piano students, Baroness Dorothea von Ertmann, to a young 
Felix Mendelssohn while Mendelssohn was on a visit to Milan, and may have inspired 
his later claim that ‘If you ask me to explain a piece of music, I can’t do it, not because 
music is too vague, but because words are too vague’ (quoted in Chanan 1999: 131). The 
baroness related to Mendelssohn – who, in turn, related to his sister in a letter – how 
Beethoven had shrunk from visiting her after the death of her last child, no doubt finding 
it impossible to summon up adequate words of condolence. 
 
[B]ut at length he invited her to visit him, and when she arrived, she found him seated at 
the piano, and simply saying, ‘Let us speak to each other by music’, he played on for more 
than an hour, and, as she expressed it, ‘he said much to me, and at last gave me 
consolation’ (Letter of 14 July 1831 as given in Marek 1973: 190-1).  
 
    Our induction into music’s gestural language begins early in life with the elegant ritual 
dance of communication between adults and babies. The exaggerated intonation and 
rhythmic emphasis of echolalia, or ‘motherese’ as it has been called, might well be the 
bedrock of musical communication, displaying certain parallels, for example, with the 
animated to-ing and fro-ing of jazz musicians when they improvise off each other (Storr 
1992: 8-9). While we might be reluctant to describe baby talk as ‘music’, it nevertheless 
possesses a musicality that extends far beyond ordinary speech, perhaps serving as 
evidence for an innate musical communicability (Service 2008). Furthermore, it seems 
reasonable to assume that such intensive play in the art of sound gestures continues to 





inform our responses to music throughout the rest of our lives, reinforcing, for example, 
the connection between patterns of sound and emotional states. In this regard, it is 
significant that echolalia is usually accompanied on the part of adults by exaggerated 
facial expressions so that the affective ‘meaning’ of the various vocalisations is rendered 
visible. For instance, a rising ‘ooh’ sound might be accompanied by raised eyebrows in 
order to signify surprised delight. It is interesting to further note that one theory of why 
music is able to induce such powerful emotional states is that it reminds us of the prosody 
of emotional speech (Service 2008). Perhaps music taps into an affective-expressive 
foundation laid down in early infancy. 
    The exquisite babble that is exchanged between adults and babies might seem far 
removed from the Western art-music tradition with its rigorous notation of pitches, 
rhythms and timbres, yet there have been some curious parallels. One of the most notable 
of these is to be found in Schoenberg’s Pierrot Lunaire (1912), which calls for the 
soprano to employ a singing style midway between song and speech, known as 
Sprechgesang – literally ‘speechsong’.132 In his foreword to the piece – a setting of 
poems by Albert Giraud – Schoenberg instructs that rather than maintaining a constant 
pitch through a note, the singer ‘immediately abandons it by falling or rising’. He adds 
that ‘[t]he goal is certainly not at all a realistic, natural speech […]. But it should not call 
singing to mind, either’ (Schoenberg 1994: 54).133 Two further examples of music that 
approximates to echolalia are György Ligeti’s Aventures (1962) and Nouvelles Aventures 
(1962-5). As the Russian musicologist Marina Lobanova (2000) writes, ‘The idea behind 
the Aventures was to write a composition in which words and sounds, i.e., bearers of 
affects, would be at one and the same time both a verbal text and a musical composition’ 
(101). To this end, Ligeti employed a ‘non-semantic, imaginary language’ consisting of 
119 sounds pronounced or sung in different ways, combined with ‘extra-linguistic 
elements, such as laughter, coughing, groaning, muttering, whispering and sighing’ 
(ibid.). The result has been described as a ‘phonetic composition which is constructed 
from a musical one and forms an organic whole with it’ (Salmenhaara quoted ibid.).134 
    The link between prosody and music might, to a degree, explain why people often 
claim to hear in pieces of orchestral music a distinct national flavour – the Russianness of 
Tchaikovsky, the Frenchness of Debussy, or the Englishness of Elgar, for example. The 





importance of variations between musical traditions in terms of pedagogy and practice 
cannot be discounted, yet it seems reasonable to assume that the rhythms and cadences of 
a composer’s native language should also exert an influence on the character of their 
musical phrasing.     
 
Mimetic culture 
So far, in discussing the connection between music on the one hand and prosody, gesture 
and facial expression on the other, we have been concerned with the ontogenetic 
development of musical and linguistic faculties, that is to say their development in the 
individual. The matter, however, has also been considered phylogenetically, i.e. at the 
species level. In The Descent of Man, Charles Darwin (1871/2007) famously posits that 
music preceded speech in human evolution, arising as an elaboration of mating calls:  
 
it appears probable that the progenitors of man, either the males or females or both sexes, 
before acquiring the power of expressing their mutual love in articulate language, 
endeavoured to charm each other with musical notes and rhythm […]. The impassioned 
orator, bard, or musician, when with his varied tones and cadences he excites the strongest 
emotions in his hearers, little suspects that he uses the same means by which his half-
human ancestors long ago aroused each other’s ardent passions, during their courtship and 
rivalry (478).135                 
 
In addition to Darwin’s speculations on the role of music in sexual selection, a common 
argument is that music, or a prehistoric prototype of it, contributed to the development of 
human cognition.136 In Origins of the Modern Mind, the neuroscientist, Merlin Donald 
(1991), argues that there have been three major transitions in the cognitive evolution of 
humans: the first, from the ‘episodic’ life of apes to a ‘mimetic’ culture, in which 
emotions, external events and stories could be represented by means of gesture, 
movement and sound – but not yet language; the second, from ‘mimetic’ to ‘mythic’ 
culture, in which the language adaptation emerged; and the third, from ‘mythic’ culture to 
the final phase: that of ‘theoretic culture and external symbolic storage’, in which writing 
and other forms of external memory – such as the phonograph – have been invented. 
Each of these stages represents a significant advance on what went before, both in terms 
of culture and cognition, but the defining transition in human evolution is, for Donald, 
that from ‘episodic’ to ‘mimetic’ culture: 






mimesis forms the core of an ancient root-culture that is distinctly human. No matter how 
evolved our oral-linguistic culture, and no matter how sophisticated the rich varieties of 
symbolic material surrounding us, mimetic scenarios still form the expressive heart of 
human social interchange (189).  
 
Donald attaches particular importance in this regard to the ‘combination of vocal and 
facial expression’, which, he claims, ‘might have played a paramount role in mimetic 
culture, as it still does in modern society’ (180). The inference is that our hominid 
ancestors employed a sing-song language consisting, not of arbitrary phonemes, but of 
tonal (and gestural) shapes that bore a sensuous similarity or ‘iconic connection’ to their 
referents. He argues that this type of communication was crucial because of the very 
much larger and more complex social groupings that homo erectus – the first decisively 
mimetic culture in the fossil record – had to negotiate compared with their ‘episodic’ 
ancestors (137, 163).137 ‘Mimetic skill’ was, according to Donald, the means by which 
our hominid forebears modelled, explored and affirmed social structure (173-4). He adds 
that ‘[l]anguage is not necessary for the development of complex social roles and rules, 
but mimesis is essential’ (175). Thus, auditory-gestural-affective ritual and play may 
have provided pre-linguistic hominid cultures with the means for both conceptualising 
and reinforcing social bonds. This would correspond to Christopher Small’s account of 
the role of ‘musicking’, which he describes as ‘an activity by means of which we bring 
into existence a set of relationships that model the relationships of our world […]. [T]he 
sound relationships of a musical performance stand in metaphorical form for ideal human 
relationships as imagined by the participants’ (Small 1998: 50, 129).  
    Mimetic culture, of which something akin to music was an integral part, may have 
flourished and endured ‘for tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of years before language 
and conceptual thinking evolved’ (Sacks 2007: 246-7). In cognitive terms, it is the 
‘missing link’ between ape colonies, devoid of abstract symbols, and human societies, 
characterised, among other things, by the spoken word (Donald 1991:162). There is 
clearly something romantic, indeed, Rousseauvian about this notion. In his Essay on the 
Origin of Languages, Rousseau (1781/2006) propounded the ‘musical protolanguage 
hypothesis’, as it has come to be known, some ninety years before the publication of 
Darwin’s Descent of Man. Rousseau’s claim is that, long before the divisive intervention 





of logocentric reason, humans existed in prelapsarian – or at least pre-Babelian – 
harmony. Another recent elaboration on this idea is to be found in Steven Mithen’s The 
Singing Neanderthals. Like Donald, Mithen argues that our hominid cousins 
communicated via vocal and physical gestures rather than language. He hypothesises 
that, in some respects, Neanderthals may have been more musical than homo sapiens 
sapiens. This argument is based on studies of pitch discrimination in infants, which 
suggest that we are all born with perfect pitch but ‘unlearn’ it in favour of relative pitch 
during language acquisition, relative pitch being a far more useful aptitude in linguistic 
terms, allowing for the recognition of syntactical units of meaning regardless of what 
pitches they are transposed to. According to Mithen (2005), only one in every ten 
thousand adults fulfils the criterion for possessing perfect pitch – ‘the ability to identify 
or to produce the pitch of a sound without any reference point’ – but this proportion is 
much higher among professional musicians, whether because of innate ability, intensive 
training, or both (76). The notion that Neanderthals, who almost certainly didn’t possess 
language, having bequeathed no indisputably symbolic objects to the existing fossil 
record, were nevertheless able to recognise and produce absolute pitches is an intriguing 
one, and may well merit our hominid cousins with the ‘singing’ epithet from the title of 
Mithen’s book. 
    According to this romantic view, our distant ancestors, as well as extinct lines such as 
the Neanderthals, were cognitively like early infants in their reliance on the iconicity and 
musicality of pre-linguistic speech. Mimetic communication on this account precedes 
linguistic communication at the level of both individual and species, and remains 
fundamental to forms of human interaction today. To quote the dramaturgical theorist, 
Paul Woodruff (2008): ‘Mimesis and ordinary life are not divided by clear boundaries. 
Our lives are laced with mimesis’ (124). Woodruff gives imitative behaviour as an 
example, arguing that ‘to live without any form of mimesis would be impossible for a 
human being’ (ibid.). With these issues in mind, I would like to argue that mimesis 
remains fundamental to human sociality – and, indeed, fundamental in our sociality with 
non-humans – and that, as a concept, it deserves much wider uptake in cultural theory. As 
indicated in chapter one, the work of Michael Taussig (1993) has provided a significant 
starting point in this regard but much more could be done.  






Mimesis and cultural theory    
In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1979) claim that, over the 
centuries, there has been a decline in, and taboo on, the mimetic impulse. This decline is 
in inverse proportion to the rise in instrumental reason, via which humans assert their 
difference from nature in order to control and subjugate it. The result of this is self-
defeating, however, as the suppression of the urge to imitate non-human nature, and 
thereby express our correspondence and reciprocity with it, ends up being a form of self-
subjugation: 
 
Civilization has replaced the organic adaptation to others and mimetic behavior proper, by 
organized control of mimesis, in the magical phase; and, finally, by rational practice, by 
work, in the historical phase. Uncontrolled mimesis is outlawed […]. For centuries, the 
severity with which the rulers prevented their own followers and the subjugated masses 
from reverting to mimetic modes of existence, starting with the religious prohibition on 
images, going on to the social banishment of actors and gypsies, and leading finally to the 
kind of teaching which does not allow children to behave as children, has been the 
condition for civilization (180-1). 
 
For Adorno and Horkheimer, the taboo on mimesis is, then, a form of alienation from 
nature – and a more primary form of alienation than that outlined by Marx, which is an 
alienation from the labour process. The capitalist mode of production is to be understood 
in these terms as an intensification of mimesis’s decline in which ‘the indelible mimetic 
heritage of all practical experience is consigned to oblivion’ (ibid.).138 Writing in the 
context of Nazism, Adorno and Horkheimer see the suppressed mimetic impulse as 
erupting in acts of violent hatred in which the anti-Semite unconsciously mimics his 
internal image of those whom he hates (184). The Jew is accused of being uncivilised or, 
more specifically, of unconstrainedly mimicking bestial nature, and thus the Nazi 
behaves in like manner towards him or her. ‘Anti-Semitism’, in this sense, ‘is probably 
the morbid expression of repressed mimesis’ (187). 
    Adorno and Horkheimer’s use of the concept of mimesis in this passage owes much to 
Benjamin’s work of more than a decade earlier. In a short monograph that remained 
unpublished in his lifetime, Benjamin (1933/1979) also diagnoses ‘the increasing decay 
of the mimetic faculty’ (160). He defines mimesis, in its strong form, as ‘the powerful 
compulsion in former times to become and behave like something else’, observing rather 





more optimistically than Adorno and Horkheimer that the mimetic impulse still lives on 
in childhood games: ‘Children’s play is everywhere permeated by mimetic modes of 
behaviour, and its realm is by no means limited to what one person can imitate in another. 
The child plays at being not only a shopkeeper or teacher but also a windmill and a train’ 
(160). Similarly, in his memoir, A Berlin Childhood, composed over a number of years in 
the 1930s, Benjamin (2006) recalls a butterfly hunt in which he and his prey become 
sympathetically bound together via the ancient magic of mimesis: ‘Between us, now, the 
old law of the hunt took hold: the more I strove to conform, in all the fibers of my being, 
to the animal – the more butterfly-like I became in my heart and soul – the more this 
butterfly itself, in everything it did, took on the color of human volition; and in the end, it 
was as if its capture was the price I had to pay to regain my human existence’ (51). We 
can, in this short passage, detect a subtle mimesis of feeling which gets at the heart of 
what Benjamin and his friends in the Frankfurt School intend by the concept. The feeling 
we have when perceiving the physical or tonal gesture of another agent or creature – the 
soaring arc of a bird in flight, the tumbling whoosh of a waterfall, the gentle swaying of 
the branches of a tree, the caress of the wind – is mimetic of that gesture. That is to say 
our feelings are creative imitations of what we perceive, affective analogues of the 
sensuous world in which we are embedded. In turn, gestures evoke the world of feeling, 
they give mimetic expression to what is within, making it external and manifest. 
    This mimesis of feeling is inherent in music too, which, like other art forms, is a 
continuation of the mimetic impulse in contemporary society. To quote Raymond 
Williams (1961): ‘rhythm is a way of transmitting a description of experience, in such a 
way that the experience is re-created in the person receiving it, not merely as an 
“abstraction” or an emotion but as a physical effect on the organism – on the blood, on 
the breathing, on the physical patterns of the brain’ (40-1). The ethnomusicologist, John 
Blacking (1977), emphasises the socio-biological nature of this kind of mimetic 
experience: ‘Crucial factors in the development of cultural forms are the possibility of 
shared somatic states, the structures of bodies that share them, and the rhythms of 
interaction that transform commonly experienced internal sensations into externally 
visible and transmissible forms’ (9). Musical communication can, in this way, be 
understood as a process of transduction in which each stage is mimetic of the one that 





preceded it. Initially, the musician’s body movements – bowing, strumming, hitting, etc. 
– are transduced into sound, i.e. into the oscillating contraction and expansion of waves 
of air molecules.139 This sound can then be transduced back into bodily movements – 
most notably dancing but also a range of other more or less unconscious and involuntary 
movements such as swaying, toe-tapping, and the rhythmic contraction and relaxation of 
musculature. In the case of recorded music, there are obviously many more intermediate 
steps, such as the transduction of sound waves into an electrical signal and its inscription 
in analogue or digital form but, here too, the process can be understood as a sequence of 
imitative steps.140 
    I would like to round off this interlude by making an argument for a more sustained 
engagement in cultural studies with the concept of mimesis. This can be proposed, in the 
first instance, as a way of complementing semiotic analysis. As can be seen, mimesis 
understood as creative imitation overlaps with the Peircean notion of iconicity, i.e. 
signification involving signs that are taken as resembling the objects they refer to, 
sometimes in quite conventionalised ways. Culture understood mimetically is not just an 
arbitrary play of signifiers but neither is it a set of monolithic signs with an innate 
meaning. Rather it is a series of delicate mimetic adjustments between ourselves as 
humans and between us and the whole of the sensuous world. These ‘adjustments’, in the 
sense of sympathetic gestures, are universal and transhistorical yet the precise forms they 
take are historically specific and local. Mimesis is to be understood, moreover, as an 
imitative process via which gestural and expressive meanings circulate, often in quite 
subtle ways, this being related to Peirce’s notion of the sign as a catalyst for a chain of 
effects.  
    The concept of mimesis also complements affect theory. Indeed, it could be argued 
that mimesis is one of the primary mechanisms by which affective states spread. Shame 
in this regard is a particularly ‘contagious’ affect, in which there is a painfully exact 
process of recognition and imitation between, on the one hand, the person who feels 
ashamed and, on the other, the person who feels the shame of another while 
simultaneously revulsing from it. This kind of exchange is described by Jennifer Biddle 
(1997) as ‘the mimetic interchangeability of ourselves with others as subject and object’, 
a ‘symbiotic bond of mirroring and mutuality’ (228, 229; emphasis in original). ‘Shame’, 





she writes, ‘is a direct mimetic introversion of the other’s negation’ (229).141 A musical 
parallel can be observed in situations in which we respond negatively to music we ‘don’t 
like’ because, at a mimetic level, it impels us to ‘become like’ it, or ‘become like’ its 
performers or ‘like’ those who ‘like’ it. Identification with a pop song or performer is, in 
this sense, essentially mimetic, while the refusal to identify in this way is the attempt to 
extricate oneself from this kind of mimetic entanglement.142 
    The recent discovery by neuroscientists of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ gives the ancient 
concept of mimesis an abruptly contemporary relevance. Mirror neurons are neurons that 
fire both when performing a certain action and when watching someone else perform that 
same action. Thus, the neurons ‘mirror’ the behaviour of the other as if the observer 
herself were acting. They were first detected in the early 1990s by a team of 
neuroscientists at the University of Parma, headed by Giacomo Rizzolatti, who were 
studying macaque monkeys. The scientists noticed that certain neurons in the brains of 
the macaques fired not only when the monkeys grasped food, but when they saw the 
experimenter grasp it. In April 2010, researchers at UCLA reported the first direct 
recordings of mirror neurons in humans. The neurologist V.S. Ramachandran predicts 
that this discovery ‘will do for psychology what DNA did for biology’ (quoted in 
Frampton 2011). In a sense, mimesis is cultural theory’s pre-emptive answer to 
neuroscience’s mirror neuron. As a concept of signal importance, it can be elaborated 
with reference to a literary and philosophical tradition spanning more than two millennia, 
from Plato and Aristotle in antiquity, through Erasmus, Montaigne, and Shakespeare in 
the Renaissance, to the Frankfurt School in the twentieth century, and beyond. In its 
attention to the language of gesture, mimesis puts mind and matter back together again. 
As Merleau-Ponty (1962) asserts: 
 
It is through my body that I understand other people; just as it is through my body that I 
perceive ‘things’. The meaning of a gesture thus ‘understood’ is not behind it, it is 
intermingled with the structure of the world, outlined by the gesture, and which I take up on 
my own account. It is arrayed all over the gesture itself’ (186) 
 
Furthermore, mimesis connects the human and non-human worlds. It allows us to 
consider the ways in which meaning is socially constructed but without positing nature as 
an inert sphere without meaning – the binary opposite of culture. An anecdote from the 





life of Mozart illustrates this very nicely. In a manner that embodies many a romanticist 
trope, Mozart kept a starling as a pet and musical companion. While Mozart was 
composing the Piano Concerto in G Major, K. 453, the starling is said to have mimicked 
the theme of the piece’s variation finale but turning a G-natural to a G-sharp. This 
audacious harmonic detail so impressed the composer that he wrote out the bird’s version 
of the theme in his notebook, naming it ‘The Starling’s Tune’ (Kinderman 2006: lxv). As 
the ecologist and philosopher David Abram (1996) observes, ‘We are human only in 
contact, and conviviality, with what is not human’ (22). It is mimesis which grants us this 
conviviality. 










Recorded Music, Mimicry, & Self-Oblivion 
* 
 The ecstasy of the Dionysian state, with its annihilation of 
the usual limits and borders of existence, contains for its 
duration a lethargic element in which all past personal 
experience is submerged [… T]his chasm of oblivion 
separates the world of everyday reality from that of Dionysian 




Diegetic performance in the pop soundtrack movie 
The film of Bridget Jones’s Diary (2001) opens with a sequence in which the 
thirtysomething singleton is lying on the sofa of her one-bedroom London flat, smoking a 
cigarette and wearing red, penguin-emblazoned pyjamas with grey woollen socks. The 
scene is set for what is clearly a lonely night in: Bridget listlessly watches an episode of 
Frasier, browses through a magazine, and fruitlessly checks her answerphone messages, 
accompanied all the while by the female country artist Jamie O’Neal singing the refrain 
to ‘All by myself’.143 As the song’s chorus gives way to a gentle but highly chromatic 
piano interlude, Bridget gulps down a large glass of red wine and gives a slight, 
convulsive shake of her head. Clearly drunk, she plays air guitar along to the song’s 
instrumental section, picking out the delicate notes of a classical guitar, her right hand 
still holding the empty wine glass, and a rolled-up magazine in her left standing in for the 
instrument’s fretboard. As Jamie O’Neal reprises the song’s first verse, Bridget sings 
along, her melancholic state underpinned by the song’s interesting modulation between 
major and minor keys: ‘When I was young, I never needed anyone, and making love was 
just for fun – those days are gone…’144 She starts sobbing as she reaches the words of the 
title but, rather than break down in tears and so transform this into a moment of pathos, 





her arm gestures become comically expansive and expressive, as if she herself were 
O’Neal, astride the stage of a football stadium, belting out the penultimate chorus in what 
would normally be the song’s sparsely-accompanied ‘confessional’ moment. As the 
power-ballad sweeps to its inevitable strings-laden crescendo, Bridget alternates between 
using the rolled-up magazine as a microphone and as a drumstick – miming along to the 
final chorus and head-banging to the backing track’s huge, reverb-driven snare. 
    Bridget’s demonstrative and histrionic physical response to ‘All by myself’ is typical 
of what Simon Frith (1981) identifies as one of the key pleasures of rock music. Frith 
observes that ‘one of the effects of the music is the vicarious experience of producing it, 
as listeners mime the movements of the guitarist, the drummer, or the singer’ (15). He 
adds, however, that ‘rock pleasure is a cultural as well as a physical matter’, so that the 
impulse to play air guitar, for example, as with most of our responses to music, is learned 
rather than innate (ibid.; emphasis in original). Writing in 1981, Frith notes that, among 
rock fans, acts of consumption are gendered: ‘if male consumers identify with rock 
performers and do so publicly, collectively […], female consumers are addressed, by 
contrast, as individuals, the potential objects of the performer’s private needs’ (228). 
Interestingly, Bridget’s response to the film’s opening power ballad represents something 
of a post-feminist reversal: significantly, we hear Jamie O’Neal’s cover of the song and 
not Eric Carmen’s original 1975 version, and Bridget acts in much the same way as Frith 
would have expected young men or boys to have behaved, though crucially perhaps, she 
– unlike them – is alone and in the privacy of her own living room. Indeed, much of the 
humour of the scene derives from the fact that we are witnessing what we are led to 
assume would normally be a very private act. By being performed for the cinema screen, 
Bridget’s mime is ambiguous in terms of the public/private dichotomy, this of course 
being the key feature of the film’s ‘diary’ trope. 
    Another romantic comedy, The Holiday (2006), also by a female director and writer, 
reproduces almost identical scenes of pop-rock mimesis and catharsis. Cameron Diaz and 
Kate Winslet play upper-middle-class media professionals – very much like Bridget 
Jones – seeking to forget about their failed relationships with male ex-partners by 
swapping homes via an internet chatroom and spending Christmas on opposite sides of 
the Atlantic. Safely ensconced in Winslet’s cottage in the Surrey countryside, Diaz’s 





character unwinds by drinking a glass of red wine of similarly copious proportions to the 
one drunk by Bridget Jones, and proceeds to caterwaul along to The Killers’ ‘Mr 
Brightside’, clearly identifying with the lyric’s account of sexual jealousy and eventual 
optimism, before head-banging, punching the air, and jumping up and down as the song 
reaches its rock-anthemic climax. In a more or less parallel sequence, Winslet is shown 
using a pillow as a guitar as she mimes along to her chosen song while sitting on the bed 
of Diaz’s deserted Beverley Hills mansion. 
    These examples of pop-rock mimicry in contemporary cinema represent moments of 
heightened performance and intensity, interrupting a film’s narrative in the way that the 
show tunes of a classical Hollywood musical used to. Estella Tincknell (2006) observes 
that 
 
the classical film musical’s use of diegetic musical performance to express dramatic 
developments or emotional intensity has been effectively replaced by a ‘postmodern’ model 
of the film score in which a pre-recorded soundtrack is foregrounded, a soundtrack which 
may also be ironised through parody and distanciation. [...T]he relationship between 
popular music and popular cinema remains central even if it is differently mediated (132-3).   
 
Characters in such ‘soundtrack movies’ engage with songs that are already familiar to the 
audience and in everyday settings that evoke the audience’s own active consumption of 
pop music, eliciting comic self-recognition. Such musical mimicry often interrupts a 
film’s narrative and marks a rupture, too, in the everyday – its temporary transcendence 
or oblivion, a physical and affective release from the constraints and dissatisfactions of 
one’s personal situation and identity.      
 
Pop-rock mimicry 
Although impromptu hairbrush or tennis-racquet performances no doubt still abound, 
vicarious acts of musical pleasure have become more formalised and commercialised in 
recent decades, as the industry which spawned such actions has found new ways of re-
appropriating them. Since its introduction in Japan in the early 1970s, karaoke has 
become a global phenomenon. Tōru Mitsui (1998) questions the usual, supposedly literal, 
translation of ‘karaoke’ as ‘empty orchestra’, suggesting instead that something like ‘an  
orchestra void of vocals’ might be less misleading, as the word karaoke refers to the fact 





that the first tapes used for that purpose were specially recorded so as not to contain 
vocals, the singing to be supplied later via a live performance (37-8; adapted). In fact, as 
Mitsui points out, the word ‘karaoke’ predates karaoke as we know it now, referring to 
tapes recorded minus a lead vocal track that would allow a record company to send an 
artist out on a promotional tour without the added expense of a live backing band (38). In 
the international scope of its influence, coupled with its adaptation to local differences, 
karaoke is a signal example of the interpenetration of the global and the local or, more 
precisely, their mutually constituting effects – a process known somewhat awkwardly, 
and with reference to what was originally a marketing term, as ‘glocalization’ (Robertson 
1995). Akiko Ōtake and Shūhei Hosokawa (2005) observe this process in the genesis of 
the karaoke machine: 
 
None of the basic parts of the karaoke apparatus – microphone, magnetic tape, video, laser 
disc, PA system – is a Japanese invention: what Japan created is a new combination and 
style of use in a certain spatial setting. In this, it resembles the Walkman whose uniqueness 
is clearer in its outdoor use of headphones than in its mechanism itself. Street use of 
headphones was possible before the ground-breaking release of Sony’s Walkman in 1979. 
But nobody thought to do so because street walking and listening were conceived as two 
different acts […]. Both karaoke and Walkmans doubtless use Western technology, 
however, far from the realm of Western desire and imagination. These inventions and the 
image evoked by their use in public space are certainly modern but not necessarily Western 
(56).  
 
When one looks, therefore, at the Japanese invention of karaoke and its subsequent global 
uptake, it is a case neither of homogenisation nor heterogenisation but rather their 
existence as two tendencies that have become a feature of life across much of the world 
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (Robertson 1995: 27). Kōichi 
Iwabuchi (1995) suggests that karaoke and Japanese culture more generally has a broad 
appeal across East Asia because it ‘indigenises’ the West, actively constructing an 
assimilated Asian image of Western culture, i.e. ‘a Japanized version of the “American 
way of life” ’. This, in turn, is domesticated by Asian people in other countries, 
becoming, for example, ‘a Malaysian version of a Japanized American way of life’ (103; 
adapted). This constitution of local cultural differences via the global spread of karaoke is 
particularly evident in the specificity of karaoke’s modes of consumption. The 
differences between karaoke in different countries ‘reflect the pre-existing culture of 





people’s singing and socializing, and the organization of the entertainment industry 
(music, television, restaurants, sex, and so on)’ (Ōtake and Hosokawa 2005: 51). 
    As well as traversing the divide between the global and the local, karaoke traverses the 
divide between the personal and the public. Karaoke performances mould public conduct 
via participants’ adoption of different personae. To quote the ethnomusicologist Charles 
Keil (1984) in one of the earliest English-language descriptions of karaoke, ‘[t]he goal of 
each singer seems to be a perfect replication of a specific star in a specific style’ (94). 
Karaoke understood in this way is an example of mimesis – never quite in actuality a 
‘perfect replication’ but more a ‘creative imitation’ of the voice and mannerisms of a 
famous performer. Karaoke’s role as a resource for gendered acts of display should be 
emphasised in this regard. In an ethnographic study of karaoke in England, Tia DeNora 
(2000) notes that men and women’s choices of karaoke material diverge quite sharply, 
with women more likely to select romantic ballads or other songs dealing explicitly with 
relationships, while men tend to opt for a wider range of material – hard rock, rap, Elvis, 
Sinatra – but in ways that consciously construct quite specific and limited notions of 
masculinity (119). 
    Karaoke formalises and makes public something that almost all of us do from time to 
time, that is to say sing along to a song we know. Another way of taking vicarious 
pleasure in musical performance is to mimic playing a rock or heavy-metal guitar solo, 
and here too an industry has emerged in order to facilitate this fantasy. In the first decade 
of the twenty-first century, air-guitar competitions became an annual fixture in most 
cities, with Oulu in Finland establishing itself as the global capital of this unlikely 
subculture: the Air Guitar World Championships have been held there every year since 
the event’s inception in 1996 (Watson 2007). A team of Finnish scientists even went so 
far as to invent electronic ‘data gloves’ that link the movements of your fingers to a 
computer in order to produce a user-generated imitation of a guitar solo (Knight 2005). It 
is, perhaps, apt in this context to quote Robert Walser (1993) from his book on heavy 
metal: ‘The music is felt within as much as without, and the body is seemingly hailed 
directly, subjectivity responding to the empowerment of the body rather than the other 
way round’ (45). The experiments of a few Finnish eccentrics did not go unnoticed by the 
wider gaming industry, and in 2005 the Guitar Hero series of computer games was 





launched, allowing gamers to use a guitar-shaped game controller to simulate playing 
lead, bass, and rhythm guitar. Although the series has helped spur greater physical 
interactivity in gaming culture and has opened gaming up to a wider demographic, it 
seems possible that, with hindsight, the air-guitar/Guitar Hero craze will be seen as a 
passing fad – a turn-of-the-millenium equivalent of the 1950s hula hoop.145 It is 
significant in this regard that the craze coincided with the rehabilitation of heavy metal as 
a genre in popular music, albeit on decidedly ‘postmodern’ terms. The ‘cock rock’ once 
derided by Frith and McRobbie (1978/1990) took a more ironic and parodic turn at the 
beginning of the new millennium, with rock fans both male and female demonstrating a 
greater knowingness and detachment even as they engaged in performative displays of 
masculinity. 
 
Mimicry in classical music       
It would be a mistake to assume that acts of mimicry such as the ones I’ve described are a 
wholly recent phenomenon or that they are confined to rock or pop music. In what is, 
admittedly, an improbable connection, Jean Sibelius seems to have anticipated the 
activities of his Finnish compatriots at the Air Guitar World Championships by playing a 
curious sort of air fiddle when listening to recordings of violinists. As a youngster, 
Sibelius had dreamed of being a violin virtuoso along the lines of Paganini, and, much 
later in life, his son-in-law noticed that as the elderly Sibelius sat and listened to violin 
music, he often mimed the fingering and bowing that he heard on the record (Macleod 
2009a). 
    While not being an altogether recent phenomenon, such musical mime-play is clearly 
dependent upon the advent of sound recording and the opportunity it presents for listeners 
to physically complete the performances they hear. In 1926, the Minneapolis Phonograph 
Society reported that some of its members had taken to ‘shadow conducting’, described – 
in careful terms so as to avoid even the slightest taint of femininity – as ‘that most 
exhilarating of indoor sports’ (quoted in Katz 2004: 59). The musicologist, Richard 
Crawford, offers a personal recollection: 
 
Fairly early in my life, I became aware that my father would go into a room of our house 
that was glassed in, with opaque glass, and I would hear music coming out of that room. If I 





stood outside, I could see shadows moving inside the room. Now, my father… was not a 
musician in any sense at all. [He was a foundry supervisor by day.] But I eventually put 
together what he was doing in that room when I saw him walk into the house one day with 
a baton. He was going into that room, turning on the record player and conducting. I 
imagine it must have been a very important experience for him (ibid.).  
 
As Mark Katz (2004) notes in his history of recording, the phonograph gave non-musical 
men such as Crawford’s father ‘the possibility of self-expression through music, 
permitting them to do in private what they could not or would not otherwise do’ (59). 
This is to say it offered the average American man a way to enjoy music physically and 
sensually without incurring the risk of being unmanly.146 It should be remembered that in 
the bourgeois drawing-rooms of the preceding century, music had centred around the 
piano and had been largely the preserve of the females of the house.  
 
The blurring of musical production & consumption  
Acts of musical mimesis and the vicarious, often cathartic, pleasures they offer are, of 
course, not confined to music fans or overweening amateurs, but are central to the 
production of musical culture. The somewhat vulgar and nationalistic spectacle of the 
Last Night of the Proms, held in London’s Royal Albert Hall, has seen fledgling 
conductors practising their art by addressing the orchestra but standing behind the real 
conductor, the seriousness of their youthful intent suggesting that they have become 
absorbed in the fantasy of omnipotence and authoritarian rule that the figure of the 
conductor embodies. Such occasions give these would-be conductors an opportunity to 
experience something of the nervous ordeal that established conductors go through when 
faced with an orchestra full of world-class musicians in a major metropolitan venue.   
    As far as popular music is concerned, its entire history in the recorded era could be 
characterised as one of more or less deliberate plagiarism, pastiche, and imitation. Frith 
(1993) notes that ‘[r]ock history has always been about musicians finding their own 
voices in the process of trying unsuccessfully to sound like someone else’ (6; emphasis in 
original). One thinks, for example, of a teenage Mick Jagger and Keith Richards, 
rehearsing in Jagger’s bedroom in the home counties, and making his family laugh with 
their earnest attempts to imitate Chicago bluesmen. Frith (1996) underlines the intimate 
connection between musical consumption and production by drawing attention to the 





innervated muscularity of many of our modes of listening: ‘we listen by performing, by 
reproducing (even if only silently, tentatively) those muscular movements for ourselves, 
“sympathizing” with a singer by pushing the words up against the top of our mouths 
when she does’ (192). For Frith, there is a literal ‘physical sympathy’ with the singer, due 
in large part to the fact that, as organisms with the same glottises and tracheas, we can 
identify with singers to a greater extent than we can with other musicians, whose 
dexterity greatly exceeds our own: ‘we can sing along, reconstruct in fantasy our own 
sung versions of songs, in ways we can’t even fantasize instrumental technique – 
however hard we may try with our air guitars – because with singing, we feel like we 
know what to do’ (ibid.; emphasis in original). Even as non-musicians, most of us have an 
extraordinarily precise level of control over the muscles in our voice boxes, the position 
of our tongue against the palate, and the flow of air from our windpipes, enabling us to 
produce passable imitations of a range of singers whose records we’re familiar with. And 
for professional musicians, who have developed a high degree of muscle memory in 
relation to their chosen instrument, listening to recordings of an artist who shares the 
same specialism can trigger peculiar sets of involuntary motor responses, as in the case of 
the sax-player whose lips twitch and quiver when he or she listens intently to another 
saxophonist playing a solo. 
    The extended transatlantic dialogue that constitutes the history of rock ’n’ roll marks 
perhaps the most significant example of creative imitation in the history of twentieth-
century music. The crucial act of mimesis was that carried out by white artists in order to 
appropriate the movements and sounds of black artists. The ambiguous tribute paid by 
white musicians to their black counterparts – ambiguous because black artists were often 
never properly remunerated for their work, and what was often being celebrated was their 
imagined otherness – has, of course, a much longer history than that of rock ’n’ roll, 
stretching back at least as far as the minstrel shows of the nineteenth century and the 
other ‘blackface’ performances that preceded them. Frith (1996) observes that ‘[t]he 
racism endemic to rock ’n’ roll was not that white musicians stole from black culture but 
that they burlesqued it’ (131). In similar terms, Bernard Gendron (1985) has argued that it 
seems ‘reasonable to place [Jerry Lee] Lewis’s “Whole Lotta Shakin” in the tradition of 
black-faced minstrelsy’: 






If ‘Whole Lotta Shakin’ was to succeed in advertising itself as white-boy-wildly-sings-
black, it had to do so quickly and simply. The result had to be a coarsely outlined cartoon 
of what it means to sing black. That is, the result had to be a caricature (7, 9). 
 
In tandem with this, ‘gospel and r&b and doo-wop’ were themselves ‘blacked-up’ (Frith, 
1996, p 131, italics in original): 
 
The black pioneers of rock and roll were also driven to produce caricatures of singing-
black. Chuck Berry, Little Richard, and Ray Charles […] quite radically changed their 
styles as their audience shifted from predominantly black to largely white. Though all three 
began their careers by singing the blues in a rather sedate manner (at least by rock and roll 
standards), they later accelerated their singing speed, resorted to raspy-voiced shrieks and 
cries, and dressed up their stage acts with manic piano-pounding or guitar acrobatics 
(Gendron 1985: 10; emphasis in original). 
 
The tensions inherent in what Frith (1981) calls ‘the relationship between black 
performance and white pleasure’ are thus a tangle of projected otherness and 
identification with that otherness (22-23). As we shall see later, there are parallels here 
with the history of possession rituals, in which, a participant typically allows him- or 
herself to be possessed by a deity who is viewed as foreign or exotic. 
 
Identification, expressivity, & song lyrics 
In chapter one, we saw how the introduction of recording has marked effects upon the act 
of musical communication, privileging some aspects of the musical code over others. In 
order to compensate for the fact that the performer is no longer physically present, his or 
her emotivity or expressivity becomes more pronounced. At the same time, there is a 
more overt attempt to maintain contact with the listener by addressing him or her directly, 
and by eliciting physical, emotional, or psychological responses. This means, firstly, that 
it becomes easier for the listener to identify with the personality of the recording artist, 
which manifests on the phonograph recording through very precise and discrete musical 
qualities. These can be melodic or rhythmic but are, above all, timbral. Secondly, it 
becomes easier for the listener to be ‘interpellated’ in the song-text, i.e. for him or her to 
imagine themselves as either the addresser in the musical act of communication or as its 
addressee. This is particularly the case with songs that contain the words ‘I’ and ‘you’ in 
their lyrics. At the beginning of this chapter, we saw how Cameron Diaz’s character in 





The Holiday identifies very closely with the lyrics of ‘Mr Brightside’, having recently 
discovered that her boyfriend has been cheating on her. The song’s account of sexual 
jealousy chimes with her own experience, so that as she drunkenly sings along with 
Brandon Flowers, she assumes his role as the ‘I’ or addresser of the song: ‘Jealousy, 
turning saints into the sea / Swimming through sick lullabies / Choking on your alibis…’ 
    The lyrics of pop songs, almost without exception, encourage these kinds of fantasies 
through their modes of address. The subject of what is being enunciated, i.e. of the words 
themselves – as opposed to the enunciating subject, i.e. the singer – is overwhelmingly an 
unspecified ‘I’ that the listener can imagine him- or herself being. Similarly, the ‘you’ 
that is addressed is an empty cipher which the listener can easily fill. In a survey of lyrics 
from the top fifty songs in English from the 12 September 1987 edition of Music & 
Media’s Hot 100 chart, Tim Murphey (1989) found that forty-seven out of the fifty 
contained an unspecified ‘I’-referent, and thirty-two an unspecified ‘you’-referent. Thus, 
from a sample, the date of which was chosen ahead of time in order to be as 
representative as possible, it was confirmed that pop songs almost exclusively have an 
open mode of address that facilitates auditor identification and role play. Murphey is 
understandably cautious about the extent to which listeners may or may not place 
themselves in the role of either the ‘you’ that is being addressed or the ‘I’ that is doing 
the addressing, but he suggests that such role play might occur via the song’s ability to 
circumvent rational responses: ‘Although our logic tells us that it is not possible that we 
are being addressed directly, subconsciously (and perhaps illogically) we may receive the 
messages as directed toward us’ (186). Thus, ‘to the extent that the auditor is permeable 
to the song’s influence, the ‘you’ and ‘I’ take on personal meaning for present, 
remembered, idealised or desired affective relationships, consciously or unconsciously’ 
(190). Murphey takes the example of a song belonging to the era in which he was 
writing: ‘every American youth knows Bruce Springsteen sings “Born in the USA”, [but] 
when they hear it and sing along they also are exclaiming that they were “Born in the 
USA”’ (187).     
    In Jakobsonian terms, the ‘I’ of song lyrics is ‘emotive’, acting as a vehicle for self-
expression, whereas the ‘you’ has a ‘conative’ or vocative function, addressing the 
auditor directly. As Richard Middleton (1990) has demonstrated, these communicative 





functions work in conjunction with the non-lyrical features of the song. For example, a 
pronounced vibrato or melisma on the word ‘I’ will be heard – according to the coding 
implicit in Western genres – as more emotive than a single, unwavering tone, and a ‘you’ 
on the downbeat is liable to have more conative force than one on an unstressed beat. 
Whitney Houston’s version of ‘I will always love you’ gives ample evidence of the use 
and abuse of these two musico-lyrical modes of communication, to the point where the 
song title almost becomes a threat. These musicological, as opposed to purely literary, 
features of the text help to explain a song’s subconscious force in eliciting identification 
and role play. We commonly respond to popular songs at an affective level that we would 
struggle to notice, let alone explain in words, yet, precisely because of this fact, ‘silly 
love songs’ and their ilk engage us all the more. In simple terms, we are most conducive 
to adopting other subjectivities – and the ideologies implicit in them – when we relax and 
desist from the arduous process of constructing and maintaining our own. 
    Dave Laing (1970) associates the personal mode of address, typical of ballads such as 
‘I will always love you’, with the attenuated emotional life of late bourgeois society and 
its regressive flight into sentimental fantasy (57-60). Within this possessive individualist 
milieu, collective modes of address are usually disdained in favour of the first- and 
second-person singular. Murphey’s sample of chart hits from a single week in 1987 
certainly evidences the continuation of this trend. Laing cites rock ’n’ roll and other 
‘subcultural’ styles as notable exceptions, with their plural terms of address such as 
‘come on everybody’ and ‘we all shine on’, etc. (ibid.; Laing 1985: 68-73). Similarly, 
Frith (1988) comments on The Beatles’ characteristic use of the third person throughout 
their careers: ‘I saw her standing there’, ‘She loves you’, etc. (100). Unlike many of their 
peers, The Beatles frequently declined to objectify their fans as the addressees of the 
group’s songs, opting instead for a more narratological approach that included rather than 
cajoled their listeners. 
    What these different modes of address have in common is the function of 
‘interpellation’, whereby listeners are designated varying subject positions within the 
musical text (Middleton 1990: 242). Obviously, this occurs more readily within the 
personal mode of ‘you’ and ‘I’ as the open-endedness of such emphatically employed 
referents invites completion by the auditor. As Murphey (1989) writes, ‘the listener 





would seem to be able to complete the message, or make sense of the song, through using 
the persons, times and places from their own physical and metaphysical situation’ (185). 
In spite of this apparent hermeneutic freedom, pop lyrics exert considerable ideological 
influence due to the fact that their message is completed within certain parameters: the 
listener (mis)recognises him- or herself within the terms set by the song. Moreover, the 
subject position that he or she discovers for him- or herself in the musical text has a 
pleasing unity, which ordinary subjectivity, by its intermittent and fragmentary nature, 
cannot supply. So, in a sense, identification at this level is about the adoption of a ready-
made personality: one whose specious authenticity and affective charge is able to 
temporarily supersede our more humdrum notions of selfhood.  
 
Pop-rock mimicry & possession rituals 
We have already seen how playing air guitar or singing along to a favourite song can be 
an emotionally-charged experience in which a person often transcends or ‘forgets’ his or 
her own identity and temporarily takes on that of another. It is my contention that such 
examples of mime-play can be understood as secular possession rituals. For Gilbert 
Rouget (1985) in his book Music and Trance, ‘[p]ossession is essentially identification 
with another’ (225). Among the many contemporary and historical examples of 
possession that he looks at, he examines the available literature on the Dionysus cults of 
Ancient Greece. In such accounts of music’s role in possession and other trance states, 
Rouget identifies a common misconception extending back to the work of Aristotle: the 
belief that music in itself is the direct cause of trance. For Aristotle, the Phyrgian scale – 
probably heptatonic – was ‘the mode of madness’ whereas the Dorian – probably 
pentatonic and without semitones – was the mode of ‘serenity’ (223). While not denying 
that music, particularly amplified music, can have immediate psycho-physiological 
effects, Rouget draws attention to music’s role as ‘a coded signal’ and its status as a 
semiological system (205). In spite of the fact that ‘the music of enthusiasm or Dionysiac 
mania was strongly felt to be Phyrgian’, he argues that it was not any innate quality of 
Phyrgian harmony that contributed to ecstatic states but rather its association with Asia 
Minor, from whence it was also believed the Dionysiac cult itself originated (91; 
emphasis in original). (The Dorian mode, by contrast, was considered stoutly Hellenic.) 





Similarly, it didn’t much matter what kinds of instruments were used in the ceremonies: 
the aulos or double clarinet was most commonly employed, but the pan pipes or syrinx, 
and the lyre were also played (76-7). What was required was something that sounded 
suitably exotic, for the God that the maenads, or revellers, sought to invoke was, in 
simple terms, a foreigner. In this regard, Rouget asks: 
 
[W]hat in fact is possession other than an invasion of the field of consciousness by the 
other, that is, by someone who has come from elsewhere? Insofar as he is the other, 
Dionysus is at the same time an elsewhere; whether he is or not really is of little importance 
(93; emphasis added). 
 
Interestingly, Rouget suggests that ‘Beatlemania’ and other forms of contemporary idol-
worship might represent a continuation of ‘the poetic tradition of mania’, in which states 
of enthusiasm and hysteria are the norm (241).147 One should stress in this regard Barbara 
Ehrenreich’s point that Beatlemania was not about teenage girls’ blind adulation or 
sexual objectification of John, Paul, George and Ringo so much as their identification 
with them as oppositional figures (Ehrenreich 2007: 213). The first Beatles film, A Hard 
Day’s Night (1964), presented the four musicians as young, Northern, working-class men 
at odds with a largely middle-class and London-based media. They were cheerful and 
exuberant but also witty and sardonic, and it was arguably the combination of these 
qualities that teenage girls identified with. The sequence towards the end of the film in 
which the fab four evade the police after Ringo’s wrongful arrest parallels their fans’ 
attempts to do the same –  preserved for posterity in the glorious images of teenage girls 
wrestling with uniformed police officers on the streets of England.      
    One of the most important and influential accounts of the Dionysian cults is, of course, 
Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy or, to give it its full title, The Birth of Tragedy from the 
Spirit of Music. By putting music at the centre of his account of the rise and fall of Greek 
tragedy, Nietzsche (1872/2000) was following the classical Aristotelian theory that 
‘tragedy emerged from the tragic chorus’, this chorus being, in essence, a continuation of 
the Dionysian possession rituals (42; emphasis altered). In privileging the dithyrambic 
chorus, Nietzsche was writing within an established dramaturgical tradition though he 
objects to the view held by the German Romantic critic A.W. Schlegel ‘that the chorus 
represents the ideal spectator’ (ibid.).  For Nietzsche, as it was for Schiller before him, 





the chorus was not an intermediary between the actors and the audience, or between art 
and empirical reality, but a bulwark intended ‘to shut out the real world’ (44). The 
members of the chorus were not therefore representatives of the Athenian citizenry or 
demos, but witnesses to the quasi-supernatural manifestation of the ‘Titans and heroes’ 
who prowled the stage (32). This is to say, the masked actors did not merely play the role 
of these superhuman beings, they invoked them and were possessed by them. Nietzsche 
thus restores to tragic drama its status as ritual, arguing that, far from being ‘political’ or 
‘social’ as Schlegel had suggested, the origins of the chorus were in fact ‘purely 
religious’ (42). 
    Significantly, the Greek tragic chorus is a ‘Dionysian chorus’ as opposed to an 
‘Apollonian’ one (50). This important distinction merits further attention. As Douglas 
Smith (2000) explains, ‘The Apollonian takes its name from Apollo, the god of light, 
dream, and prophecy, while the Dionysian takes its name from Dionysus, the god of 
intoxication’ (xvi). Apollo is associated with rational knowledge, society, individuation, 
and order, Dionysus with mysticism, nature, merging, and self-abandonment. In artistic 
terms, Apollo is the representative of the ‘art of the sculptor’ whereas Dionysus presides 
over the ‘imageless […] art of music’ (Nietzsche 1872/2000: 19). This difference 
between representational Apollonian art and non-representational Dionysian music can 
also be couched in terms of a distinction between ‘appearance’ and ‘essence’, between 
that which presents itself to the senses but has no more reality than a dream, and that 
which is intangible yet forms the very core of existence (20, 37; original emphasis 
removed).148 
    Nietzsche is careful to stress that the Dionysian and the Apollonian exist together ‘in a 
relationship of reciprocal stimulation and intensification’ (33). He urges that ‘we must 
understand Greek tragedy as the Dionysian chorus which again and again discharges 
itself in an Apollonian world of images’ (50). This is to say that ‘the shattering of the 
individual’ which lies at the heart of the ‘Dionysian state’ is objectified via theatre’s 
Apollonian ability to give Dionysian chaos and flux a form and order (51). The ‘chorus 
parts which are interwoven through tragedy’ are, for Nietzsche, ‘the maternal womb of 
the whole so-called dialogue’, yet, to continue his metaphor, the Apollonian images and 





dialogue are its offspring (50). ‘Thus drama is the concrete Apollonian representation of 
Dionysian insights and effects’ (51). 
    The transcendence – ‘annihilation’ even – of the chorus members’ identification with 
their own thoughts, and along with it, the transcendence of their everyday identities, is 
crucial to an understanding of why Nietzsche values the early Attic tragedies so much 
more highly than the later Euripidean ones (23). He argues that in ‘the dithyramb’, the 
ecstatic hymn dedicated to Dionysus, the chorus ‘stands before us’ as ‘a community of 
unconscious actors […] who even among themselves regard themselves as transformed’ 
(50). ‘Under the influence of’ dramatic art’s ‘spell’, ‘the Dionysian enthusiast sees 
himself as a satyr, and as satyr he in turn beholds the god’ (ibid.; original emphasis 
removed). It should be pointed out that for Nietzsche, the Titanic demigods such as 
Prometheus, who challenged their usurpation by the Olympian gods, are essentially 
Dionysian figures. As such, it is the same god that is being invoked and worshipped 
throughout the Attic tragedies. Dionysus, as one who was persecuted by those who 
refused to accept his divinity, is a fitting embodiment of the pain and suffering which 
Nietzsche claims is at the heart of existence. This pain, he claims, is the pain of 
individuation: ‘we should regard the state of individuation as the source and original 
cause of suffering, as something objectionable in itself’ (59). The chorus, which played 
such a distinctive role in early tragic drama, is therefore to be understood as being at the 
forefront of the Dionysian struggle to overcome individuation. The wild ecstatic song of 
the chorus is able to transcend the pain of separation, albeit temporarily. The 
‘overpowering feeling of unity’ that results constitutes part of tragic drama’s 
‘metaphysical consolation’: ‘that life at the bottom of things, in spite of the passing of 
phenomena, remains indestructibly powerful and pleasurable’ (45). This immersive sense 
of unity with both fellow humans and with nature is achieved via the temporary 
suspension of individuation and, along with it, the social and moral claims upon oneself 
that individuation implies. Nietzsche writes that ‘[t]he ecstasy of the Dionysian state, 
with its annihilation of the usual limits and borders of existence, contains for its duration 
a lethargic element in which all past personal experience is submerged’ (46; emphasis in 
original). ‘[L]ethargic’ here is to be understood in the sense of ‘forgetful’, ‘amnesic’, or 
‘Lethean’. Similarly, Nietzsche describes ‘the dithyrambic chorus’ as ‘a chorus of people 





who have been transformed, who have completely forgotten their past as citizens, their 
social position’ (50; emphasis added). The ‘displacement of the chorus’ in Sophocles’s 
work, and its eventual ‘annihilation’ via Euripides, Agathon, and the New Comedy 
represented for Nietzsche an eclipse of the Dionysian impulse (79). This, according to 
Nietzsche, was to have important consequences for music. As the old Dionysian chorus 
gave way to ‘the New Dithyramb’, the ‘myth-creating power of music’ was lost (94). 
Music degenerated from representing the primordial unity at the heart of existence to the 
mere ‘imitation’ of ‘superficialities’ or what in Nietzsche’s own time was known as 
‘tone-painting’ (ibid.). 
    In positing possession trances as a form of ‘forgetting’ or ‘self-oblivion’, Nietzsche 
introduces themes that will be taken up in his later work. In Beyond Good and Evil, for 
example, he famously subverts the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5:3-11) by declaring, 
‘Blessed are the forgetful, for they get the better even of their blunders’ (Nietzsche 
1886/2008: 89; adapted). And in his essay ‘On the uses and abuses of history’, he claims:  
 
it is always the same thing that makes happiness happiness: the ability to forget […]. He 
who cannot sink down on the threshold of the moment and forget all the past, who cannot 
stand balanced like a goddess of victory without growing dizzy and afraid, will never know 
what happiness is – worse, he will never do anything to make others happy […]. Forgetting 
is essential to action of any kind (Nietzsche 1876/1997: 62). 
 
Echoing these sentiments, Jane Bennett (2001) argues that ‘in small, controlled doses, a 
certain forgetfulness is ethically indispensable. Occasions during which one’s critical 
faculties are suspended and one is caught up in the moment can produce a kind of 
enjoyment – a sense of adequacy or fullness – that temporarily eclipses the anxiety 
endemic to critical awareness of the world’s often tragic complexity’ (10). This kind of 
Nietzschean forgetting or self-oblivion can be understood in semiotic terms as belonging 
to what C.S. Peirce (1998) designates as the most rudimentary level of signification, 
‘Firstness’. This level consits of signs that are barely recognised as such, producing more 
or less direct, unreflected-upon feelings via qualities inherent in the sign rather than via 
what it refers to (268-9).149 Turino (1999) makes explicit the links between Peircean 
Firstness and self-oblivion: 
  





A state of Firstness is when there is no consciousness of self, other, or world – when ‘trains 
of thought’, or ‘chains of semiosis’ have not begun or are kept from beginning. Such states 
are achievable, for example, through certain meditation practices as well as other activities 
including dance and musical performance. This state can not be apprehended until after the 
fact, in memory; recognize it and you are already outside of it, and it is gone […]. States of 
Firstness […] are often deeply satisfying and relaxing because the self and mundane 
matters of the world are temporarily transcended (252; emphasis added).  
 
    To reiterate my earlier point, examples of pop-rock mimicry and identification – such 
as singing along, playing air guitar, head-banging, ‘wild’ dancing, etc. – can be 
understood as contemporary versions of the possession ritual. In our more secular world, 
these actions do not occur as part of religious rituals per se but rather ‘rituals of relaxation 
and abandonment’, this being the characteristic mode in which much popular culture is 
consumed (McRobbie 2006: 68). These types of mime-play, understood as possession 
trance, can be located within a long tradition of using music for healing purposes.150 
According to Rouget (1985), the role of music and dance is ‘to reconcile the torn person 
with himself’: ‘healing is achieved by the reinsertion of the individual in society as a 
result of the movement of music and dance, which provokes identification with the 
[possessee’s] god’ (206, 212). Music’s role in pop-rock possession trances is, as Rouget’s 
work would suggest, not that of direct cause but rather that of a ‘coded’ sign, signalling 
that what would normally be considered bizarre or even psychotic behaviour – flailing 
one’s arms about, jumping up and down, head-banging, making incoherent noises, etc. – 
is, in the current circumstances, socially acceptable. Music, in other words, provides an 
appropriate environment for people to ‘let go’.  
 
Mimicry, subjectivity, & the habitus 
The ‘healing’ effected by overtly physical forms of musical mimicry can be better 
understood in relation to the concept of ‘habitus’: a sociological term salvaged from 
scholastic philosophy by Marcel Mauss and later extended by Pierre Bourdieu in order to 
provide a theory of social reproduction. Habitus refers to a deeply ingrained set of 
tendencies and dispositions, structuring the movements, choices, and lifestyle of an 
individual in accordance with his or her social position. For Mauss (1926/2007), habitus 
is ‘the sum of bodily habits’ (25). Similarly, in the work of Bourdieu it is ‘a system of 
dispositions’ which is ‘inscribed’ in the bodies of social agents ‘by past experiences’ 





(1996: 265; 2000: 138). ‘Habitus’, he writes, ‘is the basis of an implicit collusion among 
all the agents who are products of similar conditions and conditionings’ and is therefore 
part of what ‘keeps people in their place’, in spite of the fact that they may have 
accumulated a certain amount of economic capital, which, on the face of it, should allow 
them a degree of autonomy and social mobility (Bourdieu 2000: 145; adapted). Habitus is 
thus closely related in Bourdieu’s work to his notion of cultural capital: socially-valued 
knowledge or expertise, which also extends to one’s comportment or the way one 
‘carries’ oneself. I wish to argue that the kinds of wild ecstatic mimicry that listeners to 
recorded music often indulge in provide a way of departing from deeply-ingrained 
physical habits and tendencies, to change – albeit temporarily – their physical 
comportment, the way they ‘hold’ themselves. As secular possession rituals, such actions 
are a means of unselfconsciously modelling our movements and overall disposition on 
those of another in order to temporarily transcend the invisible constraints and 
accumulated tensions that we store in our bodies. In mimetically taking on a different 
personality – often that of a charismatic performer whom we wish to emulate – we 
‘forget’ to be ourselves for a moment or two and, in the process, we subtly alter our 
habitus, changing our relation to the social meanings inscribed in physical comportment. 
   The connection between self-oblivion and unrestrained physical responses to music can 
be understood more clearly by considering the opposite scenario: the inhibition of 
physical responses and the attendant increase in one’s own subjectivity. To a large 
degree, the inhibition of immediate physical responses is what produces an ‘aesthetic’ 
mode of reception, not just to music but to other art forms too. Bergson (1908/1988) 
argues that ‘perception as a whole has as its true and final explanation in the tendency of 
the body to movement’, so that when we suppress such tendencies it gives rise to a sense 
of inwardness or what he calls ‘the indetermination of the will’ (45, 41). In this way, 
‘consciousness’, for Bergson, ‘means virtual action’ – it is what arises when we inhibit 
our tendency to real action (50). In a similar vein, Eric Clarke (2005) writes:  
  
In the circumstances of entertainment and aesthetic engagement, […] overt manifestations 
of the perception-action cycle are often blocked or transformed […]. Watching films and 
television, looking at paintings or sculpture in a gallery, and listening to music in a concert 
hall deliberately place perceivers in a relationship with the objects of perception that 
prevents them from acting upon or exploring those objects in an unhindered fashion. Many 





of the reactions that people have to these special circumstances (reaching out to touch a 
sculpture; approaching or standing back from a painting; laughing, crying, or flinching at a 
film; foot- and finger-tapping in response to music) are a residue of the more usual 
relationship between perception and action, as are the specific conventions that regulate 
these reactions (ritualized audience participation at pantomimes, socially enforced silence 
and immobility at concerts, applause at regulated moments) (20).  
 
As Clarke recognises, ‘The interruption or suspension of the perception-action cycle that 
characterizes some forms of aesthetic engagement is, of course, culturally specific’, and 
‘is at its most extreme in some of the “high” art forms of the West’ (ibid.). It is 
illuminating in this regard to consider the change in concert audiences towards the end of 
the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. In the opera houses of Paris, 
for example, spectators reported something new in audience behaviour in the 1770s – 
genuine attentiveness – though it would take several decades before enthusiastic whoops 
of approval mid-performance or idle chat to one’s neighbour would be replaced by 
silence and physical immobility (Johnson 1995: 59). In policing their own behaviour, the 
newly-emergent bourgeoisie sought to assert their moral superiority over the aristocracy, 
whom they often perceived as decadent and effete, while reassuring themselves regarding 
their social standing vis-à-vis others of their own class. James Johnson (1995) describes 
the situation thus: 
  
Audiences reasoned on some level that if politeness was necessary to succeed, its absence 
signaled inferiority. Policing manners thus became an act of self-reassurance. It confirmed 
one’s social identity by noticing those who didn’t measure up (232). 
 
Self-policing – in theatres and opera houses and, later, the purpose-built concert halls of 
the nineteenth century – was not simply repressive, therefore, but the expression of a 
will-to-power, an assertion of moral and social superiority and the channelling inward of 
mental and physical energy resulting in a heightened sense of one’s own individual 
experience. The inhibition of immediate physical responses to Western art music is thus 
an important factor in the emergence of the bourgeois humanist subject: ‘In labeling a 
range of responses unacceptable, and defining when the acceptable ones could be 
expressed, politeness directed musical responses inward, carving out for social reasons a 
private sphere of feeling that in earlier generations had been public’ (235-6). This 
explains, to a large extent, the intensely subjective turn that composition took in the 





nineteenth century, reaching its apogee in the unresolved, suspended harmonies of late 
romanticism. 
    Set against this, twentieth-century popular music was disseminated largely via 
recording, and thus in the physical absence of the performers or producers who made it 
and in a variety of physical spaces, and it was partly for these reasons that it was able to 
produce such a heightened sense of physicality in those who listened to it. Whether it be 
jazz, rock ’n’ roll, disco, house, or techno, this music is distinguished by overtly physical 
responses as well as a corresponding self-oblivion, a sense of ‘losing oneself’ in the 
music via the intensity of one’s bodily engagement with it. While not being quite 
‘Dionysian’ in any literal sense nor a simple ‘liberation’ of the body and its powers, it 
nevertheless represents a re-claiming by young people of their bodies, and a deployment 
of them for explicitly hedonistic purposes in which it is not immediately clear to outsiders 
what is being produced nor what is being consumed. In such experiences, what matters 
most is the feeling of ‘being played by the music’ (Waters 2008). 












 What form do you suppose a life would take 
 that was determined at a decisive moment  
 precisely by the street song last on everyone’s 
 lips? 
        Walter Benjamin (1929/1999a: 210). 
 
 
The history of a dream 
‘Reverie’ means not only ‘a dream-like state’ but also an instrumental passage of music 
suggesting such a state. Musicians as diverse as Claude Debussy and Elton John have 
used the word to designate otherwise unnamed compositions. 
    ‘Reverie’ entered the English language in the fourteenth century as a term for ‘wild or 
uncontrolled behaviour’, ‘wantonness’, ‘rejoicing’, or ‘revelry’ (OED). It derives from 
the Old French rever meaning ‘to be delirious’. To be under the sway of ‘reverie’ or 
‘raverie’ – a variant form – was thus ‘to rave’. The definition bears a similarity to 
descriptions of people in the grip of possession trances, such as the Maenads (‘ravers’) of 
ancient Greece: devotees of Dionysus who worshipped him via wine-fuelled circle 
dances in which their everyday personalities would be forgotten and they would attain 
union with their deity. By the 1830s, ‘reverie’ had been domesticated, taking on the sense 
it still retains: ‘daydream’. A word that once had carnivalesque meanings to do with the 
expression of outward, collective joy has come to be associated with an individual and 
interior psychological state. Nineteenth-century paintings on musical themes often 
portray this more inward, atomised meaning of reverie. A painting by Frank Dicksee, for 
example, first exhibited at the Royal Academy in the 1890s and simply entitled A 
Reverie, depicts a morose Victorian gentleman slumped in an armchair in a dimly-lit 





parlour, imagining that the ghostly form of his deceased wife is playing the piano just 
next to him, as she was wont to do when she was alive. In the original exhibition-
catalogue, Dicksee included the lines: ‘In the years fled, / Lips that are dead / Sang me 
that song’ (quoted in Leppert 1993: 144).   
    Moving into the age of recording, music gives rise to a different kind of reverie. Still 
inward and individual, it is, however, distinguished by much greater contingency, 
synchronicity, and serendipity. Recorded music frequently irrupts unexpectedly in the 
midst of everyday life, transforming for a moment or two its character. The actor  
Dominic West recalls driving from the set of a BBC period drama to the hospital where 
his wife was about to give birth to their first child (Berkeley 2009). The drama in 
question is called The Devil’s Whore (2008) and is set during the English Civil War 
though it was filmed in South Africa. West’s character Oliver Cromwell had just been 
made Lord Protector on set so he mischievously put on Handel’s Zadok the Priest, a 
piece which has been played at every English coronation ceremony since 1727, its 
repetition of hierarchical subdivisions an homology of social hierarchy. As the 
introduction to Zadok the Priest climaxed with the entrance of the choir and trumpets, the 
car crested the hilltop and the sun burst through the clouds. West and the passenger who 
was accompanying him burst out laughing.     
 
Everyday reveries: two examples from cinema  
The everyday reverie is, by definition, a very subjective experience but one whose 
contents are mediated by the social totality. This is to say its meaning is determined by 
the sum of meanings available in the social formation and our positioning as subjects 
within that formation. Contemporary films that use pre-recorded music on their 
soundtrack are sometimes able to reveal the objective contents of subjective musical 
experiences. In doing so, they allow us to re-experience approximations of our own 
reveries but from a third-person perspective. 
    The first of the two examples I’d like to discuss comes from The Shawshank 
Redemption (1994), a film charting the perseverance and ingenuity of Andy Dufresne in 
his bid to escape from a penitentiary after he has been wrongfully convicted of the 
murder of his wife and her lover. Dufresne is a stoic and taciturn banker played by Tim 





Robbins. In the scene in question, he has just taken receipt of a collection of books and 
‘sundries’ from the state library on behalf of the other inmates, after a protracted letter-
writing campaign. Among the ‘sundries’ is a recording of Mozart’s The Marriage of 
Figaro. Left alone for a moment by one of the prison’s more trusting guards, Andy seizes 
the opportunity to do something extraordinary: he locks himself in the office of the 
prison’s tyrannical warden and uses the warden’s gramophone player and PA system to 
broadcast the duet Sull’aria…che soave zeffiretto (‘On the breeze…what a gentle little 
zephyr’) to every one of his fellow inmates. Scenes follow of slack-jawed prisoners in 
grey uniforms breaking off from what they are doing in order to contemplate the sound of 
two female voices singing in Italian. In the prison hospital, in the workshop, and outside 
in the yard, all are transfixed by what they hear, as Morgan Freeman’s honeyed voiceover 
delivers a somewhat heavy-handed but nonetheless moving interpretation of events: ‘It 
was like some beautiful bird flapped into our drab little cage and made those walls 
dissolve away. And, for the briefest of moments, every last man at Shawshank felt free’. 
Obvious objections can be raised to this scene: its over-demonstrative sentimentality; the 
way the inmates are presented as noble savages suddenly graced by the magic of high 
culture; the way the freedom associated with the aesthetic realm is gendered as female in 
contrast to the realm of harsh social and political realities that the male prisoners 
normally inhabit. These criticisms notwithstanding, the scene retains unusual force and 
beauty in depicting what, in the midst of everyday life, a musically-inspired reverie can 
feel like. 
    The second example gives an impression of reverie via its deliberate breaking of realist 
cinematic conventions. Towards the end of Magnolia (1999), the film’s cast of lonely and 
deeply-troubled characters are assembled via a montage sequence accompanied by the 
Aimee Mann ballad ‘Wise up’. What makes the sequence so striking and affecting is that 
each of the characters sings along to the words of the song in spite of there being little 
indication that it is playing diegetically, i.e. from a sound source within the narrative 
world that each of them inhabits. The slow tempo of the song is matched by the slowness 
of the cuts via which their isolated worlds are traversed. Similarly, Mann’s subdued vocal 
accords with the dimness of the mise en scène, her voice breaking at certain moments in 
correspondence with the emotional fragility of each of the characters. The sequence as a 





whole produces a sense of resignation yet also redemption, reinforced by the lyrics of the 
chorus: ‘It’s not going to stop / Till you wise up / It’s not going to stop / So just give up’. 
Through their unexpected sing-along, each of them painfully alone yet united in their 
pain, the film’s main characters are lifted for a moment from the squalor and confinement 
of their personal circumstances. The sequence is a lot like a diegetic performance from a 
Hollywood musical but with each of the characters isolated from each other. The union of 
each of them is initially only with the pre-recorded voice of Aimee Mann but is extended 
via the temporal rhythm of the sequence to a union with all of the film’s other characters: 
a chorus of atomised individuals whose individuality – and loneliness – is temporarily 
transcended. In this sense, the song achieves eloquence and catharsis on their behalf yet 
there remains the suggestion that it is really the audience’s catharsis. It is we who 
perceive the similarity between their different modes of suffering (and between theirs and 
our own); by contrast, each individual character, so we must surmise, only perceives the 
idiosyncrasies of his own painful predicament, matched for a moment in mimetic, 
musical form by Mann’s plaintive piano and vocals. 
 
Attention, distraction, and the everyday reverie 
The everyday reverie is, in simple terms, a movement from distraction to absorption. It 
occurs when we put ‘background’ music into the ‘foreground’ and, in the process, renew 
our sensuous connection to our lived environment. The significance of such moments lies 
in the fact that they make concentrated listening possible again. When a piece of recorded 
music catches us by surprise – because of its uncanny transformation of one’s immediate 
environment, or because we haven’t heard it in a long time and it brings back a flood of 
memories or else a vague, tantalising sense that it holds the key to unlock the past – it 
makes us stop in our tracks and pay attention. 
    As a contemporary mode of musical reception, the everyday reverie is to be understood 
more precisely as arising from the dialectical interplay of attention and distraction. 
Drawing on the ideas of the Frankfurt School and Benjamin in particular, Jonathan Crary 
(1999) argues that experience in late modernity is characterised not solely by the 
dissipation and diminution of awareness but, in certain circumstances, by its 
intensification and augmentation.151 This is partly because overstimulation necessitates 





new forms of concentration that can isolate objects of perception from amongst the 
incessant flux of urban life and from its psychological correlate, the ‘stream of thought’ 
(James 1890/1950: 224). In other words, distraction and attention exist in a reciprocal 
relationship with each other, one which, furthermore, is historically produced. Crary 
(1999) assigns particular importance in this regard to the rise of the human sciences: 
‘modern distraction was not a disruption of stable or “natural” kinds of sustained, value-
laden perception that had existed for centuries but was an effect, and in many cases a 
constituent element, of the many attempts to produce attentiveness in human subjects’ 
(49; emphasis in original). Crary’s concern here is with social and moral regimes, and the 
policing of the attention-distraction continuum. In the previous chapter, we saw this in 
the example of audiences in the nineteenth-century concert hall: how physical immobility 
and attentive silence gradually became the norm. Among the many examples cited by 
Crary is the contemporary practice of diagnosing certain schoolchildren as suffering from 
an ‘attention deficit disorder’ or ADD (35). Amid a culture of intensive stimulation via 
various forms of media consumption, Crary is suspicious of claims that such diagnoses 
identify a ‘natural’ or ‘genetically-inherited’ condition, suggesting instead that the 
concern of those who medicate ‘hyperactive’ children is with ‘rule-governed conduct’ 
(ibid.). In confirmation of his wider thesis of the reciprocity that obtains between modern 
forms of attention and distraction, Crary quotes an educational study in which the author 
notes that ‘Many, if not most, hyperactive children are apparently able to sustain attention 
for a substantial period of time in high interest situations, such as watching television or 
playing video games’ (37). 
    In the context of such normative regimes aimed at the management of attention and 
distraction, Crary identifies reverie as a ‘domain of resistance’ (77). ‘The daydream’, he 
writes, ‘has always been a crucial but indeterminate part of the politics of everyday life’ 
and is ‘internal to any system of routinization or coercion’ (ibid.). This returns us to 
chapter two and the idea introduced by Lefebvre and the other everyday-life theorists: the 
idea of the everyday as its own critique. This notion will be explored further in what 
follows, with particular attention being paid to the role of recorded music in day-to-day 
life. 





    For now, I would like to pursue Crary’s comments regarding reverie’s function in late 
modernity. Crary argues that in the twentieth century, television became the main way of 
organising the attention-distraction continuum. The importance of TV’s role in 
everything from entertainment and relaxation to advertising and ‘public relations’ is 
axiomatic. One of the ramifications of this is that reverie, previously understood as an 
experience askance from, or in direct opposition to, regulatory forms of 
attention/distraction, now has to compete with the manufactured reveries of screen media. 
As Crary puts it, ‘in the twentieth century, both film and television […] entered into a 
“functional competition” with daydream’ (77). This means that ‘what once might have 
been called reverie now most often takes place aligned with [the] preset rhythms, images, 
speeds, and circuits [of radio, television, video games, the Internet, etc.] that reinforce the 
irrelevance and dereliction of whatever is not compatible with their formats’ (78). Crary 
raises ‘the question of how and whether creative modes of trance, inattention, daydream, 
and fixation can flourish within the interstices of these circuits’ (ibid.). The present study, 
and the present chapter in particular, is intended as one possible answer to this question.  
    In terms of the model just proposed, the everyday reverie is a means of wresting back 
moments of inactivity and contemplation from the kind of media-orchestrated rhythms of 
(in)attention outlined by Crary. Seeing that this occurs, however, via one’s engagement 
with the medium of recorded music, it is a highly dialectical process. As a creative 
daydream triggered by exposure to music in day-to-day life, the everyday reverie is 
closely related to nostalgia, and, more broadly, to memory. As Huyssen (1995) argues, a 
concern with memory and the past becomes a way of slowing time down, a way of 
(re)discovering meaning in temporality and in the Bergsonian impression of duration 
(101). This meditative reflection on the experience of time stands in contrast to the 
collapse of past and present into one another, a collapse that is driven by media and 
communications technologies and the effects they produce of synchronicity, simultaneity, 
and ‘hyperreality’ (Baudrillard 1981/1994: 67).  
    As already mentioned, the everyday reverie is born not simply of attention or 
inattention but of the dialectic between the two. This sometimes consists of being fully 
present to one’s environment but lost to oneself, as in the types of musical self-oblivion 
described in the previous chapter. At other times, it consists of becoming distracted, in 





the sense of being lost in thought or reminiscence, but as a result of one’s attentiveness to 
a familiar piece of music that one has chanced upon hearing. The everyday reverie is, 
then, in its most general lineaments, concentrated listening but in the midst of an 
environment of distraction. It might take the form of involuntarily becoming absorbed in 
a piece of music, perhaps because we recognise it and it holds for us intimate 
associations, or, it can be a practice: an active choice to attend to the music we hear in 
public spaces. In this latter case, such attentiveness relies on our not cramming every 
available moment of our lives with music but, instead, allowing periodic silences to 
intervene. Just as the first notes of a symphony signify in relation to the silence which 
precedes them, music in everyday life signifies more powerfully when punctuated by 
moments in which sound is, to a relative degree, absent. A rudimentary but nevertheless 
important observation is that the meaning of music for us will be diminished if we only 
ever hear it in the background. Attentiveness to music in everyday life therefore implies a 
certain economy or self-regulation of our listening habits. It is apposite in this regard to 
quote the founder of the ‘acoustic ecology’ movement, R. Murray Schafer (1973/2004): 
‘the soundscape will not again become ecological and harmonious until silence is 
recovered as a positive and felicitous state in itself’ (38). 
    Schafer’s Pythagorean conception of the cosmos as an immense musical composition 
or ‘soundscape’ can be related to the notion of bricolage-listening introduced in chapter 
two: the idea that recorded music is but one element in a collage of elements to be found 
in everyday life, the whole being greater than the sum of its parts. This kind of 
interpretative melding of apparently heterogeneous elements is implicit in the experience 
of listening to music in everyday life: a way of inviting and exploring the chance 
confluences between the music we hear and the environment in which hear it, exploring, 
too, the moods and memories that we as bricoleurs bring to such musical experiences. 
The everyday reverie is in this sense a Certeauvian ‘tactic’ for searching out new kinds of 
meanings in our sonic environment: an act of bricolage in the sense of ‘making do’, using 
what is close to hand – and even closer to our ears – as a critique of everyday life from 
within its midst. 
    In what follows, I would like to examine in more detail the different dimensions of the 
everyday reverie through a critical engagement with the work of a range of artists and 





authors, all of whom in their various ways posit the relation between attention and 
distraction as being fundamental to a politics of everyday life.                    
 
Cagean listening 
The Cagean reverie is that in which ambient noise – traffic, birdsong, the humming of a 
refrigerator – is listened to as (if it were) music. The result is a renewed effort of 
attention, an expanded awareness, and a glimpse of new possibilities. This kind of reverie 
has its origins in John Cage’s 4′ 33″, a piece which nominally consists of four minutes 
and thirty-three seconds of silence.152 Instructions are given for a pianist to signal the 
start of the piece by closing the lid of the keyboard. He or she then opens it at the end of 
the first ‘movement’, before closing it again at the start of the next ‘movement’ and so on 
until all three of the piece’s movements have been ‘played’, the duration of them adding 
up to the 4′ 33″ of the title.153 At its premiere in 1952, the audience could hear birds 
singing outside the auditorium – in addition to the accumulated hubbub of shuffling and 
coughing from inside, and, shortly after, the clamour of a few outraged members of the 
audience getting up to leave. The duration of silence denoted by the piece’s title is thus 
not really silence at all. Instead, the piece is an invitation to listen with rapt attention to 
the ambient sounds of everyday life that we normally fade out of our awareness. As part 
of a transition that is indicative of Cage’s influence on sonic art and music in the 
twentieth century, ‘noise’ becomes sound, and ‘sound’ becomes music. 
    Cage’s life-long project was to make audiences more sensitive to and enraptured by 
our phenomenological immersion in a world of sound. Listening to – or at least hearing – 
ambient noise goes on all the time, as David Toop (2004) notes in a way that is clearly 
indebted to Cage:  
 
We hear, not just through the ears, as a conscious activity, but through the whole body, in a 
mixture of fully conscious, peripherally conscious and unconscious awareness. Hearing 
more like feeling: a multiplicity of impressions at the edge of perception. We hear space all 
the time, not just its echoes and foreground signals but also its subliminal undertow (47). 
 
The everyday reverie has to be understood in terms of the unfolding dialectic between 
recorded music and the everyday: the way the presence of recorded music in everyday 
life has become increasingly ordinary over the decades yet retains something of the 





extraordinary too – an ability to surprise, stimulate, entertain, or provoke. The everyday 
reverie is a conscious dialectical negation of the tendency for music in everyday settings 
to be ignored. By reversing the polarity of the recorded music we come across in 
everyday life – putting ‘background’ music in the ‘foreground’ – we invite moments of 
uncanniness that have a potentially transformative effect, producing a confluence of 
music, memory, and affect within a quotidian physical space such as a shop or café. The 
affective intensity of such moments can be unsettling at first but this is precisely their 
power: these reveries shake us from our habitual numbness, re-sensitising us to our 
immediate environment and those we share it with. Everyday situations do not merely 
retreat into the background when recorded music is attended to; rather they stand out. Not 
merely aestheticised, their emotional, psychoanalytical and political dimensions are 
revealed, and ‘listening’ in an expanded sense is able to occur. 
 
Bachelardian reveries 
In The Poetics of Reverie, Gaston Bachelard (1960/1969) presents an eccentric manifesto 
for the power of daydreaming. He figures reverie as a form of ‘listening’, both to one’s 
environment and to oneself, especially our fleeting fantasies and intuitions: ‘The 
subconscious is ceaselessly murmuring, and it is by listening to these murmurs that one 
hears the truth’ (59). Similarly, he claims that ‘[i]n order to know ourselves doubly as a 
real being and an idealizing being, we must listen to our reveries’ (58; emphasis in 
original).154 Bachelard describes daydreaming as a ‘mnemonics of the imagination’, 
claiming that ‘[i]n reverie we re-enter into contact with possibilities which destiny has 
not been able to make use of’ (112). Reverie is thus a ‘memory’ or fantasy of that which 
never happened but which is nevertheless able to produce in us a powerful suggestion of 
the contingent basis of what is real and actual. We are therefore freed by our imagination 
from the necessity of ‘things as they are’ and are able to invite other possibilities. In a 
sense, what Bachelard is arguing for is a particularly fertile and productive type of 
nostalgia – the kind of nostalgia which envisions past events having taken an alternative 
course, or which remembers how life felt before a time of disappointment, before we 
knew what would become of us and those around us. In musical terms, Simon Frith 
(1996a) pithily describes this as ‘[r]ock ’n’ roll before anyone knew what rock ’n’ roll 





would be’ (7). In part, then, reverie consists in remembering how strange and contingent 
things seemed at the time, before hindsight smoothed experience into a linear 
progression. 
    Bachelard (1960/1969) makes the paradoxical claim that daydreams put us in more 
intimate contact with our surroundings: ‘From all over, coming from all objects, an 
intimacy lays siege to us’ (162). ‘Poetic reveries’ are thus a form of awakening in which 
we are united with the objects of our perception due to the fact that an instrumental or 
‘means-end’ relationship with them is temporarily suspended. Instead, we are able to 
‘listen’ to what they have to tell us. Reverie is, in this manner, a means of remembering 
our primordial unity with the world, prior to individuation, and is thus very similar to 
Proustian memory. According to Bachelard, this unity manifests most powerfully in 
experiences of sensual delight in which we close our eyes, for example, when we savour 
the taste of a chocolate truffle, or imbibe the fragrance of a rose, or lose ourselves in the 
music in our headphones. In such experiences, the organ of our most objectifying sense, 
the visual, falls into abeyance so that ‘our fusion with the world’ is complete (136).  
    Bachelard’s notion of reverie is similar to that of enchantment, described by Jane 
Bennett (2001) as an ‘affective attachment to the world’ (3). As such, Bachelardian 
reverie can be seen as a counter to the many disenchantment narratives in the Western 
intellectual tradition. Bennett summarises these narratives thus: ‘The disenchantment tale 
figures nonhuman nature as more or less inert “matter”; it construes the modern West as a 
radical break from other cultures; and it depicts the modern self as predisposed toward 
rationalism, skepticism, and the problem of meaninglessness’ (7). We are all, according 
to the disenchantment narrative, a collection of discombobulated Prince Hamlets. As 
suggested by the title of her book, Bennett argues for ‘the enchantment of modern life’, 
not its ‘re-enchantment’. ‘[T]he question’ she says ‘is not whether disenchantment is a 
regrettable or a progressive historical development. It is, rather, whether the very 
characterization of the world as disenchanted ignores and then discourages affective 
attachment to the world’ (3). She starts, then, from ‘the assumption that the world has 
become neither inert nor devoid of surprise but continues to inspire deep and powerful 
attachments’ (4). In accordance with this, she argues that the cultivation of moments of 





reverie and enchantment constitutes an ethical imperative in eliciting care for, and 
affective engagement with, the world:  
  
if enchantment can foster an ethically laudable generosity of spirit, then the cultivation of 
an eye for the wonderful becomes something like an academic duty […]. Without modes of 
enchantment, we might not have the energy and inspiration to enact ecological projects, or 
to contest ugly and unjust modes of commercialization, or to respond generously to humans 
and nonhumans that challenge our settled identities (10, 174). 
 
To take the example of what I call everyday reveries, attentiveness to recorded music as 
we encounter it in our day-to-day environment parallels attentiveness to those with whom 
we share that environment. Being present to music as and when we hear it becomes a 
way of being present to the embodied and affective reality of our engagement with others 
while evoking surprise and delight. It is a way of honouring the Kantian injunction to 
treat others as ends in themselves rather than as a means to an end.   
 
Profane illumination, dialectical images, and historical consciousness 
This brings us to another figure who has been influential in the formulation of the 
everyday reverie. In his essay on Surrealism, Walter Benjamin (1929/1999a) introduces 
the notion of ‘profane illumination’: the process by which ordinary objects in everyday 
life are suddenly revealed as uncanny, irrational or phantasmagoric.155 An experience of 
disorientation and estrangement is central to this process. By making the commonplace 
bizarre, profane illumination paves the way for the abandonment of current realities and 
heightens experience to a revolutionary pitch. Among the apparently mundane objects 
that can spark such Surrealist revelations, Benjamin lists ‘the first iron constructions, the 
first factory buildings, the earliest photos, objects that have begun to be extinct, grand 
pianos, the dresses of five years ago, fashionable restaurants when the vogue has begun to 
ebb from them’ (210). Benjamin’s concern, in other words, is with the detritus of 
modernity – those discarded artefacts and commodities that usually get ‘forgotten’ during 
industrial capitalism’s restless re-shaping of the urban landscape. Among such 
commodities, one can include, today, the many playback technologies that have been 
rendered wholly or partially obsolete during the history of recorded music: rolls of 
indented paper for player-pianos; phonograph cylinders; brass-horned gramophone 





players with their stacks of 78s; mix tapes lovingly compiled for friends. One can also 
count the many hundreds of thousands of musical recordings from the twentieth century, 
listened to with excitement and enthusiasm in their time but now mostly forgotten. As an 
example of such musical ephemera, Benjamin mentions ‘the street song last on 
everyone’s lips’, claiming that the genius of the Surrealists was to ‘bring the immense 
forces of “atmosphere” concealed in these things to the point of explosion’, a method that 
would become central in his work on the Paris arcades (ibid.). For Benjamin, this was 
more a dialectical and materialist procedure than a mystical one. In philosophically 
contemplating the sense of novelty and promise for the future that such outmoded objects 
once held for those who first used them, we are forced to confront the truth that social 
reality, especially the fact of class-based society, has not significantly altered in the 
intervening decades. Instead of the genuinely new, what we have gained instead is ‘the 
new-and-always-the-same’ (Benjamin quoted in Buck-Morss 1991: 209; adapted). Thus, 
in this way, the history of capitalist societies – embodied, for Benjamin, in the pile of 
outmoded commodities left behind in their wake – is to be understood as the ‘prehistory’ 
of a future society in which the injustices of economic production founded upon one 
class’s coercion of another will have been transcended (Buck-Morss 1991: 64-5). 
    These ideas found their most complete formulation in Benjamin’s sprawling and 
unfinished study of the shopping arcades of nineteenth-century Paris. At the theoretical 
core of the fragments that comprise the Passagenwerk (1927-1940), one finds Benjamin’s 
notion of the ‘dialectical image’: a vivid historical impression sparked by one’s 
philosophical engagement with an outmoded commodity or artefact. The dialectical 
image is a piece of subtle materialist conjuring on Benjamin’s part in that he makes the 
commodity fetish yield historical truths. The industrially-produced artefact, which 
obscures the labour process that brought it into being and is thus normally considered by 
Marxists to be false and mystifying is, in a flash, made to reveal the precise historical and 
political ‘atmosphere’ that obtained at the point of its entry into the commodity-laden 
spaces of the capitalist metropolis. Such commodities, though long-since discarded or 
forgotten, ‘ripen’ or ‘mature’ for the historical materialist so that their meaning – ‘the 
relation of what-has-been to the now’ – suddenly reveals itself (Benjamin 1999a: 463 
[N3,1]). What we experience in this revelatory moment is a sense of the past as lived 





experience: the hopes and dreams, sorrows and joys that characterised life in a particular 
era and with which we, in the present, are able to empathise. This dialectical image – the 
‘flashing up’ of the past into the present – provokes, for Benjamin, a strong impulse to 
change the course of history on behalf of previous generations, to realise what was left 
unrealised in their lifetimes. 
    The everyday reverie is intended as an aural version of the dialectical image – a 
moment in which past and present fuse as one listens to a piece of recorded music. 
Musical recordings are able to produce a vivid sense of the past, not just as an idea or 
image but as a lived reality. This is due to their richness of sound – all the timbral, 
rhythmic and melodic inflections that are unique to a particular recording. These features 
can only be appreciated in the here and now while one is actually listening to a piece of 
music – even a short while after the recording has stopped playing, the listener will 
usually struggle to accurately recall any of these musical nuances in his or her ‘mind’s 
ear’. Old records evoke for the duration in which we hear them a sense of ‘a different 
now’ and this, as we shall see, is crucial to their utopian appeal. The poignancy of 
particular recordings matures over time, i.e. they only become ‘legible’ in their historicity 
at a certain moment – what Benjamin refers to as ‘the now of [their] recognizability’ 
(ibid.). This is related to the fact that the pertinent features of historically-discrete musical 
genres, styles of performance, techniques of record production, etc. become more evident 
in retrospect. Even if we are unable to fully articulate what these features are, we can 
easily recognise in old recordings what is specific to their era in a way that is not the case 
with contemporary recordings. In Benjamin’s words, we ‘discover in the analysis of the 
small individual moment the crystal of the total event’ (Benjamin 1999a: 461 [N2,6]). 
    Roland Barthes’s notion of ‘grain’ helps to explain how listening to dated musical 
recordings is able to fuse past and present – how such records are able to produce a sense 
of ‘a different now’ via our physical sympathy as listeners with the aural traces of the 
performers’ movements and gestures. For Barthes (1977), there is a vast area of musical 
meaning beyond what is explicit and articulate in the patterns of sound we hear. This 
level of signification – exemplified by what he calls ‘the grain of the voice’ – is more 
paralinguistic than linguistic in the sense that it consists of signs whose signifiers are not 
purely arbitrary but signify instead at a powerfully gestural and affective level that is 





often subconscious. Understood in this way, ‘grain’ is very similar to Peirce’s notion of 
‘firstness’, a concept not readily available to Barthes as he was working within, and 
exploring the limits of, a Saussurean paradigm. Barthes defines grain as ‘the body in the 
voice as it sings, the hand as it writes, the limb as it performs’ (188). In music, it is that 
‘something else’ which music rubs up against: ‘the materiality of the body speaking its 
mother tongue’ or ‘the image of the [musician’s] body’ heard by the body of the listener 
(182, 185, 189). Grain thus defines a relationship between musician and listener that, for 
Barthes, is ‘erotic’ (188). To apply this idea to the notion of records as historical archives, 
it can be seen – and heard – that, in phonography, every tiny nuance of sound can become 
an index of history and, as such, a marker of style in the sense of an historically precise 
set of ideas, attitudes and feelings, enfolding the material basis for their expression. To 
invoke an analogous concept, recorded sound embodies in aural form a finely detailed 
‘structure of feeling’ (Williams 1977). In often unforeseen ways, musical recordings 
come to characterise the lived experience of the quality of life at a particular time and 
place, and they do this via the sensuous and bodily nature of our connection to them.  
 
The everyday reverie and utopia  
The everyday reverie is an attempt to hear in musical recordings the unrealised utopian 
impulses that inhere in them: the appeal to collective solidarity, for instance, or freedom 
of expression, transparency and equality in social relations, etc. This idea that musical 
recordings give expression to utopian impulses – albeit in reified form – can be 
elaborated with reference to the work of Ernst Bloch, in particular his ideas on the 
immanent utopianism of the cultural sphere. Immanent utopianism is the belief or 
intuition that utopia is not to be found elsewhere or else-when but is already present in 
the midst of everyday life, albeit in the form of utopian moments rather than utopia per se 
(Anderson 2002: 211). The central contention of Bloch’s work on utopia – most notably, 
the three volumes that comprise The Principle of Hope (1938-1947) – is that the utopian 
is to be found throughout the field of culture but is only ever partially present. This 
contention is encapsulated in his notion of ‘the Not-Yet-Conscious’: anticipatory or pre-
conscious elements that Bloch (1959/1986) sees as central to human thought.156 In regard 
to the artwork, Bloch defines the Not-Yet-Conscious thus: ‘Every great work of art, 





above and beyond its manifest content, is carried out according to a latency of the page to 
come, or in other words, in the light of the content of a future which has not yet come into 
being, and indeed of some ultimate resolution as yet unknown’ (quoted in Jameson 1971: 
149; emphasis in original; Bloch 1959/1986: 127). Historically, these anticipatory 
elements are often carried over from unfinished political projects in the form of a utopian 
surplus. Thus the ascendancy of the European bourgeoisie was initially framed in terms 
of an attack on the feudal order for its denial of rights, liberties, class mobility, and 
democracy, yet once the middle-classes had established their hegemony they attempted to 
deny these things to the rest of the population. As Douglas Kellner (1997) observes, 
‘Bloch takes seriously Marx’s position that the task of socialism is to fully realize certain 
bourgeois ideals’ (84). In addition to the customary sites for Marxist ideology critique, 
Bloch finds evidence of the Not-Yet-Conscious in a range of other cultural phenomena 
including fashion, advertising, fairy tales, travel, jokes, film and theatre. A new set of 
clothes, for example, maintains, on the one hand, a set of distinctions in taste and thus the 
class structure of society but, at the same time, it gives the wearer a sense of freedom and 
possibility, a sense of social mobility, which might be denied to him or her under the 
current class structure but is nevertheless felt intuitively as part of an innately human 
striving for ‘something better’ (436). For Bloch, then, ideology is ‘Janus-faced’ or two-
sided. To quote Kellner (1997), ‘it contains errors, mystifications, and techniques of 
manipulation and domination, but it also contains a utopian residue or surplus that can be 
used for social critique and to advance progressive politics’ (82). In Jürgen Habermas’ 
words, ‘Bloch wants […] to salvage whatever may be true in false consciousness’ 
(Habermas 1983: 63). 
    In keeping with his idea of the Not-Yet-Conscious as the ground of utopian thought, 
Bloch (1959/1986) claims that music provides an anticipatory signal of profound changes 
in the social formation: ‘Music in its unsurpassable nearness to existence is the most 
closely related and most public voice of this incognito’. It is ‘seismographic, it reflects 
cracks under the social surface, expresses wishes for change, bids us to hope’ (1088; 
original emphasis removed). This idea has an unacknowledged influence on Jacques 
Attali (1977/1985) in his book Noise in which he claims that ‘every major social rupture 
has been preceded by an essential mutation in the codes of music, in its mode of audition, 





and in its economy’ (10). Richard Dyer (1977/1999) also draws on Bloch’s work in his 
essay ‘Entertainment and utopia’ in which he argues that the role of music in the 
Hollywood musical is to produce the feeling of utopia without presenting an explicit 
vision of it. Bloch’s work stands in a long tradition of utopian writing on music, most of 
which usually emphasises music’s non-representational qualities or its ‘relaxed semiotic’ 
as Caryl Flinn (1992) calls it (8). In Strains of Utopia, her study of the classical 
Hollywood score, Flinn broadly endorses the Blochian thesis of music carrying utopian 
traces. She cautions, however, that these traces need to be actively interpreted by a 
human subject – they are not simply given by or immanent within the text in question. 
Furthermore, what is considered utopian and what is not depends, to a large extent, on 
one’s subject position. She notes that in certain examples of melodrama and film noir, for 
instance, the musical score endorses what is, on closer inspection, a decidedly male 
perspective of utopia. She adds, too, that utopian signs are not necessarily progressive but 
can be used for any number of political agendas as evinced most vividly by the example 
of the Third Reich. In her role as a film critic, Flinn notes that Hollywood scores have 
often been employed in order to connote a sense of ‘lost plenitude’, as in flashback 
scenes (52). Ascribing music a nostalgic function, as many film composers have done, or, 
as Bloch does, an anticipatory one are, according to Flinn, both ways of idealising it and 
thus sidestepping the problems of interpretation. She is particularly suspicious of the 
mainly poststructuralist claims that music represents a symbolic challenge to the status 
quo; again, the question she would want to ask is ‘For whom?’  
    With a similar Blochian problematic in mind, Fredric Jameson (1981) argues that all 
ideological expressions, all cultural texts – whether issuing from dominant or oppressed 
classes – contain a utopian impulse due to their implicit attempts to forge a certain class 
unity: ‘even hegemonic or ruling-class culture and ideology are Utopian, not in spite of 
their instrumental function to secure and perpetuate class privilege and power, but rather 
precisely because that function is also in and of itself the affirmation of collective 
solidarity’ (291). This utopian impulse is, then, the appeal to a collectivity, whether it be 
made up of the ruling class or those they rule. Jameson’s point is that those on the Left 
need to harness the power of this ‘positive’ critique in order to have broad appeal. This 
entails understanding what the utopian element is within all artistic texts, even those that 





might be overtly repugnant: ‘a Left which cannot grasp the immense Utopian appeal of 
nationalism (any more than it can grasp that of religion or of fascism) can scarcely hope 
to “reappropriate” such collective energies and must effectively doom itself to political 
impotence’ (298). For Jameson, then, cultural critique should combine ‘positive’ and 
‘negative hermeneutics’: ‘a Marxist negative hermeneutic, a Marxist practice of 
ideological analysis proper, must in the practical work of reading and interpretation be 
exercised simultaneously with a Marxist positive hermeneutic, or a decipherment of the 
Utopian impulses of these same ideological cultural texts’ (296; emphasis in original). So 
far in this chapter, I have pursued a broadly ‘positive hermeneutic’ in delineating the 
concept of the everyday reverie, positing it as an attempt to discover the utopian element 
in the reified cultural products of the music industry. Yet, following Bloch and Jameson, 
it should be noted that questions of music’s utopian qualities are inseparable from 
questions pertaining to its ideological content – the one implies the other. Bloch’s notion 
of all culture being false and mystifying and simultaneously utopian and progressive can 
be understood in terms of the workings of memory. The apperception of a cultural text’s 
utopian qualities is an act of ‘strong’ remembrance in that it recalls collective struggles to 
establish social relations on a more equitable basis and, at the same time, an act of 
forgetting in that it implies a momentary forgetfulness of one’s immediate, everyday 
surroundings and a surrender to the semiotic play of the aspect of utopia that is being 
presented. As we saw in the previous chapter, recorded music’s ability to make us feel 
‘something better’ is closely bound up with its ability to make us forget (Anderson 2002: 
212).    
    A final question remains: how are musical recordings capable of carrying utopian 
traces? The answer comes down to the fact that what we hear in the best recordings is the 
sound of groups of individuals at play in an especially intense form of communication 
with one another. In spite of the presence of economic determinants within the processes 
of production and consumption, and ideological factors shaping the kinds of texts that are 
produced and consumed, musical recordings are able to articulate remarkably often a 
sense of freedom and joy – or else their inverse, a sense of pathos – which we are invited 
to share in with the performers. Though only partially realised in the society at the time 
or amongst the group of musicians playing on the recording, these sounds of liberty are 





carried over into our own generation and future generations as a utopian surplus: an 
intuition of how the pleasures and creative freedoms of unalienated labour might be 
developed on a more enduring and extensive scale. This, if it were to become lived 
reality, would be the greatest reverie of the everyday.















                                                 
Chapter One: Music & Memory in the Age of Recording 
1 Such a storybook account also neglects to mention that Edison and his staff had successfully constructed 
an earlier prototype – patented in Britain as a ‘telephonic repeater’ – some months before the one built by 
his engineer, Kruesi. The earlier model used paraffin paper instead of tinfoil, and Edison shouted into the 
instrument’s crude mouthpiece, not ‘Mary had a little lamb’, but the rather less memorable utterance, 
‘Hello’ (Koenigsberg 1969: xi-xii; Millard 1995: 24-25). 
2 In 1958, the chief pioneer of British electronic music, Daphne Oram, pinned this passage from Bacon’s 
‘New Atlantis’ to a wall in the newly-established BBC Radiophonic Workshop (Oram 2009).   
3 This point was evoked by a poetic rumour surrounding the music-room in the Ali Qapu palace in Esfahan, 
Iran (Hay 2006: 77). The upper-storey room, built in the eighteenth century as part of the lavish 
headquarters of the Safavid monarchs, is astonishingly ornate, the walls and ceiling being covered in deep 
but narrow niches in the shape of vases, bowls, and musical instruments. Legend has it that, in the past, 
when women were forbidden from entering while the male musicians were playing, they were able to hear 
the music after the men had left the room as the shapes created an echo effect. However, this romantic 
notion of music becoming lodged in instrument-shaped niches is challenged by other accounts that stress 
that the intricate hollows in the walls and ceiling actually prevent sounds from echoing excessively, rather 
like the peculiar swollen shapes that populate the ceilings of many modern concert halls (Ayatollahi 2003: 
262). So, rather than being an early attempt at preserving sound, it seems that the room, with its 
harmonious proportions and heavily-ornamented stuccowork, should be viewed as an early and particularly 
sophisticated example of acoustic design, aimed at the isolation of brilliant timbres and pitches, un-
muddied by the cavernous reverberations that characterised earlier acoustic spaces. 
4 Sterne’s ‘Ensoniment’, the aural counterpart to the Enlightenment, occurred ‘[b]etween about 1750 and 
1925’ (Sterne 2003: 2). This period covers the development of the science of acoustics, plus the 
transformation of the phonograph into the gramophone, i.e. the step from a cylinder system capable of both 
recording and playback to a device playing shellac discs and aimed more squarely at the commodification 
of musical recordings within an already competitive marketplace.  
5 It should be noted that, even among cognitive psychologists, this three-fold taxonomy of ‘echoic’, ‘short-
term’ and ‘long-term’ memory is a source of contention, particularly with regard to their interaction. In 
very simple terms, they are to be understood more as a loop than as a strictly linear series, so that ‘long-
term’ memories or ‘memory-schema’ play a crucial role in determining which features of the auditory 
environment – which ‘echoic’ memories – are considered significant enough to be ‘extracted’ as ‘short-
term’ memories, i.e. as sonic ‘events’ that we are aware of (Snyder 2000). 
6 Freddie Mercury’s performance with Queen at the Live Aid concert in 1985 offers the superlative 
example of this; listen also to the live recording of ‘It’s gonna be a beautiful night’ on Prince’s album, Sign 
o’ the Times. 
7 The idea of two orchestras, two choirs of instruments, was a characteristically Venetian one, imitating a 
style of composing for the choirs in the Basilica of St. Mark’s (Macleod 2009). A special kind of 
antiphonal writing had been developed which exploited the many spaces of the Basilica to great aural 
effect, rather like a sonic mapping of the building’s interior.  





                                                                                                                                                 
8 Cf. Harrison Birtwhistle’s work in which the visual spectacle of music-making is heightened by soloists 
changing their position in the auditorium mid-performance.   
9 The orchestra pit at Bayreuth occupies a recess under the stage and is covered by a hood. 
10 My use of mimesis emphasises a more Aristotelian than Platonic reading of the term.  
11 It should be pointed out that the distinction between mimesis and representation is an analytical one 
rather than an empirical one, i.e. a single activity such as writing could be placed in either of these 
categories depending on whether one wants to emphasise verisimilitude on the one hand or the active 
transformation of what is being ‘copied’ on the other. 
12 Sterne (2003) draws attention to the fact that the characteristic feature of modern technologies of sound is 
that they rely on devices called transducers, ‘which turn sound into something else and that something else 
back into sound’. Hence, ‘[t]he diaphragm and stylus of a cylinder phonograph change sound through a 
process of transcription in tinfoil, wax, or any number of other surfaces. On playback, the stylus and 
diaphragm transduce the inscriptions back into sounds’ (22).  
13 This function of recording the last words of the dying was listed among Edison’s proposed uses for the 
phonograph, published as part of an article for the North American Review (Chanan 1995: 2-3). It should be 
noted that speech was traditionally viewed as being created by the breath of life, hence the Scientific 
American’s figuration of its preservation as a form of immortality.    
14 In fact, the era of home recording using wax cylinders was even shorter. The North American 
Phonograph Company didn’t start producing them on a wider scale for the home market until 1892 
(Koenigsberg 1969: xviii). Wax cylinders had first been developed by Edison’s competitors at Alexander 
Graham Bell’s Volta laboratory. Bell’s cousin, Chichester Bell, and Charles Tainter called their machine 
the ‘graphophone’ (Millard 1995: 30-1). As subsequent modifications to the ‘phonograph’ demonstrated, 
Edison acknowledged the improvements in sound quality that the wax cylinders afforded but, when 
approached by the Volta associates in 1886, he refused to go into business with them, no doubt piqued by 
the fact that, during the years he’d spent working on the lightbulb, others had overtaken him in the field of 
sound-recording. 
15 In the United States, the term ‘phonograph’ continued to be used in order to refer to what, to be precise, 
was its successor, the ‘gramophone’, while in Europe the latter term became the norm. 
16 The term ‘album’ was first applied to a four-disc package of Tchaikovsky’s Nutcracker Suite in 1909 
(Elborough 2008: 18). 
17 The alleged ‘faithfulness’ to an original performance implied by the term ‘high fidelity’ has always been  
somewhat problematic considering the numerous intervening technical decisions that have to be made. This 
was even more the case once multi-track recording allowed a ‘copy’ to be made of performances that had 
never actually occurred, at least not in the way the recording preserved it.  
18 In its popular form, the song goes by the name, ‘Am brunnen vor dem tore’ (‘At the well in front of the 
gate’). 
19 In this regard, the trajectory of gramophone-usage echoes, in greatly compressed timescale, the changes 
that occurred to reading practices. In a celebrated incident from the fourth century, Augustine recalls with 
amazement how the Catholic Bishop of Milan, Ambrose, would pore over books in silence, even when 
others were present: ‘When he was reading, his eyes ran over the page and his heart perceived the sense, 
but his voice and tongue were silent’ (Augustine 1998: 92-3). The high regard in which Augustine held 
Ambrose is matched by the inscrutability as to what the bishop was up to: ‘Whatever motive he had for his 
habit, this man had a good reason for what he did’ (ibid.). The practice of reading silently to oneself 
continued to be something of an anomaly. In Medieval Europe, ‘[r]eading was a kind of performance. Even 
the solitary reader most often read aloud […], and most reading was not solitary’ (Burrow 1982: 47). 
During the fourteenth century, however, the practice of solitary, silent reading was becoming increasingly 
common. The historian of private life, Roger Chartier (1989) goes so far as to claim that it was more 
important than the printing press in expanding intellectual horizons and making possible ‘previously 
unthinkable audacities’ (125-6). Of course, the spread of solitary reading had an uneven development. In 
the salons of France, for example, reading around the fireplace was considered distinctly old-fashioned by 
the latter decades of the nineteenth century and was being abandoned in favour of activities such as 
painting, singing and playing music. For the French peasantry, by contrast, reading aloud remained a 
traditional source of evening entertainment right up until the First World War (Corbin 1990: 535-6). 
20 Those members of the European nobility who imagined they were listening to music on their own when 
in fact their minstrels were playing for them often paid the price in terms of leaked secrets: musicians in the 





                                                                                                                                                 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance – including, it seems, John Dowland, who had worked in Christian IV’s 
court in Denmark – had a significant sideline in espionage (Kirkby 2009).       
21 Twain was familiar with the rowdy, convivial atmosphere of the New York Metropolitan, which itself 
recalled behaviour in the Paris opera houses of the early eighteenth century, so that the ‘[a]bsolute attention 
and petrified retention’ of the Wagner devotees came as a shock. 
22 Although the pianola seems impossibly antiquated to us today, perhaps because it was so quickly 
superseded by improvements in gramophone recordings, it nevertheless presaged, in a certain sense, the 
current fad for computer games such as Guitar Hero and Rock Band – including the Beatles edition – that 
give gamers a feel of what it might be like to be extremely adept at playing a musical instrument without 
the encumbrance of actually having to learn.   
23 At the time of writing, Nigel Kennedy’s 1989 rendition of The Four Seasons remains the best-selling 
classical recording of all time.  
24 In a seven-year project undertaken for Decca in the 1950s and 60s, the record producer John Culshaw, 
working with Georg Solti, managed to accommodate Wagner’s 14-hour Ring cycle on 19 LPs as opposed 
to the estimated 112 shellac 78s that would have been required (Elborough 2008: 18). A friend of mine 
recalls how, shortly after the cycle’s release, he and another Wagner obsessive conspired in the almost 
equally epic project of listening to all 19 discs in a single day. 
25 See, for example, Hosokawa (1984) and Bull (2000). 
26 Elborough (2008) suggests that the age of digital downloads marks a return to some of the listening 
habits of the pre-vinyl era, ‘when people collected individual tunes and did much of their listening via the 
radio, spinning from station to station until they found something to their taste’ (18).     
27 I’m drawing here upon Nattiez’s integrative approach to understanding music, whereby three 
fundamental categories combine to produce what he calls the ‘total musical fact’ (Nattiez 1990: ix). These 
categories are as follows: (i) the ‘neutral’ or ‘immanent’ level, i.e. the musical text; (ii) the ‘poietic’ level, 
i.e. the level of musical production; and (iii) the ‘esthesic’ level, i.e. musical reception.    
28 Bach’s choral works may originally have been performed without a choir, the soloists themselves 
providing the choral sections one voice per part (Staines and Clark et al 2005: 22).  
29 Chanan (1999) alludes to the difficulty of discerning a metalingual function in music; if music doesn’t 
even possess the denotative or referential function that natural languages clearly do, it would seem 
impossible for it to possess a metalanguage that could be used to comment on such a system of reference. 
He goes on, however, to cite Bach’s Well-Tempered Clavier, which comprises a set of preludes and fugues 
in every major and minor key, as an example of what, due to its exploration of the logic of tonality, could 
be termed ‘metamusic’. Chanan quotes Adorno, who, in a slightly different context, asserts that ‘This 
second language of music is synthetic and primitive’ (162).  
30 Cf. Adorno and Eisler (1947/1994 ): ‘At least two of the most important elements of occidental music, 
the harmonic-contrapuntal one and that of its rhythmic articulation, point directly to a group modelled upon 
the ancient church community as its only possible inherent ‘subject’ (74).   
31 Mendelssohn’s 1829 revival of the St. Matthew Passion marks a watershed in terms of the classical 
repertory’s shift towards old works rather than an ever-changing roster of new ones (Small 1998: 190).   
32 Today, when some of the St. Matthew Passion’s original Lutheran tone is injected into it by it often being 
staged in a cathedral over the Easter weekend, audiences can still choose how they listen, i.e. they can 
choose, to some extent, not to hear it as a religious piece but instead as something transcendentally 
beautiful yet secular (Small 1998: 7). 
33 It should be noted that there is a contrast between classical and popular music with regard to musical 
expressivity in the age of recording. Classical recordings, in certain respects, have become less obviously 
emotive, firstly, as a reaction against the romantic style, with its use of rubato and much greater rhythmic 
exaggeration via which performers – including composers themselves – often departed from the score; and, 
secondly, as a way of producing a less idiosyncratic recording in the hope that a more literal interpretation 
would bear repeated listening more successfully (Day 2000: 142-159).  
34 Swann’s experience of being the sole addressee of a piece of music is echoed by a young woman who 
appears in a BBC documentary, Memories are Made of This. The woman in question associates the Bon 
Jovi rock ballad ‘Broken home’ with the time her parents split up and she was sent into lodgings, saying 
‘it’s like it was written solely for me’ (Savage 1994). 





                                                                                                                                                 
35 The persistence of diatonicism – indeed its spread to other musical cultures, in spite of the efforts of 
serialist composers – would suggest that the metalingual and poetic functions have been less important in 
the history of recorded music thus far.  
36 Lévi-Strauss (1969) notes the difficulty of distinguishing between the phatic and conative functions, 
especially in the case of music (29). The act of checking that contact is being made often takes the form of 
an exhortation to respond, as when a speaker in a crowded room asks ‘Can you hear me at the back?’  
37 The results of a 1993 study by music psychologist, Jane Davidson, suggest that visual cues are actually 
more important than aural ones in allowing audiences to gauge performers’ expressive intentions (cited in 
Katz 2004: 95-6).     
38 In arguing that the technique of vibrato helped ‘compensate for the loss of the visual element in 
recording’, Katz (2004) quotes Robert Schumann’s remark about Franz Liszt in performance: ‘Within a 
few seconds tenderness, boldness, exquisiteness, wildness succeed one another; the instrument glows and 
flashes under the master’s hands. He must be heard and seen; for if Liszt played behind a screen a great 
deal of poetry would be lost’ (95).  
39 Alex Ross (2007) argues that, in recent decades, the emotive or expressive function has been suppressed 
in classical recordings as musicians seek a more neutral, less idiosyncratic performance that will stand up to 
repeated listening. 
40 The backbeat, in which the drummer uses the snare drum to accent the normally weak second and fourth 
beats of each bar, has been a staple of rock ‘n’ roll and rock music ever since Little Richard’s drummer 
came up with it in response to the rhythmic emphasis already inherent in Richard’s own piano-playing.  
41 ‘Crazy frog’ (2005) would be a recent example.   
42 Cf. Schafer (1977): ‘Hearing is a way of touching at a distance and the intimacy of the first sense is fused 
with sociability whenever people gather together to hear something special’ (11). 
43 Examples of ‘loud’ albums include Red Hot Chilli Peppers, Californication (1999); Arctic Monkeys, 
Whatever People Say I Am, That’s What I’m Not (2006); Lily Allen, Alright Still (2006); and Metallica, 
Death Magnetic (2008). 
44 This lends weight to the claim of Adorno (1938/1982) and Attali (1977/1985) that recorded music 
functions as a monologue of power, reducing entire populations to silence.  
45  It seems strange that, writing in 1939, Halbwachs doesn’t consider the impact of recording on the 
collective memory of musicians.   
46 At best, we can find a metaphor to describe what the music sounded like, though a metaphor invoked by 
one listener might diverge markedly from that of another (Sloboda 1985: 59). 
47 When the same pitch is played on two different instruments we can discern the difference between them, 
their different timbres, because of the presence of ‘harmonics’ or ‘overtones’, as well as ‘inharmonics’ or 
‘partials’. These are pitches that we are not normally conscious of and which are higher than the main pitch 
– the one we actually hear. Harmonics or overtones form part of a universally-occurring pattern of acoustic 
energy known as the harmonic series or overtone series. The sounds produced by different musical 
instruments also have distinctive dynamic waveforms, i.e. different patterns of ‘attack’ and ‘decay’. 
48 For example, Levitin (2006) found that when he asked non-musicians to sing their favourite song, they 
tended to reproduce it at, or very near, the absolute pitches of the original recording (152-4).  
49 Cf. Adorno (1938/1982): ‘the hit song remains salutarily forgotten in the half-dusk of its familiarity, 
suddenly to become painfully over-clear through recollection’ (288). 
 
Chapter Two: Recorded Music in Everyday Life 
50 ‘The sun has got his hat on’ comes from the musical Me and My Girl (1937).   
51 Pet Sounds is, of course, the title of the Beach Boys’ 1966 album, and refers to the concrete sonic objects 
of North American life so beloved by the album’s principal creator, Brian Wilson.  
52 The chord progression of The Flumps’ theme tune – I | IV | I | IV | V | I – closely resembles a 
‘passamezzo moderno’ or ‘Gregory Walker’ pattern: one of the most commonly found harmonic structures 
in Western popular music since the time of the Renaissance.  
53 Cf. Benjamin (1929/1999a): ‘we penetrate […] mystery only to the degree that we recognize it in the 
everyday world, by virtue of a dialectical optic that perceives the everyday as impenetrable, the 
impenetrable as everyday’ (216).  





                                                                                                                                                 
54 Eliot (1921/2006) introduces the term ‘dissociation of sensibility’ in his essay on the metaphysical poets,  
praising Donne and Marvell for their harmony of head and heart in contrast to later poets such as Collins, 
Gray and Johnson, in whose work ‘the language became more refined, [but] the feeling became more 
crude’ (198). 
55 Hesmondhalgh (2002) notes, too, that in studies of popular music that have ‘everyday life’ as their 
ostensible focus, the everyday often remains an untheorised category, e.g. Crafts et al (1993) and DeNora 
(2000).   
56 The Queen song that uses the melody from Canio’s aria in its intro is ‘It’s a hard life’.    
57 The rendition was in effect a double tribute to Sondheim as he had also written the lyrics for ‘America’ 
but he appears to have been singularly unimpressed by the unauthorised use of ‘Send in the clowns’ – U2 
allegedly had to pay him $50,000 and they agreed to edit the snippet out of some of the later pressings of 
the album. 
58 The version of ‘Paid in full’ featuring the Ofra Haza sample was a re-mix by Coldcut. The original 
version of ‘Im nin’alu’ was taken from Ofra Haza’s 1984 album, Yemenite Songs.  
59 Triste et isolé also recalls how the young Marcel felt at bedtime at the beginning of À la recherche when 
he would have to leave the adults and ascend the steps to his bedroom at Combray, his ‘sadness’ and 
‘isolation’ relieved only when his mother would enter to kiss him goodnight (Goodkin 1991). 
60 ‘Just one Cornetto’ was sung by Renato Pagliari, one half of the male/female vocal duo, Renée and 
Renato, who had a number one single in the UK with ‘Save your love’ in 1982 before disappearing into 
obscurity.    
61 The irony of these ads is that Cornetto ice creams are not in any sense Italian. They are produced by 
Unilever as part of their Heartbrand ice-cream business. In the UK, they trade under the brand name 
Wall’s.     
62 Viewers of British television in the 1970s will remember an advert with a similar cadence on the 
product’s name: ‘For mash, get Smash’. 
63 Studies of amnesic patients suggest that implicit and explicit memory operate via distinct processes in the 
brain (Snyder 2000: 73). 
64 For a description from another industry insider of computer games as ‘the new radio’, see Ito (2005), p. 
36. 
 
Interlude I: Music, Semiotics, Affect  
65 It should be mentioned that Clough’s work doesn’t simply disregard philosophies of language, as 
evidenced by her attention in Autoaffection (2000) to the work of Jacques Derrida. Other recent work on 
affect includes the following: Ahmed (2004), Brennan (2004), Grosz (1994), Kosofsky Sedgwick (2003), 
and Massumi (2002). 
66 Similarly, David Howes (2005) proposes to unseat the ‘empire of signs’ by fostering an ‘empire of the 
senses’ (1).  
67 In spite of there being broadly identifiable paradigms within cultural studies’ admittedly brief history, 
Hall (1997) is quick to point out that there is never ‘one regulative notion of culture’ (25). 
68 See Gilbert (2007) for more on the idea that cultural studies is still in the grip of a linguistically-
orientated model of culture.  
69 A particularly sophisticated formulation of this position appears in the work of Peter Osborne. Osborne 
argues that Kant’s notion of aesthetic judgement already implies the intertwining of signification and affect, 
but has been overlooked by cultural theory. For Kant, aesthetic judgement is ‘reflective’, in the sense that it 
involves reflecting, not just on an artwork, but on one’s own responses and impressions (Osborne 2000: 
30). 
70 Gilbert’s formulation here is informed by the meshing in Foucault’s later work of discursive and 
disciplinary practices.   
71 See also Gilbert (2010). 
72 See, for example, Lévi-Strauss (1969) on the dialectic in music between nature and culture, physiology 
and signification (16-17).    
73 I follow the usual method of referencing Peirce’s Collected Papers, whereby the first number refers to 
the chapter and the second number to the paragraph. 
74 One of the pioneers of psychology, William James, was a friend of C.S. Peirce and a champion of his 
work. 





                                                                                                                                                 
75 Cf. the similar formulation of the Soviet linguist, V.N. Voloshinov: ‘consciousness itself can arise and 
become viable only in the material embodiment of signs’ (Voloshinov 1929/1986: 13; emphasis in original).  
76 The study of symptoms as signs of illness was the original meaning in English of ‘semeiotics [sic]’ as 
defined by Henry Stubbes in a treatise published in 1670.  
77 The ‘interpretant’ is not to be understood as the ‘interpreter’ though this confusion does occasionally 
arise in Peirce’s work (Eco 1976: 68). 
78 Osborne identifies a link between Derrida and Peirce in this regard. Both suggest that a sign can only be 
understood via recourse to other signs in a process of (potentially) infinite deferral – what Derrida calls the 
‘deconstruction of the transcendental signified’. For Peirce, however, the meaning of a sign will at some 
point issue in an action – which is itself a sign with its own effects – necessarily curtailing the process of 
intellectual semiosis, though not the processes of affective and energetic semiosis. In other words, our 
actions in the world have the effect of defining the logical meanings of the signs we use, so that meaning is 
not, as Derrideans insist, endlessly deferred (Osborne 2000: 42-3). 
79 There are certain similarities between the Peircean ‘sign’ and the Bergsonian ‘image’, the latter being  
neither a ‘thing’ nor a ‘representation’ but poised between the two (Bergson 1908/1988: 9). It should also 
be mentioned that Deleuze attempts to use Peirce’s work, declaring that Peirce is ‘the true inventor’ of 
semiotics. In Osborne’s view, however, Deleuze ‘misreads Peirce through the Saussurean model he himself 
rejects’. In particular, ‘Deleuze neglects the theory of interpretants’, thus collapsing the triadic relations of 
the Peircean sign into the dyadic relation of signifier-signified. Such a reading of Peirce sacrifices ‘the 
semiotic specificity of the subject of habitual action’, i.e. a person for whom signs have meanings and uses 
(Osborne 2000: 47-9). 
80 Massumi’s notion of the ‘virtual body’ is based on a famous set of experiments in which participants 
were asked to register the precise moment when they made the decision to move one of their fingers. The 
finger movement came 0.2 seconds after the decision to move, but electrical impulses in the brain 
corresponding to the decision to move were found to have occurred another 0.3 seconds before that. The 
implication is that there is ‘a half-second lapse between the beginning of a bodily event and its completion 
in an outwardly directed active, expression’, i.e. a lapse between the onset of electrical activity in the 
central nervous system and our actual experience of it (Massumi 1996: 222-3). Electrical impulses lasting 
less than half a second appear to have no actual or perceivable results: they occur with some regularity but 
have no outward manifestations, being ‘potential’ or ‘virtual’ activity. 
81 Cf. ‘An Index is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that 
Object’ (Peirce 1955: 102). 
82 See, for example, Gilbert (2007), Osborne (2000), Shepherd and Wicke (1997), and Turino (1999).  
83 Cf.: ‘Language, according to Benveniste, is the only semiotic system capable of interpreting another 
semiotic system […]. How, then, does language manage when it has to interpret music? Alas, it seems, 
very badly’ (Barthes 1977: 179; emphasis in original). Also, ‘art – certainly music, and probably all art – is 
formally and essentially untranslatable’ (Langer 1957: 234). 
84 Tagg (1982) uses a process of ‘hypothetical substitution’ in order to locate units of musical signification 
across the various musical parameters. In effect, he imagines what a piece of music would sound like if, for 
example, a single note had a different pitch value, or if the tempo was different, or if a rhythmic inflection 
was placed slightly differently, or if a different instrument was used, etc. By doing so, he is able to 
demonstrate the significatory effects of often very minute features within a single piece of music.     
85 The unamenability of music to semiological analysis is also evident in the attempts of those working 
within the Saussurean paradigm to account for the specificity of musical meaning and affect. For instance, 
Kristeva – and following her lead, Barthes – introduce dual forms of signification to account for the way in 
which semiotic systems such as music function differently from those constituted by signs with an arbitrary 
relation to their referents. Kristeva (1986) makes a distinction between what she terms ‘the symbolic’ and 
‘the semiotic’, the dialectic between them being constitutive of the type of discourse, or the type of semiotic 
system, in question, so that a scientific paper would signify mainly via ‘symbolic’ communication; a poem, 
via the ‘symbolic’ and the ‘semiotic’ in equal measure; and music, almost exclusively via the ‘semiotic’. 
Barthes (1977) uses the equivalent terms, ‘signification’ and ‘signifiance’, borrowed from elsewhere in 
Kristeva’s work. 
86 The numerous cover versions of ‘Hallelujah’ include those by John Cale (1991) and Jeff Buckley (1994). 
87 Cf. Said (1991): ‘the best interpreters of poetry and music allow both their audience and themselves (self-
conviction being not the least of the interpreter’s virtues) the proposition that the work being presented is as 





                                                                                                                                                 
if created by the performer’ (89; emphasis in original). Another example of a song that enacts the process of 
its own composition is the Alice Cooper song, ‘School’s out’ (1972), in which Alice sings: ‘Well, we got 
no class / And we got no principles [‘principals’?] / And we got no innocence / We can’t even think of a 
word that rhymes’.   
88 For more on the resemblance between music and emotional speech, see Interlude II of the current work.   
89 Bono did this during a performance of ‘One’ at the Brit Awards ceremony in 2002 when he added a verse 
from Craig David’s ‘Walking away’ in wry acknowledgement that David’s song had virtually replicated 
the chord progression played on guitar that opens the U2 number. Craig David returned what was an 
ambiguous compliment by including in his subsequent live performances a segue from ‘Walking away’ 
into U2’s ‘One’.  
90 Eco tends to overstate his case in claiming that icons and indices are solely a matter of convention and 
are thus similar to Saussure’s arbitrary signifier. This is to downplay Peirce’s account of the icon as a sign 
that, very often, is immediately recognisable, regardless of learned habit. See Osborne (2000: 24-9) for a 
critique of Eco’s extrapolations from Peirce’s writings on the icon.   
91 There are biological explanations for why we might be predisposed to associate ‘high’ pitches with 
physical height. Experiments suggest that when pitches of different frequencies are heard, they tend to 
resonate in different parts of the body – the chest, head, abdomen, etc. – in ways that correspond roughly to 
the relative ‘height’ of the frequencies. This phenomenon appears to be independent of formal musical 
training (Nattiez 1990: 121). The reason why other musical cultures sometimes think of pitches the other 
way round – ‘high’ pitches as ‘low’ and vice versa – would appear to stem from a correspondence found in 
instruments such as harps, pipe organs and pan pipes, the strings or pipes of which are arranged vertically. 
The notes produced by the strings or pipes that are literally higher in physical space are taken to be so at a 
metaphorical level too. This is true also of a choir composed of men, women and children; the tallest or 
‘highest’ members of the group, i.e. the men, are thought to sing the ‘highest’ notes, while the children, as 
the shortest or ‘lowest’ members, are described as singing the ‘low’ notes.   
92 Plato and Aristotle disagree on the precise character or ēthos of the modes. In the Republic, Plato 
banishes all the modes for their deleterious effects, apart from the Dorian and the Phrygian. In his Politics 
meanwhile, Aristotle concurs with Plato in granting the Dorian a special ethical status, but thinks that every 
mode has an appropriate occasion for its use. See Plato (1987) and Aristotle (1996).    
93 For more on music and mimesis, see Interlude II in the current work. 
 
Chapter Three: Involuntary Musical Memories 
94 The volumes that comprise À la recherche du temps perdu were first published 1913-1927.  
95 In passing, the narrator mentions that whenever he sees a horizontal ray of sunlight passing through a 
window, it reminds him of the bedroom of one of his family’s servants, Eulalie. As a child, he slept there 
for a week while Eulalie nursed his aunt Léonie through a fever.    
96 Contrary to what Benjamin suggests here, Proust seems no more disposed to historicising his conception 
of memory than does Bergson his. Proust actually argues against what will become a distinctively 
Benjaminian thesis: that the sensory overload of urban existence in the twentieth century militates against 
contemplation. ‘Some people were […] saying that the art of an age of haste would be brief […]. The 
railway, according to this mode of thinking, was destined to kill contemplation and there was no sense in 
regretting the age of […] diligence. But in fact the car has taken over its function and once more deposits 
tourists outside forgotten churches’ (Proust 19271970: 246).   
97 This conception of memory accords with that of Benjamin’s contemporary, Maurice Halbwachs (1992).  
98 Simpson doesn’t mention the name of the song. 
99 One of the intended functions of the music supplied by the Muzak Corporation was to promote 
productivity in the workplace by the countering of fatigue (Lanza 1994).   
100 For a description of the unconscious chaining of signs in response to a piece of music, see Meyer 
(1956), p. 256. 
101 ‘Brown girl in the ring’ is another example of a ‘stray refrain’: a song that has criss-crossed the world, 
taking on a life of its own and becoming a cherished part of many different cultural traditions. 
102 Cf. Meyer (1956): ‘an unstable memory trace will first tend toward stability; and, if this is impossible, it 
will tend to disintegrate […]. This means that we tend to remember themes as being simpler that they really 
are and that we remember forms as “ideal types” rather than as particular things’ (89).   





                                                                                                                                                 
103 ‘The auditory system of the fetus is fully functional about twenty weeks after conception’ (Levitin 2006: 
223). 
104 Cf. Stiegler (1998): ‘the being that we ourselves are is much less placed in a situation of mastery over 
nature by technics than it is subjected, as an entity belonging to the realm of nature, to the imperatives of 
technics’ (10). 
105 Cf. Levitin (2006): ‘The appreciation we have for music is intimately related to our ability to learn the 
underlying structure of the music we like – the equivalent to grammar in spoken or signed languages – and 
to be able to make predictions about what will come next. Composers imbue music with emotion by 
knowing what our expectations are and then very deliberately controlling when those expectations will be 
met, and when they won’t […]. The setting up and then manipulating of expectations is the heart of music’ 
(111-2). 
106 In a short piece entitled ‘A note upon the “mystic writing-pad” ’ (1925), Freud formulates the 
relationship between memory and perception in similar terms. He draws an extended analogy between 
memory storage in humans and a device known to him as a Wunderblock: a simpler version of an Etch A 
Sketch pad. The layer of celluloid on top of the pad is analogous to immediate awareness in that ‘no 
permanent traces’ are formed on it. Its function is that of a ‘protective shield against stimuli’. Impressions 
are formed instead on the wax tablet below, which corresponds to ‘the system Pcpt.-Cs. [perception-
consciousness]’. Freud’s hypothesis is that ‘the perceptual apparatus of our mind consists of two layers: an 
external protective shield against stimuli whose task it is to diminish the strength of excitations coming in, 
and a surface behind it which receives the stimuli’ (Freud 1925/1961: 230). 
107 Freud’s view here concurs with the idea formulated in interlude I that a sign or stimulus is a catalyst for 
a chain of further significations and affects, some of which may be inaccessible to consciousness, though 
their existence can be inferred from the effects they give rise to.  
108 Aptly enough, Gershwin once declared ‘I frequently hear music in the very heart of noise’. For example, 
the musical ideas which formed the germ of Rhapsody in Blue were inspired by a noisy train journey from 
New York to Boston: ‘the train, with its steely rhythms, its rattle-ty-bang [,…] is so often stimulating to a 
composer’ (quoted in Schafer 2001: 63). 
 
Chapter Four: Recorded Music & Nostalgia 
109 Although the earliest surviving complete version of the myth of Pan and Syrinx is to be found in Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses, written at the end of the first century BC, the story of the nymph’s transformation was 
probably created in Alexandria at least two centuries earlier (Landels 1999: 159-160). As for the pan pipes, 
the invention of which is related in the tale, they seem to have originated in Eastern Asia as long ago as the 
third millenium B.C. (Bloch 1959/1986: 1059). 
110 I follow the usual method for referencing Ovid’s Metamorphoses, whereby the first number refers to the 
book and the second number to the line.  
111 Boym (2001) cautions against smiling condescendingly at our ancestors’ view of nostalgia as a medical 
condition, suggesting that future generations might be equally amused by our attempts to treat depression 
with Prozac, seeing depression instead ‘as a metaphor for a global atmospheric condition’ (7). 
112 Cf. Jameson (1991). 
113 In Anthony Burgess’s novel, Alex’s ‘therapy’ leaves him with an aversion to all classical music, not just 
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony (Burgess 1962).  
114 See, for example, the leading article from The Guardian for 1 June 1987. Amusingly, Paul McCartney 
did his best to keep a low profile in 2006, the year another of his lyrics from Sergeant Pepper came to 
journalistic fruition: ‘When I’m 64’.   
115 The Wunderblock is similar in certain respects to what was patented in the US and elsewhere as an Etch 
A Sketch. 
116 Freud’s comment here anticipates just such a ‘mystic writing-pad’, otherwise known as a personal 
computer. 
117 Cf. Derrida’s description of memory as ‘a prosthesis of the inside’ (Derrida 1996: 19; original emphasis 
removed). 
118 When, for example, in the incipient stages of what was being touted in the music press as a ‘mod 
revival’, an angry Paul Weller of The Jam wore a sign round his neck reading ‘How can I be a “revivalist” 
when I’m only 18?’, he was missing the point somewhat: it was precisely because he was 18 that he was a 
revivalist. 





                                                                                                                                                 
119 This was apparently the reaction among those who attended the first Broadway production of Grease in 
1972. 
120 Middleton (1990) refers to this as the myth of ‘cultural fall’: the oft-noted tendency for people to believe 
that there has been an impoverishment or ‘dumbing-down’ of culture within their own lifetime. 
121 Cf. Hamilton (1977): ‘life may be getting worse, but the old records, at least, stay the same’ (69). 
122 Strictly speaking, the ‘reminiscence effect’ refers to the clustering of autobiographical memories at 
around age twenty in people over the age of sixty (Draaisma 2004: 194). 
 
Interlude II: Music &Mimesis  
123 The concept of mimesis has been applied much more extensively in philosophy, anthropology, 
ethnomusicology, and theatre studies. See, for example, Levin and Suzukei (2006), Mora (2005), Scruton 
(1997), Spitzer (2004), and Woodruff (2008).   
124 Cf. Engh (1999) on ‘the notorious ungraspability of this concept [i.e. mimesis] in Adorno’s thought’ 
(161). 
125 Philodemus is an important exception. See Halliwell (2002). 
4 Although, ‘representation’, ‘imitation’ and ‘expression’ now seem to us words with quite distinct senses, 
their meanings were conjoined in early usages of mimēsis, most notably in the work of Plato and Aristotle. 
See Halliwell (1999), p. 314; Scruton (1997), p. 119. 
5 For an example of Koller’s misleading influence on aesthetic historians, see Tatarkiewicz (1980).  
6 See Else (1958) and Sörbom (1966). 
7 There is little biographical evidence to support such a view. The metrical irregularity of the pulse that 
begins the symphony is also sometimes taken as being mimetic of Mahler’s heart murmur. Similarly, the 
slow movement that ends Tchaikovsky’s Sixth Symphony, the Pathétique, contains a fading ‘heartbeat’ 
that is thought to be explicitly about death.     
8 Professor Nigel Osborne has used these principles to help children traumatised by war. Such children 
typically have raised heart rates and their breathing patterns can also be disrupted. Music is able to bring 
these autonomic rhythms closer in line with what one would expect in a person who hadn’t been exposed to 
such ordeals (Service 2008).   
131 Music is also mimetic more generally of emotion though the mimetic or iconic connection between them 
is culturally coded and thus owes much to convention. (See Interlude I.) A further type of mimetic 
connection is proposed in Adorno’s writings on Beethoven. Adorno (1998) claims that Beethoven’s work is 
imitative of thought processes, especially the dialectical unfolding of a concept, but that it refuses to make 
its ‘concepts’ literal or explicit. ‘Music’, he claims, ‘is the logic of the judgement-less synthesis’ (11; 
original emphasis removed).   
132 Schoenberg himself used the term Sprechstimme but Sprechgesang is the term that has stuck in order to 
describe such a style.  
133 Pierrot Lunaire is an example of ‘acousmatic’ music: the instrumentalists were hidden from view at the 
work’s premiere, functioning as a ‘ghostly commentary’ on soprano Albertine Zehme’s Sprechgesang 
(Staines and Clark 2005: 470). 
134 The closest thing to Ligeti’s setting of a nonsense text in popular music is probably to be found in the 
ethereal melismatic swoops of Elizabeth Fraser, lead singer with The Cocteau Twins in the 1980s and 90s. 
135 Others have taken the opposite view – that the language adaptation preceded music. Among them are 
Herbert Spencer, the man who went on to coin the regrettable phrase ‘survival of the fittest’ to describe 
Darwinian theory; Claude Lévi-Strauss (1971/1981); and, more recently, the cognitive scientist, Steven 
Pinker (1997).  
136 Among those who have claimed that music preceded speech, Storr (1992) cites the Enlightenment 
philosopher and composer, Jean-Jacques Rousseau; psychoanalytic aesthetician, Anton Ehrenzweig; and 
ethnomusicologist, John Blacking (12, 15-16). To this list he adds the eighteenth-century Italian 
philosopher, Giambattista Vico, and Martin Heidegger, both of whom averred that poetry came before 
everyday language (12-13).   
137 Mimetic skill was also important in the imitation of another’s manual skills, for example, in order to use 
tools. Donald cites the fact that, in the transmission of handicraft skills, getting a novice simply to copy 
one’s own dexterous movements is still more effective today than giving a spoken explanation. 





                                                                                                                                                 
138 Marx’s notion of alienation can be understood in mimetic terms as the inability of the industrial worker 
to view the product of their labour as being imitative of, or a ‘copy’ of, their own self, inasmuch as this 
product no longer bears the authentic stamp of the worker’s personality.   
139 Cf. Baily (1977): ‘Music can be viewed as a product of body movement transduced into sound’ (330); 
and Stravinsky (1936): ‘The sight of the gestures and movements of the various parts of the body producing 
the music is fundamentally necessary if it is to be grasped in all its fullness’ (122).   
140 Notated music will also involve more steps in the process of transduction but, again, each of these steps 
can be understood as mimetic of the one that preceded it. 
141 One of the most penetrating insights into the mimetic basis of human emotion is to be found in the work 
of the great French essayist Montaigne. Scrutinising himself with typical frankness, Montaigne recognises 
his ‘aping and imitative character’: ‘whatever I contemplate, I adopt – a foolish expression, a disagreeable 
grimace, a ridiculous way of speaking […]. I often usurp the sensation of another person’ (quoted in 
Frampton 2011: 20). 
142 Cf. Frith (2003): ‘The pleasure that pop music produces is a pleasure of identification – with the music 
we like, with the performers of that music, with the other people who like it’ (38).  
 
Chapter Five: Recorded Music, Mimicry, & Self-Oblivion 
143 O’Neal’s rendition of ‘All by myself’ is virtually identical to Céline Dion’s 1996 version, especially in 
its use of a belted high note that is held for several seconds.  
144 The chord progression in the verse of ‘All by myself’ is based on the adagio that forms the second 
movement of Rachmaninov’s Piano Concerto No. 2. 
145 For an ethnographic study of how Guitar Hero has helped open gaming up to a female demographic, see 
Juul (2010), pp. 145-152.   
146 Mechanical reproduction also helped to mitigate the alleged ‘feminising’ influence of music, especially 
classical music, by creating opportunities for workman-like tinkering and shop-talk, although it should be 
added that much of the advertising for machines such as the Victrola was targeted specifically at women in 
what was assumed to be their continuing role as homemakers (Katz 2004: 59). 
147 For a challenge to the view that contemporary popular music can be Dionysian, see Adorno 
(1932/1982).  
148 The Dionysian/Apollonian duality is based on Schopenhauer’s distinction between ‘will’ and 
‘representation’, which was itself based on Kant’s distinction between the ‘noumenon’ and the 
‘phenomenon’ (Schopenhauer 1818/1996; Kant 1781/1998). 
149 Peirce (1998) gives the example of the ‘redness’ of something that is red (268).  
150 See Gouk (2007) for a summary of the history of musical healing in Western Europe. 
 
Chapter Six: Everyday Reveries  
151 I would argue that Crary (1999) underestimates the extent to which the Frankfurt School conceived of 
distraction and attention as being part of the same problematic in late modernity, and that they were not 
seen by them simply as ‘polar opposites’ (50). Adorno’s notion of ‘quotation listening’, for example, 
emphasises that listeners’ reception of a symphony on the radio typically oscillates between inattention to 
the work’s large-scale formal characteristics and very focused attention to melodies occurring within it that 
are already familiar from other contexts (Adorno 1941/2002).     
152 4′ 33″ was partly inspired by Robert Rauschenberg’s White Paintings (1951) though the idea for the 
piece had occurred to Cage prior to his encounter with Rauschenberg’s monochrome canvasses. In a 1948 
lecture entitled ‘A composer’s confessions’, Cage mentions his desire ‘to compose a piece of uninterrupted 
silence and sell it to the Muzak Co. It will be 4½ minutes long – these being the standard lengths of 
“canned” music, and its title will be “Silent prayer”. It will open with a single idea which I will attempt to 
make as seductive as the color and shape or fragrance of a flower. The ending will approach imperceptibly’ 
(quoted in Pritchett 1993: 59).  
153 The exact instructions for 4′ 33″ are disputed. The first score was never published and is now either lost 
or the current existence is presently unknown (Fetterman 1996: 72). See also Pritchett (1993) and Gann 
(2010).    
154 There is a connection in this regard with Bachelard’s work as a historian and psychologist of scientific 
breakthroughs. For instance, his concept of the ‘epistemological obstacle’ – a mental pattern that prevents 
scientists from going beyond what they already know – contains the suggestion that scientists too should 





                                                                                                                                                 
‘listen’ to the ‘murmurs’ of their subconscious in order to reach conclusions that might contradict 
established models (Bachelard 1938/2002). 
155 Benjamin (1929/1999a) chose the term ‘profane illumination’ in recognition that Surrealists like Aragon 
and Breton, as well as their forebears such as Lautréamont and Rimbaud, were lapsed Catholics who were 
seeking a ‘creative overcoming of religious illumination’ (209). Something similar is to be found in the 
work of James Joyce. In A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916), for example, Stephen experiences 
a revelatory moment at the sight of a girl on the beach, hastening the onset of his atheism while confirming 
his vocation as a writer. Joyce’s masterpiece Ulysses (1922) reads as a catalogue of such secular epiphanies 
in which the textures of everyday life have a radiant, numinous quality to them. 
156 Deleuze and Guattari’s more recent notion of ‘virtuality’ is similar to Bloch’s ‘Not-Yet-Conscious’ but 
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